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FOREWORD
Scientific and engineering organizations within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Department of Defense, and throughout the aerospace industry are greatly concerned about the impact of
system failures related to parts, materials, and processes. Establishment of the NASA ALERT reporting program
in 1964, expanded in 1968 to include participants of the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
(GIDEP), provided the means for sharing and benefiting from each other's experience with these types of
failures. Extensive data accumulated from ALERT reports have proved a valuable method of communicating
problems and providing assistance in avoiding or minimizing recurrences.
In order that this accumulated experience be made readily available, this publication, Parts, Materials, and
Processes Experience Summary, condenses and catalogs ALERT and other information on basic design,
reliability, quality and application problems. Designers, engineers, failure analysts and other reliability and
quality personnel will fred the answers to many application and problem-avoidance questions.
This publication was developed under contract NAS2-6060 by 'the Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc.,
Sunnyvale, Calif., under the leadership of W.L. Finch, W. Geiler, and S. Ognibene. The contract was
administered under the technical direction of NASA's Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif., with G.E.
DeYoung as technical monitor. This effort and the significant assistance provided by the members of the NASA
Parts Steering Committee are gratefully acknowledged.
ThB hsue of the Summary is a revision of CR-114391, Feb. 24, 1972. It includes, new, expanded, and revised
material reflecting additional NASA experience and responses to the questionnaire sent to Government and
industry personnel.
It is expected that this summary will be revised periodically to disseminate new and expanded information on
existing topics and possibly new topics. Any suggestions or recommendations that will enhance its usefulness
will be most welcome and should be referred to the Office of Safety and Reliability and Quality Assurance,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 20546.
GEORGE C. WHITE
Director, Safety and Reliability
and Quality Assurance
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OBJECTIVE
The objective of this Parrs, Materials, and Processes Experience Summary is to provide the general engineering
community with the accumulated experience from ALERT reports issued by NASA and the Government°
Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), and related experience gained by Government and industry° It
provides expanded information on selected topics by relating the problem area (failure) to the cause, the
investigation and findings, the suggestions for avoidance (inspections, screening tests, proper part applications,
requirements for manufacturer's plant facilities, etc.), and failure analysis procedures.
ALERTPROGRAM
The ALERT program is a system for communicating common problems with parts, materials, and processes.
The ALERT program has as its basic objective the avoidance, or at least the minimization, of the recurrence of
pans, materials, and processes problems, thus improving the reliability of equipment produced for and used by
the Government. An ALERT report is prepared when an item is believed to be in common usage and the
problem may affect other users; copies are distributed to all participants in the ALERT program.
Information on the ALERT program may be obtained from the Office of Safety and Reliability and Quality
Assurance, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 20546 (phone 202-755-2284); or from" the GIDEP
Administration Office, Fleet Missile Systems Analysis and Evaluation Annex, Code 862, Naval Weapons Station,
Seal Beach, Corona, CaLif. 91720 (phone 714-736-4677; Autovon: 933-4677).
ORGANIZATIONOF SUMMARY
This two-volume publication is divided into 18 sections, one of which is a miscellaneous category. The other
sections represent 17 major topics derived from the GIDEP major classification code. The GIDEP code number
is shown on each section divider to assist in obtaining related data from test and qualification reports on parts
and materials, scientific reports, technical information, manufacturing techniques, and specifications contained
in the GIDEP fde. Each section presents fundamental concepts followed by problems that have been
experienced and suggestions for their avoidance; guidelines for producing good parts and materials; and
procedures for determining why a failure occurred. Introductory remarks and a table of contents precede each
. section.
o
o
The 17 major topics (attaching methods, capacitors, transistors, etc.) were selected because they represent 82
percent of the ALERT reports issued by NASA and GIDEP through Aug. 31, 1972. The remaining reports are
included through the medium of ALERT summaries in the miscellaneous section of Volume I.
ALERTITEMNO.
Where appropriate within a section, each ALERT report has been assigned an "ALERT ITEM NO." in order to
provide a cross reference between an ALERT referenced in the Problem/Screening Summary subsection and the
same ALERT shown in the ALERT Summaries subsection.
, Precedingpageblank;
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CODEFORPROBLEMAREASANDCAUSES
Some sections employ a coding system to identify the major problem areas and their causes. The code is entered
in the Problem/Screening Summary subsections, on the assembly flow diagrams, and on the failure analysis flow
diagrams. A separate foldout (Problem Codes and Definitions) defines the code used in a particular section of
the publication. All foldouts are l()cated in the appendix. The coding system ties together the problem
area/cause, the preventive action, the critical process during assembly, and the failure analysis step. For instance
within Section 3 (Capacitors), ALERT Item No. 7 in the Problem/Screening Summary subsection indicates a
"Short" as the problem area, with the cause being "Breakdown of dielectric." Also shown are the suggested
screens that should detect the problem area/cause. The foldout for Section 3 (Capacitors) establishes the
problem code of the area/cause as "lID." This code in the Ceramic Capacitor-Typical Assembly Flow with
Rehted Problem Codes diagram (fig. 3-2) indicates that "thin spots and contamination" during the "slip cast
dry and roll green stock" operation can eventually cause a short because of dielectric breakdown. In a similar
manner, the Ceramic Capacitor-Failure Analysis Flow with Related Problem Codes diagram (fig. 3-3) shows
that the problem area/cause can be detected at the "radiographic inspection," or at the "delSotting and
examination" or the "dissection and examination" stages of the failure analysis procedure. The two diagrams
can also be used in other ways. Possible problem areas/causes are depicted for any stage in the assembly
operation, thus facilitating the creation of a process control check-off list. If the problem area is known,
possible causes are shown for any stage in the failure analysis procedure. : '
REFERENCES
The title and responsible agency for a military standard or specification, or for a NASA special publication or
handbook, are given in the _t of references located at the back of the publication.
KEYWORDINDEX
Keyword indexing is provided in order to facilitate eas_" _earch and reference; e.g., an ALERT report for a
particular relay may contain the words: "relay," "contamination," and "solder." Looking up those words in the
index will lead to that particular relay problem; the words "contamination" or "solder" will also lead to other
ALERT reports on other types of parts.
o
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INTRODUCTION
_e. The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with attaching methods and
to provide approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
Problem Definition. The problems are defined first by specific examples cited in ALERT reports, and then by using the
broader data base of information available from other industry and government investigations. This section is limited to
discussion on soldering and crimping.
Problem Prevention. Problem prevention is dealt with by providing relevant information with respect to tooling, operational
techniques, design limits, and test/inspection criteria as applicable.
ATTACHING METHODS
Categories. Methods used for attaching hardware together may be grouped in three broad categories n thermally induced.
chemical reaction, and mechanical operation.
Thermally Induced
Processes. This category includes brazing, soldering, and welding processes commonly used for both electrical and
structural connections. Both brazing and soldering require addition of an intermediate alloy, while an intermediate alloy
may or may not he used in welding. Principal distinguishing features of these three thermally induced processes are as
follows.
Solderinlt and Brazin 8. Both soldering and low temperature brazing are surface solution processes which produce an
intermetallic compound at tile interface between the filler material alloy and parent materials. Maximum temperatures
employed are below the melting point of the parent materials. As defined by the American Welding Society, "brazing"
applies to a "soldering" process if the melting point of the filler material exceeds 800°F (427°C).
There is metallurgical evidence, however, that many higher temperature brazing processes do in fact produce results
indicating that temperature, localized to the interface between the parent materials, has in fact exceeded the melting point
of the parent materials.
Welding. This is a fusion process .which requires local temperatures above the melting point of the parent material,
resulting in an intimate fusion of both parent materials. In certain welding processes additional material is added in the
area to be joined, while for other processes the parent material is used alone.
Defective Joints. Common causes of workmanship defects in thermally induced joints are inclusion of contaminants and
inadequate process control (principally time and temperature). Common design problems are inadequate provision for
thermal and mechanical stresses and materials incompatibility.
Chemical Reaction
This method is the principal reaction that is used as an attaching method for hardware parts. It normally
consists of mixing and curing of two or more compounds to form a chemical structure that molecularly attaches (bonds)
to the surface of the materials to be joined. Some so-called one part bonding systems, such as RTV elastomers, use
airborne moisture or oxygen as the second compound required for formation of the bond.
Defective Bonds. Most defective bonds are caused by entrained contaminants, including improperly prepared surfaces.
and/or inadequate process control with respect to mixing, curing, temperature, and time.
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Mechanical Operation
Processes. Mechanical operation includes the crimping, swaging, riveting, and wire.wrap procedures that deform a metal
past its elastic limit° The deformation may be compression in one plane or elongation° The required force may be
applied directly to the parent material (as in crimping and swaging), or to an added fastener as in riveting and wire-wrap.
Control of the deformation rate and extent is required to preclude fractures.
Defective Attachments. Common causes of inadequate mechanically created attachments include use of improper tooling
and/or techniques. An example of an improper technique is swaging with the wrong mandrel speed and/or pressure.
Either of these can result in radial fracture (splitting) instead of the desired plastic deformation of the metal which
produces a satisfactory swaged joint.
OVERSTRESS
Result of Overstress. Not to be ignored in any listing of failure mechanisms for attaching methods is application of '
excessive stress. This is primarily caused by inadequate design and should be detected by testing. An insidious form
of overstressin8 often overlooked is thermal stressing due to incompatibilities of coefficients of thermal expansion. This
can result in crystallization of solder connections by cold working. Cold work crystallization of solder connections can
be first detected as abnormal bulging and/or stretch lines on the surface (Luders' line).
1.,1
PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
Problem areas and causes associated with soldering and crimping are shown below. Suggested actions for minimizing the
problems are indicated as applicable. The "ALERT ITEM NO." relates each entry to the summaries of ALERT reports
which are presented in the last portion of this section.
SOLDERING
,I
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
CRACKED SOLDER CONNECTIONS Design to minimize thermal expansion
Thermal stress fatigue 1,2.3 mismatch of materials
POOR SOLDER CONNECTIONS Periodic analysis of incoming solder lots
Lack of antimony content 4
SOLDER SHELF LIFE Seal (by crimping) end of wire after use
Core deterioration 5
CRIMPING
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ iTEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
BROKEN WIRE Preclude insertion of insulation by: (I) use of
Wire insulation in terminal barrel 6 adequate wire/barrel diameter ratio, (2) shop
instruction, or (3) stop on crimping tool
BROKEN WIRE Use crimping tool certified for applicable wire
Excessive crimping pressure 7 type and size
Mislocation of crimp indent 8
DEFORMED AND/OR SEVERED WIRE Use crimping tool certified for applicable wire
Wrong crimping tool 9 type and size
POOR CRIMP CONNECTION Avoid use of crimped connections when
Inadequate tooling I0 available tools are not certified
SOLDERING
DISCUSSION
Cracked Solder Connections. The first three entries on the summary table describes solder connections cracking becau,_e
of thermal fatigue. These failures can be reduced by applying and controlling appropriate design criteria. Unfortunately.
if is difficult to distinguish between solder cracking as a result of thermal fatigue and solder cracking b_cause of poor
workmanship (cold solder connections) in an after-the-fact investigation. The principal difference is as follows.
Workmanship vs Thermal Fatigue. Solder cracks resulting from poor workmanship will appear at random locations on
sequentially manufactured articles. Thermal fatigue induced cracks will occur in a predictable repeating Ioca:ion on
sequentially manufactured articles when the articles are subjected to the same environment. Furthermore, thermal fatigue
induced cracks will propagate with storage time because of minor thermal variations. Prior to rupture and after 5mired
exposure to thermal variations° solder connections that have been stressed by the mismatch of adjacent materials thermal
expansion (thermal fatigue) will exhibit bulging and/or stretch lines on the surface (Luders' line). On the other hand,
cold solder connections (caused by poor workmanship) will display no changes in surface condition and will retain their
relatively smooth, dull, nonsatiny finish when thermally cycled - provided the adjacent materials are minimally matched
with respect to thermal expansion.
Crystal Growth. The change in surface conditions of a connection being thermally fatigued is caused by localized interior
"crystal" growth. This solder structure change results from cold working by forces generated by differen,,ial expand
sion/contraction of adjacent materials° Therefore, the bulges and/or stretch lines on the surface (Luders" line) reflect a
nondesirable anisotropic interior solder structure.
One of the more common occurring sources of thermal fatigue induced cracks in solder connections is soldering
a swaged brass terminal to both sides of a double-sided printed wiring board. The differential ex_pansion/contraction of
the brass solid (Cocf Expansion 18 X 10a' in/in/°C) and epoxy-glass board (Coef Expansion 60 X 10-" in/in/°C) is sufficient
to produce cracks in less than 100 cycles with a temperature range of 155°C. The known conditions that contribute to
this type of failure should be supplied to the designer as mandatory criteria. A partial list is included in this section
under "'Design Criteria to Minimize Solder Connection Problems" which follows.
Material Problems. The other two entries on the summary table describe failures caused by material properties of solder
and are amenable to normal quality control by design/application engineering restraints.
NOTE: See NASA SP-5002, Appendix C (ref I) for more detail on solder cracking
DESIGN CRITERIA TO MINIMIZE SOLDER CONNECTION PROBLEMS
The following list of design criteria is provided as a suggested guide for designers. The term "printed wiring board"
includes "muhilayer board '° for purposes of this criteria.
I. Do not use rigid encapsulating systems to secure and/or protect solder connected parts on printed wiring boards.
2. Use only silicone or polyurethene based conformal coatings.
3. Conformal coatings should be held to minimum thickness.
4. tf connections are required on a double-sided printed wiring board for one metallic part such as lead or terminal,
space one solder Connection 1/8 inch or more "from edge of the feed-through hole or use a redundant hole for the
terminal or lead. Fill all feed-through holes with solder. Feed-through holes should be plated.
Resilient spacers, when used, should be of minimum thickness between any solder connected part and printed
wiring board.
7.
Do not hard mount parts to printed boards with mechanical fasteners or similar devices unless leads 'are parallel
to the board and of such length as to provide for strain relief.
Do not hard mount parts to printed wiring boards by using minimum lead length inserted through feedothrough
holes and soldering it to the opposing end of plated-through hole. Always provide strain relief in the part lead.
1-6
NOle:
I.
2.
3.
4.
g. Avoid cordwood construction for solder connected assemblies unless strain relief is provided in one part lead
(axial part lead between printed wiring boards).
9. Avoid gold-plated boards. Use solder-plated or solder-coated boards. Require sample solder tests to he conducted
on each lot of boards.
10. "Use terminals only when necessary and then only use terminals designed to be used on printed wiring boards. •
A funnel type swage should be used to secure the terminal to the board.
See following sources for additional information
AHB 5332-1. "'Soldering Students Handbook"
MSFC-STD-136. "Parts Mounting Design Requirements for Soldered Printed Wiring Board Assemblies"
TM X-2290, "'Solder-Circuitry Separation Problems Associated with Plated Printed Circuit Boards"
TM X-53653. "Investigation of Solder Cracking Problems on Printed Circuit Boards"
5. TM X-53731, "'Mounting of Components to l_inted Wiring Boards"
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CRIMPING ,-
Broken Wire. The first item on the summary table under crimping, broken wire because of insertion of insulation into
terminal pin barrel, is subject to attack at both the engineering and manufacturing level The designer should be supplied
with a complete listing of applicable wire insulation outer diameter dimensions and barrel and/or ferrule inner diameter
dimensions in such a form that will facilitate selection of combinations of wire/connectors that cannot be mismated in
the above fashion. Shop personnel should be informed by appropriate written instructions and/or visual aids that insertion
of insulation into pin barrels and/or ferrules prior to crimping is forbidden.
Use of Improper Tool. The remaining four items have a common cause - use of improper tool. In one case, the
problem was compounded by engineering requirement to use materials in a manner for which required tooling was not
known.
Tool Qualification. Proper tools for crimping each wire/connection should be positively identified by qualification before
incorporation into any design, To assure the repeatability of each different wire/terminal crimping, each Iool should be
periodically submitted for qualification testing and/or calibration as required. Both engineering and manufacturing should
be supplied with a list of all approved crimping tools that includes wire/terminal combinations lhat may be crimped with
each tool. These lists should be periodically updated to include changes in tool status and/or application of crimping
tools.
Tool Identification. Intermittent misapplication of crimping tools because of shop negligence can be reduced by color
coding tools and shop orders or supplies (wire and terminals).
1-8
ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Soldering end Crimping problems are shown below. They are listed according
to Problem Area - most frequent to least frequent occurrences. The "ALERT ITEM NO." (first" column) references
each summary back to the "Problem Area/Cause and Suuested Action" table.
SOLDERING
ALERTt
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ _ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I CRACKED SOLDER
M 5FC-66-05. CONNECTION S
Add I, 2 Thermal stress
fatigue
Cracked solder
connections were
discovered on printed
wiring boards.
Severity of the
problem increased
with time and
temperature cycling.
Investigation revealed that the cracking was
caused by stress accumulation created by
incompatibilities of coefficients of expansion
between adjacently used materials. Materials
of concern included rigid potting, printed
wiring board material, feed-through eyelets.
transistor cases, component standoffs, lead
wires, etc. and synergistic effects of
configuration and mounting procedures.
C6_9_1
CRACKED SOLDER
CONNECTION S
Thermal stress
fatigue
Cracked solder
connections were
discovered on printed
wiring boards.
Cracking was attributed to repeated stresses
imposed on the solder connection by
differential thermal expansion of the assembly
during ambient or operating temperature
cycling.
°
C6.69_2
CRACKED SOLDER
CONNECTIONS
Thermal stress
fatigue
Solder connections
cracked in modules
potted in epoxy,
silicone, or urethene.
Investigation of different potting compounds
showed that the lowest incidence of cracking
of solder connections was with a potting
compound with a very low coefficient of
thermal expansion.
Whenever possible, modules should be
desigued so that potting is not required for
structural integrity. Instead, use a relatively
thin conformal coating. Avoid any
configuration that would allow a build-up, or
pocketing, of conformal coating under the
pans.
If potting must be used, select a material with
a very low coefficient of thermal expansion.
All parts should have strain relief in their
leads. Avoid soldered cordwood types of
module configurations.
4
KSC 12.._-65,
Supl I
POOR SOLDER
CONNECTIONS
Lack of antimony
content
Difficulty was
encountered in
• obtaining satisfactory
solder connections.
Sample coupons exhibited poor flow
characteristic and dull, grainy texture.
Spectrographic analysis revealed that antimony
content was ._00_ below specification
requirements.
$6-69_!
SOLDER SHELF
LIFE
Core deterioration
A silver bearing
tin-lead solder, with a
proprietary core flux,
deteriorated when
held in storage
Investigation revealed cause to be deterioration
of flux when exposed to air. A partial
solution was to unroll and discard outer layer
of solder on roll, thus exposing usable solder.
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CRIMPING
ALERT1
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NOo Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
6 BROKEN WIRE Repeated failures
ARC 10o21-66 Wire insulation in were observed on
terminal barrel size AWG 22 and 24
wire with crimp type
connectors.
Investigation revealed that insertion of
conductor insulation into pin barrel crimp area
reduced life expectancy of connection° Some
failures were observed after one flexing.
7 BROKEN WIRE Cables being made
KSC 5-22-64 Excessive crimping with connectors and
pressure hard wire (nickel-clad)
exhibited broken
wires at t,erminationso
Investigation revealed cause was due to use of
wrong crimping tool due to inadequate tool
qualification and/or maintenance.
C6-71 o01
BROKEN WIRE
Mislocation of ihe
crimp indent
Damaged and/or
broken connector
contacts •and wire
strands were observed
that were due to a
longitudinal variation
in location of the
crimp indent.
In some cases, indent fell at the end of
contact shell; in others, was placed in wire
insulation. Both conditions could result in
connection malfunction. Problem solved by
use of proper tool which included a posieioner.
C!-70-01
DEFORMED
AND/OR SEVERED
WIRE
Wrong crimping
tool
Crimping tool caused
excessive deformation
and/or severence of
conductors.
Tool qualified for polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
insulated wire used on TFE insulated wire.
TFE is less easily deformed than PVC.
Therefore° more force was exerted on the
TFE insulated conductor. This resulted in the
deformation or fracture of the conductor which
resul|ed (in some cases) in latent open circuits.
o
L9_9.04
l0 POOR CRIMP
CONNECTION
Inadequate tooling
Numerous resistive
connections were
observed between
connector pin and
wire° which were
sometimes intermittent
in nature.
Crimp connections were made using No. 26
AWG silver plated copper, solid conductor
wire. Connector manufacturer could not
supply or identify crimping tool which could
make satisfactory connections.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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INTRODUCTION "
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of nickle-cadmium and
silver-zinc batteries and to sulupest approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The battery section is presented with the following organization:
General
i. Basic failure problems associated with batteries are identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
2. Where applicable a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished parts having a potential for failure.
Subtopics - Treatment of Specific Types
I. Battery type background
2. For those in the process of selecting batteries, or attempting to eliminate part problems at the manufacturer levels,
a portion is devoted to describing general construction features. Particular emphasis is given to the design or
manufacturing deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanism.
.t. Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan. The material is arranged
so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal
that problem.
Battery Types. Batteries have been divided into subtopics according to electrochemical system. This section deals with
two systems, silver-zinc and nickel-cadmium. An attempt is made to point out common properties of batteries as well
as the peculiarities of each system.
"BATTERY FUNDAMENTALS
What a Battery Should Do. A battery is a storage device for electrical energy and is made up of one or more battery
cells usually connected in series, so it is valid to discuss the properties of a single cell. Each cell contains one or more
positive and one more negative electrodes (or plates) in parallel; therefore, its no current or open circuit voltage is
determined by the electrochemical potential of that positive and negative electrode couple. The reproducibility of the
open circuit voltage, OCV, is a function of the electrochemical system rather than peculiarities of cell design and
consequently is a useful diagnostic tool.
When a resistance is placed across the cell terminals its voltage, or potential, will drive current through the load. Cell
voltage will drop for two reasons, first, due to drop across the internal resistance, and secondly, because of internal
inefficiencies. The result is a unique voltage-current relationship for each ceil at a given temperature. Since temperature
is such a great factor in battery performance and life, batteries are usually specified for limited temperature ranges.
Ideally a battery cell only discharges when a circuit is closed across its terminals." Unfortunately, depending on the
system, there may be self-discharge or loss of stored capacity when at open circuit.
in speaking of energy storage, the battery cell stores electrons at a given potential. Electrons are equated to ampere-hours
and potential is equated to volts. The battery designer uses ampere-hours to calculate the amount of active material
which must be on the electrodes.
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There are two broad classifications of batteries, primary and secondary. Primary signifies oneoshot and secondary signifies
rechargeable use. A rechargeable battery is dependent on a charging source which, if improperly controlled, can cause
battery failure. Failure analyses of secondary batteries should consider the charge controller.
t
Practical ' "Cons,derat_ons. A battery cell is by its nature an active device in the sense that once electrolyte is added it
is irreversibly activated, which means it has the electrochemical potential to release power and the corrosion potential of
its strong caustic or acid electrolyte. The cell differs from most parts in that is has the potential for self destruction
and is a limited life item. In order to build lightweight and compact batteries without giving up performance, margins
of safety are closely designed and this imposes close control requirements on manufacturing processes and user limitation._.
Nickel-Cadmium Battery Background. Sealed Ni-Cd cells have been used extensively in applications requiring long life
and thousands of charge-discharge cycles without maintenance. These batteries are found in communication satellites as
well as home appliances. Vented Ni-Cd batteries are used in ground and aircraft applications where high performance
is desired and routine maintenance is practicable. The vented cells expel hydrogen and oxygen, consuming water which
must be periodically added° A chief attribute of this battery is its high rate capability. The Ni-Cd cell is relatively¢
stable chemically allowing long life and high reliability; ho_vever0 the high production commercial cells have neither the
same quality nor design features of aerospace cells. Stainless steel cell cases are usually used.
Silver-Zinc Battery Background. These batteries are noted for high energy density and have been used extensively in
aerospace applications. Up to 120 watt-hours per pound has been attained in large, low rate primary batteries. Ag-Zn
secondary batteries are increasing in use, but their use in that mode is limited by number of cycles, depth of discharge,
and calendar life.
The Ag°Zn system is chemically less stable than the Ni-Cd. Zinc and silver oxide have a limited solubility in potassium
hydroxide electrolyte: ghe zinc and electrolyte form hydrogen gas which i_ vented and the silver oxide yields:silver ion
which slowly oxidizes the cellulosic separation. Pinholes in tbe separator film .eventually allows a silver bridge to form
shorting the cell. This mode of failure is well known and life is predictable. Applications should be carefully evaluated
before the system designer decides on using a Ag-Zn battery. Vented plastic cell cases are usually used, although
development of sealed cells is continuing.
FAILURE MODES
Failure Categories. Part level failure problems associated with batteries may be lumped under four basic categories:
catastrophic shorts, catastrophic open circuit, deviations in e|ectrical performance, and rLechanical anomalies. A common
mechanical anomaly is leakage from a cell seal. System level failures in charge control or thermal design, while not
caused by the battery, may be falsely interpreted as a defect in the battery.
False Failed-Equipment Indicators. On a system level low voltage may be due to a short outside of the battery or
improper charging, but generally, reported battery anomalies prove to be valid.
ELIMINATING DEFECTIVES
Problem Solving Approach. The approach taken in this section will be to identify the user encountered problem areas
associated with nickel-cadmium and silver-zinc batieries, then provide suggestions for eliminating failed or failure prone
units at the finished, manufacturing, and design level.
Finished Battery Level. Suggestions are offered on the shipping, handling, and testing of batteries prior to application
for two purposes. First, to screen failed or failure prone units, and secondly, to assure the unit is not degraded by
improper treatment.
Design Level. While screening has proven highly effective, it does not compensate for design compromises and/or
deficiencies. Battery design involves compromising one feature for another, such as life versus internal resistance:
however, reliable equipment can be built if design tolerances can be based on established practice or valid test data.
Manufacturing Level. Many of the specialty type, noncommercial batteries are manufactured using considerable hand
labor. Most of the assembly operations are very repetitious while requiring great care. Consequently, low skilled people
are trained for these tasks. This imposes a high premium on close controls over materials, processes, and workmanship.
As no screening is totally effective, it is desirable to correct manufacturing anomalies through the use of adequate controls
and inspection points.
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FAILURE ANALYSIS ._
_e. A primary objective is to identify failure mechanisms and relate them to a design deficiency or error in
manufacture, handling, or system application. New designs are frequently dictated by failure rather than by innovation.
Failed Part Rarity. Failed parts are rare and offer a unique opporiunity for learning. In the case of a battery, prompt
reaction to reported anomalies' is critical since continued chemical action and heat (as in a short) may destroy the
evidence. This also prescribes complete data records, of the anomalous behavior, since frequently the hardware may not
be available or susceptible to physical examination.
Failure Verification. After recording all data of the reported anomaly and external examination of the battery, the first
requirement is to verify the failure and carefully document all attendant circumstances.
Analysis Direction. The proce_ss of analyzing a failure, performing those steps necessary on a suspect device which will
result in the identification of a specific correctable failure mechanism, requires the coordination of a series of specialized
skills by one having knowledge of failure mechanisms, device design, and manufacturing techniques; and the experience
necessary to organize this combination of skills and knowledge into a practical plan of action.
When to Analyze. Many part failures occur for which no corrective action is planned to be !aken. In many cases it
is most cost effective to simply scrap the defective part and replace it with one that performs properly. For those cases
where it is necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur, a portion of this section is devoted to
describing some of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis.
Reliability/Life. It is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the part level (screening, analysis of design
and; manufacturing, and effective, failure analysis) that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
0.
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PROBLEM/SCREENING SUMMARY
Scope. This problem summary subsection is a compilation of problem areas derived from the ALERT reports and the
wide experience acquired over years of such encounters° it does not presume to list all possible problem areas/causes
possible within Ni-Cd or Ag-Zn batteries, but is an attempt at compiling the most commonly encountered problems. To
avoid confusion these two battery types are treated independently,
ALERT Item No. Where directly applicable, the °°ALERT Item No." of the ALERT report describing a specific cause
for a failure is listed against that cause. Thereby a cross reference is provided between a specific failure cause found
in the °'Alert Summaries" and the broader failure experiencelavoidance knowledge shown in this presentation.
The problems have been categorized into the following principal areas:
h Open Circuit
2. Short Circuit
3. Operational Deviation
4. External Anomaly
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
• NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERIES
ALERT •SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspections and
Cause NO. T_sts")
OPERATIONAL DEVIATION Electrical Performance Test
Improper process control I
SHORT CIRCUIT Mechanical Characteristics and Lot Sample
Design deficiency 2 Destructive Tests
OPERATIONAL DEVIATION Mechanical Character!stics. Open Circuit Decay
Design deficiency 3 and Pin-to-Case Voltage Tests
SILVER-ZINC BATTERIES
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening inspections and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN CIRCUIT Lot Sample Destructive Test
Design deficiency or material incompatibility 4
SHORT CIRCUIT Open Circuit Voltage Decay Test
Manufacturing fault 5
OPERATIONAL DEVIATION Electrical Characteristics and Temperature
Design deficiency 6 Measurement Test
EXTERNAL ANOMALY Visual Examination
Design deficiency 7
EXTERNAL ANOMALY Visual Examination and Electrical Performance
Uncontrolled shipping environment 8
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SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
Basic Screening. The screening inspections and tests suggested for batteries included in the Problem Screening Summary
are as follows:
i. Visual Examination
o •
2. Electrical Performance
3. Mechanical Characteristics
4. Seal Integrity
5. Pin-to;Case Voltage Checks
6. Open Circuit Voltage Decay
7. Electrolyte Volume and Analysis
8. Lot Sample Destructive Tests
9. Temperature Measurement
_eo The above tests have evolved from the attempt to do everything possible to assure reliable performance.
Slight anomalies and trends of measurement are sought as indicators of worsening conditions since battery failures usually
develop over a period of time.
Additional Screening. Specific battery designs may dictate added tests or provide instrumentation for monitoring parameters
such as temperature and pressure.
I. VISUAL EXAMINATION
Visual •examination of battery cells and batteries at the manufacturer's facility is recommended for indications of
faulty workmanship and to insure strict conformance to interface requirements. Of particular concern in vented
Ag-Zn cells is adequate insulation of terminals and intercell connectors from potential electrolyte leakage. Note
that this may not be a problem in conventional ground applications.
2o ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE
in any battery there are two main criteria of electrical performance, capacity and voltage regulation° Primary
batteries present a problem in measuring capacity since a unit cannot be recharged; therefore, lot sample cells
must be used for a statistical prediction. Secondary batteries can be repeatedly charged and discharged under
varied conditions to develop confidence and allow infant mortality to occur, since cells with gross defects should
show symptoms of deficiency. Furthermore, if cells of matched capacity are desired, as in long life applications,
cells at high and low extremes may be rejected although within nominal specifications.
Voltage regulation is used to monitor cell health under open circuit and load. Open circuit is very meaningful in
Ag-Zn batteries since it is stable at both oxide levels of silver, although the transition phase is indecisive. At
either voltage "plateau" a decay in open circuit voltage is indicative of a short or curtailed capacity. For that
rea,_on and the need for a "soak-time" to saturate separators and electrodes, open circuit readings may be taken
over many hours to note any decay.
Ni-Cd cells may use voltage for charge control and certain Ni-Cd cells are equipped with auxiliary electrodes for
this function and for recombination of oxygen with cadmium or oxygen with hydrogen. The subject of auxiliary
electrodes is complex and usually peculiar to each manufacturer; therefore, we will only state that once auxiliary
electrode performance is characterized for a cell it can be a valuable control and diagnostic •tool. Open circuit
voltage measurements should always be made with a high-impedance voltmeter to avoid "loading down" a battery.
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3. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS
These measurements and checks are made to verify compliance of cells and batteries tO all physical interface
requirements such as weight, dimensions, case finish, name plate designations, and connector and wiring configu-
rations.
4. SEAL INTEGRITY
As-Zn Batteries. This cell is usually vented or equipped with a relief valve, since hydrogen and some oxygen is
liberated during the life of the cell. Seals are important to contain electrolyte and prevent shorts. A good method
for checking seals is achieved by using vacuum activation of cells. Where closed battery cases equipped with
relief valves are used the seals are commonly checked using pressure retention measurements; helium leak checks
are not merited since the battery generates gas and small leaks are not likely to be deterimental.
Ni-Cd Batteries. This cell is available in vented or sealed form. The sealed ceil, depending on size and
requirements, can come with varied seal designs. The design dictates practical limits on test methods. Chief
concern develops in long-life and frequently charged cells where low helium leakage rates are specified. Extensive
R&D has gone into high quality ceramic-to-metal terminal seals which isolate the terminal from the usual stainless
steel cell case.
Checking of cell case welds and seals is done conveniently during manufacture, but screening tests for seals are
limited since leaks may develop over extended periods. Old cells are frequently seen with potassium carbonate
formed around terminal seals; this condition may exist with no apparent effect on performance. Phenolphthalein
is frequently used as an indicator on caustic seals.
5. P_N-TO-CASE VOLTAGE CHECKS
Battery connector pin (positive and negative) to case checks for voltage are an excellent way of detecting
electrolyte or condensed water paths from the battery circuit to structure or case. The grounding of battery
cases to general equipment structure enables in-place or remote checkout.
6. OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DECAY
7.
This test is chiefly addressed to Ag-Zn batteries and is briefly discussed under 2. above. The essence of this
test is that electrochemical potentials of single species electrodes surfaces are predictable and are independent of
cell design variables. Care must be taken in establishing criteria of acceptable versus unacceptable voltages, since
decay of a voltage is more significant than absolute value. Accuracy demands that individual cell voltages be
monitored as over-all battery voltage may mask any significant effects. The 1.85 and I..W._ values for the silver
peroxide and oxide levels respectively are well remembered values to Ag-Zn users.
ELECTROLYTE VOLUME AND ANALYSIS
This paragraph is chiefly related to AB-Zn batteries where electrolyte is not added to the cell (activation)until it
is ready to be used. Electrolyte is most reliably packaged by the manufacturer and shipped with the battery.
If one or more test cells accompany the battery, it is possible by a cell performance test to find fault with either
the cell or the electrolyte.
8. LOT SAMPLE DESTRUCTIVE TESTS
9.
As a means of either acceptance testing a battery or establishing reliability data on mean-time-to-failure, there are
extra cells from each lot built for destructive test.
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT TESTS
Any deviations from expected operating or environmental temperatures are suspect and require rationalization.
ExCess heat can usually be attributed to short or improper charge control, foi a Ni-Cd battery.
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Batteries are shown below. They are listed according to type of battery.
NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERIES
ALERT+
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I OPERATIONAL
GSFC-68- II DEVIATION
Improper process
control
Cells tested
approximately 0°1
volts higher than
normal and
abnormally high
pressures resulted
during low rate
overcharge°
Gas analysis revealed the pressure rise was
caused by the accumulation of hydrogen in the
test cells. No oxygen was being generated
during the overcharge.
Causes of the problem are attributed to
improper formation of plates, poor control of
impurities in water used to wash plates, and
impurities/contamlnates in separator material.
The problem is most critical at low
temperatures.
2 SHORT CIRCUIT
OSFC-69- I._ Design deficiency
Battery pack used
with wire-wrap tool
overheats during
charging.
Failure analysis revealed the cause as
insulation abrasion, wear through, and short
circuiting. The eventual short circuiting is
caused by repeated plugging of the pack into a
charging source or by the normal vibration in
use of the pack since the pack serves as a
tool handle,
The batteries should not be charged in a
horizontal position.
o
3 OPERATIONAL
KSC-68-02. DEVIATION
MSC-68-02 Design deficiency
Several camera
capsule control units
malfunctioned during
systems test as a
result of failure to
exhibit proper voltage
levels.
Failure analysis revealed leakage of electrolyte
through thin epoxy walls of battery case.
through polyurethane foam potting around
battery° and corrosion and short circuiting of
circuit board and relay circuits. Cracks in the
potted epoxy case surrounding the cells
allowed electrolyte z, pass out to adjacent
electronic equipment.
SILVER-ZINC BATTERIES
ALERT1
ITEM NO./
OIDEP NO.
4
LaRC_9-OI
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
OPEN CIRCUIT
Design deficiency"
or material
incompatibility
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION
r
On two separate
launch attempts, a
total of three
batteries failed to
activate when
commanded.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
Failure analysis revealed that the gas generator
cartridge which forces electrolyte into the cells
had failed to operate. Disassembly of the
cartridges showed the bridge wires within the
matches were open from application of firing
current and matches were-otherwise intact.
Failure mode was identified as the inerting of
the match by the chemical reaction of
nitroglycerine of the N._ propellant and the
LMNR base of the match squib.
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SILVER-ZINC BATTERIES
ALERTt
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/
GIDEP NO. Cause
PROBLEM ,
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
5 SHORT Battery showed a
MSC 6-8-65 Manufacturing fault terminal voltage drop.
Failure analysis revealed one cell had a low
open circuit voltage. Trouble was isolated to
a plate having a shorted area. Chemical
analyses of the material in the shorted area
revealed no foreign materials. Failure was
attributed to the protruding portion of one of
the two plates, such as a burr, having
punctured the separation material.
6 OPERATIONAL Thermostat cutoff at
MSFC -68.17 DEVIATION 86"F instead of the
Design deficiency specified 105 ±IS°F.
Failure analysis revealed the thermostat was
imbedded in foam instead of next to the cells.
Also, the terminals of the battery cell selector
were mislocated too close to the case.
7 EXTERNAL
KSC 3-30-67, ANOMALY
Addendum Design deficiency
Radial cracks
(hairline) at the filler
ports were discovered
during battery
activation, first
indication was fluid
seepage.
Failure analysis confirmed cracks or crazing of
filler ports on seven batteries. Pressure leak
tests substantiated the severity of the cracks
seen under the microscope. The cracks were
attributed to internal stress build-up as a result
of the drilling and threading of the plexiglass
filler neck buttons. Crazing was accelerated
by the cementing of the filler neck buttons to
the battery cell lids.
8 EXTERNAL Inspection of
E9.A-72-O4 ANOMALY nonactivated battery
Uncontrolled showed buckled
shipping plates and deformed
environment vent valves
Investigation revealed the damage was caused
by excessive temperatures encountered inside
truck vans during shipment.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of capacitors and to suggest
approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The capacitor section is presented with the following organization:
General
I. Basic failure problems associated with capacitors are identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
2. Where applicable, a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished parts having a potential for failure,
Subtopics - Treatment of Specific Types
I. Capacitor type background.
.9
For those in the process of selecting parts and manufacturers or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of selected types and describing the
manufacturing sequence necessary to produce the part. Particular emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing
deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
Steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal that problem.
Capacitor Types. Capacitors have been divided into subtopics according to their internal construction. Ceramic, solid
tantalum, wet-slug tantalum, and glass capacitors have been discussed in depth. Other subtopics dealing with mica
capacitors, tantalum foil capacitors, etc. include only summaries of ALERT reports.
CAPACITOR FUNDAMENTALS
What a Capacitor Should Do. Capacitance is a basic electrical circuit parameterrepresenting the ability of a circuit to
store an electrical charge with respect to the applied voltage. Capacitors are devices constructed to provide known
amounts of capacitance to circuits in order to fulfill electrical design requirements° In its fundamental form, a capacitor
consists of two conductive materials (plates) separated by a nonconductor (dielectric). Its capacitance is related directly
to the product of the dielectric constant of the nonconductor and the area of the plates and inversely to the thickness
of the dielectric material separating the plates. The dielectric constant of a material is determined empirically by relating
to that value associated with vacuum .(i.e., I).
Practical Considerations. Analysis indicates that, because of physical imperfections in materials and laws that govern
their properties, a capacitor cannot simply be defined by its capacitance value. Physical considerations force us to
recognize such compromising characteristics built into a capacitor as dielectric breakdown voltage, dc leakage (insulation
resistance), dissipation factor (equivalent series resistance), temperature coefficient of capacitance, induced voltage effects.
and frequency effects. It is only by recognizing and controlling all of these factors that stable, reliable capacitors can
be developed and manufactured. The latter two of these characteristics, voltage and frequency effects, are established
by the nature of the dielectric and the other materials used in the construction of the device, and are dealt with as
application limitations. The remaining factors are the ones usually associated with capacitor failure.
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FAILURE MODES
Failure Categories. Part level failure problems associated with capacitors may be lumped under four basic categories:
catastrophic opens, catastrophic shorts° electrical parameter deviation, and external mechanical anomalies. It must be
recognized that catastrophic opens and shorts are worst-case conditions of certain electrical parameter deviations.
False Failed-Equipment Indicators. At the equipment level low capacitance can appear to be an open, and high dc
leakage (low insulation resistance) may appear to be a short° A failure mechanism producing an apparent open or short
(e.g.o a parameter deviation), in its extreme condition, becomes an open or a short. Failure analysis must be made at
the part level in order to distinguish between these conditions and proceed to a corrective action.
ELIMINATING DEFECTIVES
Problem $oivinli Approach. The approach taken in this section will be to identify the user-encountered problem areas
associated with a particular type of capacitor, then provide suggestions for eliminating those capacitors prone to exhibiting
these problems at the finished capacitor level, the design level, and at the manufacturing level.
Finished Capacitor Level. Recognizing that the typical consumer is faced with using finished devices that are on-hand.
information is provided for screening -- sorting the bad ones from the good. Suggestions are made for subjecting the
capacitors to environmental stresses (capable of identifying defective units° but well within the safe operating margins for
properly made units). This reliability technique has found use not only for sorting, but for providing assurance that the
manufacturer has controlled his processes.
Design Level° While screening has proven to be an effective reliability tool, it does not correct the fundamental problems
of design compromises and worse yet -- design deficiencies. Certain design compromises are inevitable, however° reliable
equipment can be built if these compromises are recognized, and proper precautions are taken in the equipment design
to minimize the effects of these compromises. Design deficiencies must be identified and eliminated at the manufacturer's
facility.
Manufacturing Level. The most carefully conceived design can be brought to nought if it is manufactured in an
environment lacking necessary controls over critical materials and processes, and allowing substandard workmanship.
Again, defectives produced as a result of these conditions can be removed using a screening, but since no screen is 100
percent effective, a more desirable technique for removing these potential reliability degraders is to take action to correct
these manufacturing conditions by applying controls and providing inspection points.
FAILURE ANALYSIS
_e. A primary objective of failure analysis is to identify failure mechanisms at a level such that corrective action
is feasible. Knowing nothing more about a capacitor than that it is shorted does not allow effective corrective action.
If we learn that the short is caused by silver migration, we now have identified a mechanism suitable for corrective
action. The silver can be eliminated, or the conditions that enhance migration can be controlled.
Failure Verification. After recording all identifying external markings, and performing a thorough external and radiographic
inspection, the first requirement is to verify the failure. Too often the wrong part is removed from the circuit or an
equipment test error, rather than a part failure, results in a good part being delivered for failure analysis.
Analysis Direction. The process of analyzing a failure, performing those steps necessary on a suspect clevice which will
result in the identification of a specific correctable failure mechanism, requires the coordination of a series of specialized
skills by one having knowledge of failure mechanisms, device design, and manufacturing techniques: and the experience
necessary to organize this combination of skills and knowledge into a practical plan of action.
When to Analyze° Many part failures occur for which no corrective action is planned to be taken, in many cases it
is most cost effective to simply scrap the defective part and replace it with one that performs properly. For those cases
where it is necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur_ a portion-of this section is devoted to
describing some of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis.
Reliability/Life. it is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the part level (screening, analysis of design
and manufacturing), and effective failure analysis, that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
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PROBLEM/SCREENING SUMMARY
Scope. This summation is an accumulation of knowledge and experience gained in dealing with capacitor failures and in
avoiding those failures, it addresses itself to the causes and effects of failures, and shows the suggested screens that
will allow identification of capacitors having latent or incipient defects.
This summary is aimed toward identifying capacitor problem areas and failure causes. Haying identified problems, and
recognizing that the typical user is concerned with eliminating this problem from a group of capacitors on-hand, suggestions
are made for performing screening. These screening suggestions are based primarily upon industry experience. The
problem areas have been grouped under the basic categories of open, short, parameter deviation, and mechanical anomaly.
ALERT Item No. Where directly applicable, the "ALERT Item No." of the ALERT report describing a specific cause
for a failure is listed against that cause. Thereby a cross reference is provided between a specific failure cause found
in the "ALERT Summaries" and the broader failure experience/avoidance knowledge shown in this presentation.
PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
CERAMIC CAPACITORS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
Tests")
OPEN
Lead separation
Cold solder connection
Inadequate lead bonding
SHORT
Solder reflow
Contamination - solder between electrodes
None. All these problems were caused by the
internal use of low-melting-temperature solder.
Upon application of external heat required to
attach the capacitor to its circuit, the internal
lead-attach solder melted to cause noted
problems.
Screening would not cktect this type of
problem since solder hi, Jew temperatures
would not he reached. Use heat sink.
OPEN
Broken leads
Precap Visual Examination prior to
encapsulation
OPEN
Cracked ceramic
Temperature Cycling, Burn-ln, Seal Test; then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor. and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
SHORT
Cracked ceramic
Breakdown of dielectric
Shorted electrodes
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test: then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor. and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT
Failed temperature coefficient test
Temperature Cycling: then measure
Capacitance. lnse_lation Resistance (or DC
Leakage), and Dissipation Factor at low
temperature, high temperature, and at 25°C
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
LEAKAGE AND CAPACITANCE OUT OF
TOLERANCE
Cracked ceramic
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in. Seal Test; then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor. and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
PROBLEM AREA/
-Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO,
SUGGESTED ACTION o SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
Tests")
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - LOW
INSULATION RESISTANCE
Deformed plates
Breakdown of dielectric
|0
II
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In. Seal Test; then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
EXTERNAL,.;'M ECHAN ICAL ANOMALY
Damaged leads
Cracked case
12
13
Visual Examination
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY
Improper marking 14
Measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage:
followed by Visual Examination)
_. SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITORS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION o SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspections and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN Temperature Cycling, Burn-ln. Seal Test; then
Termination metailizadon separation (slug to case) 15 measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor. and
Lead separation 16 Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
SHORT Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test; then
Breakdown of dielectric 17 measure Capacitance," Dissipation Factor, and
Contamination - internal solder balls Ig Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
SHORT . Follow proper installation procedures including
Contamination - solder between tubelet add case 19 use of heat sink
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Wrong anodes 2O
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test; then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage);
Radiographic Inspection and
Delidding/Dissection
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Breakdown of dielectric 21
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In, Seal Test; then
measure Capa_:itance. Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
DISSIPATION FACTOR
Poor solder bonds 22
Temperature Cycling; then measure Insulation
Resistance, Capacitance. and Dissipation
Factor; Dissection
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WET-SLUG TANTALUM CAPACITORS .
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
Tests")
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Incorrect tantalum risers
Electrolyte leakage
Defective internal seal
23
24
25
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In. Seal Test: then
measure Capacitance. Dissipation Factor. and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
OPEN
Lead separation 26
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in. Seal Test: then
measure Capacitance. Dissipation Factor. and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - LOW
CAPACITANCE
Improper cathode preparation 23
Temperature Cycling; then measure Insulation
Resistance (or DC Leakage), Capacitance, and
Dissipation Factor
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY
Defective seal 27. 28
29. 30
Temperature Cycling, Burn-ln, Seal Test: then
measure Capacitance, Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
GLASS CAPACITORS
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
Tests")
OPEN
Lead not fused to plates 31
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In, Seal Tesw: then
measure Capacitance. Dissipation Factor, and
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage)
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
SERIES RESISTANCE
Void between end cap and capacitive element 32
Temperature Cycling; then measure Insulation
Resistance (or DC Leakage), Capacitance, and
Dissipation Factor
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - LOW
CAPACITANCE
Decrease in dielectric constant 33
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In, Seal Test;
deage by exposing part to temperature above
the Curie point with no voltage applied for
one hour; then age for 100 hours at ambient
temperature; then read Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor. and Insulation Resistance
MISCELLANEOUS CAPACITORS
TYPE
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION
SCREEN (see "Screening
Inspections and Tests")
AIR. VAR 'OPEN
Poor stator terminal solder
connection
34
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in, Seal Test:
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor. and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
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- MISCELLANEOUS CAPACITORS
PROBLEM AREA/
TYPE Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NOo
SUGGESTED ACTION
SCREEN (see "Screening
Inspections and Tests")
AIR, VAR SHORT
Contamination - metal particles
within capacitor
Deformed plates
35
36
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In, Seal Test:
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
AIR, VAR UNADJUSTABLE
Contamination - solder resin in
moving parts
34
Monitor Capacitance and Dissipation
Factor vs rotation
ALUM, ELECT OPEN
Internal lead separation 37, 38
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in, Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation •
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
ALUM, ELECT EXTERNAL MECHANICAL
ANOMALY ° DEFECTIVE
HERMETIC SEAL
Incompatibility of materials 39
Temperature Cycling, Seal Test (check
for electrolyte leakage if applicable):
then measure Insulation Resistance (or
DC Leakage), Capacitance and
Dissipation Factor; and Visual
Examination
MET FILM EXTERNAL MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Improper marking 4O
Measure Capacitance. Dissipation Factor.
and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage); followed by Visual
Examination
MET-MYLAR OPEN
Lead separation 41
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In. Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
MET-PAPER OPEN
Internal lead broken 42
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In. Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
MICA ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION . INSTABILITY
Damaged lead-tin contact foil 43
Temperature Cycling; then measure
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage).
Capacitance, and Dissipation Factor
MYLAR FOIL OPEN
Improper bonding, lead-to-foil 44
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
PAPER OPEN
Improper bonding, lead-to-foil 45
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage) -
POLYSTYR EN E OPEN
Improper lead attachment 46
Temperature Cycling, Burn-In, Seal Test:
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor. and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
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MISCELLANEOUS
4"
CAPACITORS
TYPE
PROBLEM AREA/.
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION
SCREEN (see "Screening
Inspections and Tests")-
POLYSTYRENE SHORT
Breakdown of dielectric 47
Temperature Cycling. Burn-In. Seal Test:
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor. and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
TANTALUM
FOIL
OPEN
Lead separation 48
Temperature Cycling: then measure
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage),
Capacitance, and Dissipation Factor
TANTALUM
FOIL
SHORT
Electrolyte leakage 49
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in. Seal Test:
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
TANTALUM
FOIL
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH DC
LEAKAGE
Internal seal defective
Contamination - metallic particles in
mylar sleeving
._0
51
Temperature Cycling, Burn-in, Seal Test;
then measure Capacitance, Dissipation
Factor, and Insulation Resistance (or DC
Leakage)
TANTALUM
FOIL
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
CAPACITANCE
Faulty anode lead-to-foil welds
Temperature Cycling; then measure
Insulation Resistance (or DC Leakage),
Capacitance, and Dissipation Factor
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SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
Basic Screening. The screening inspections and tests suggested for capacitors included in the Problem/Screening Summary
are as follows:
|. Temperature Cycling
2. Burn-In; sometimes called "'voltage conditioning," "voltage aging." or °'voltage stabilization"
3. Seal Test (for hermetic devices)
4. Electrical Measurements
5. Visual Examination
6. Radiographic Inspection
_e. The purpose of the screening is to allow detection of parts that: (I) have been improperly processed by the
manufacturer, (2) contain flaws or weak spots in the dielectric (including voids and contamination), (3) have poor solder
or weld connections, or (4) have any other anomalies that could result in a failure under normal operating conditions.
Additional Screenin B. In cases where specific characteristics are critical in the function of the using equipment, e.g..
temperature coefficient and capacitance drift, such critical parameters should be added to the requirements of these
screening._sts. "
;'?" .
Envelope Removal/Dissection. The basic approach taken here is to subject each of the devices to a test procedure in
order to make a one-by-one acceptance determination. The disadvantage of this approach is the underlying assumption
that the internal construction materials, processes, etc. from part-to-part are homogeneous so that the devices can be
treated as a uniform lot. If the devices are not produced under similar design criteria and manufacturing controls which
permit a heterogeneous lot to exist, a single screening procedure may not be the optimum for all units. For this reason,
it is frequently desirable to examine the internal design and construction. This is accomplished, first, by a nondestructive
radiographic inspection: and second, by performing a destructive envelope removal or dissection on a limited sample of
devices. This procedure is more meaningful if a design/construction baseline has been established as a comparison
criterion.
!. TEMPERATURE CYCLING -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD I02 (5 cycles) (ref 2)
General. This environmental exposure will assist in detecting a variety of design and manufacturing deficiencies
resulting from materials with incompatible temperature coefficients of expansion, inadequately bonded materials,
and materials with improper chemical composition.
Complementary Tests. Seal test and electrical measurements will detect degradation and catastrophic failures
resulting from the temperature cycling exposure. Capacitance Dissipation Factor (or Power Factor) and Insulation
Resistance (or DC Leakage) are the suggested electrical measurements to be performed after Temperature Cycling
and Seal Test. Test condition selected must be compatible with the part characteristic.
2. BURN-IN
Burn-in typically consists of the application of rated voltage at maximum rated temperature for a period of time
associated with the type of dielectric. The purpose is to stress the capacitor electrically and thermally to the
maximum of its designed operating capability° Experience has indicated that this type of stress is extremely
effective in detecting incipient failures. The number of hours that a part is burned in has evolved as a result of
experience. This time is based on minimizing the infant mortality rate of a specific part type. A typical burnoin
time is 100 hours.
3. SEAL TEST -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD 112 (ref 2)
General. The purpose of this test is to verify the integrity of the hermetic seal. Typical failure areas occur
where materials are fused, brazed, or soldered to make the final seal. The seal test will detect manufacturing
defects, damage resulting from handling, seal failures resulting from mismatched temperature coefficient of
expansion of materials, etc.
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Hermetic Seal. A hermetic seal serves basically two purposes: (I) to prevent moisture, cleaning fluids, or other
contaminants from coming in contact with the capacitor elements, and (2) to prevent electrolyte from leaking out
of wet-electrolytic type capacitors.
Metal/Glass Seal. Metal/_ass hermetically sealed capacitors should be tested per MIL-STD-202, Method 112, Test
Condition C (ref 2).
Transparent Glass Case. Transparent glass case fixed capacitors should he seal tested per MIL-C-23269 fief 3)
using ZygIo penetrant for 3 minutes under 20 psig. Dye that penetrates broken seals can later be detected by
using ultraviolet light.
Opaque Glass Case. Opaque.glass ca_ fixed capacitors should be treated per MIL-C-23269 (ref3), exposure at
5 psig in a steam atmosphere for 20 to 30 minutes, followed by IR measurement, to evaluate seal integrity.
Moulded/Dipped Epoxy Case. Moulded and dipped epoxy cased capacitors are not considered hermetically sealed,
therefore° seal testing is not normally required.
Broken Seal Effects. Fluid from a wet-electrolytic capacitor may corrode other components or conductors in the
vicinity of the leak even though the capacitor may continue to function within specification limits, in the nonwet
type construction, a broken hermetic seal could result in low IR (or short) ofthe capacitor following moisture
environment exposure. Therefore, the effect of a broken seal depends not only on the type of capacitor involved
but also on the environmental conditions during operation.
ELECTRICAL MEASUREMENTS -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD 302, 305, and 306 (ref2)
General. Electrical Measurements (including Capacitance, Dissipation Factor or Power Factor, and insu!ation
Resistance or DC Leakage) are used to check the electrical characteristics, parametric drift resulting from exposure
to the various environmental test conditions, and catastrophic failures.
When Performed. These tests need not be performed following each environmental exposure, but are suggested
as final tests in the screening cycle. It also may be desirable to perform electrical measurements at the beginning
of screening tests in order to immediately eliminate out-of-tolerance parts from the screening cycle.
._. VISUAL EXAMINATION
Following completion of screening tests, parts should be visually examined for identification and damage. Physical
damage may have occurred as a result of handling durlnl_ screening test or as a result of the environmental
exposures.
6. RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION -- MIL-STD-750, METHOD 2076 (ref4)
Radiographic inspection is an effective screening test for solid tantalum capacitors. X-ray the capacitor in two
planes at 90 degree rotation, perpendicular to the capacitor's longitudinal axis. Normally this test is performed
in order to determine the positioning of the internal material and the existence of internal damage. Performing
radiographic inspection for other types of capacitors may be beneficial.
7. ENVELOPE REMOVAL/DISSECTION
A sample from each lot (e.g., lot-date-code) has its envelope removed and/or is dissected in order to detect
internal anomalies such as part damage., poor workmanship, improper materials, etc. It is suggested that a sample
base line dissected part be used as a standard for comparison.
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
CHARACTERISTICS
Ceramic. As was discussed previously, a capacitor is formed by separating two conductive plates by an insulating
dielectric° The value of capacitance obtained is directly related to the dielectric constant as well as to other physical
factors. With the advent of the barium titanate ceramic, a material was made available having a dielectric constant as
high as ten thousand in contrast to other capacitor dielectric materials such as paper, mylar, mica, etc. having dielectric
constants up to 10. The reason for the existence of the ceramic capacitor is the fact that its high dielectric constant
allows the attainment of the highest capacitance to volume ratio of all nonpolar capacitors in commercial production.
Properties of Ceramic. Many of the properties associated with ceramic capacitors are associated with the fact that their
dielectric material is crystalline in nature and obeys the physical laws associated with crystals. Two factors that
particularly concern us are the effects of the Curie point and voltage stress.
I
Temperature Effects. At approximately 1200C, barium titanate crystals experience a drastic change in form. resulting in
large variations in capacitor characteristics. The crystalline structure changes at this point from tetragonal (elongated
cube) to cube. At this temperature, known as the Curie point, the dielectric constant experiences an increase on the
order of ._ to |0 times, resulting in increased capacitance. It is this, and other temperature effects (e.g., decreased
insulation resistance and decreased dissipation factor with increase in temperature), that induces manufacturers to combine
barium titanate with other proprietary additives (e.g., compounds of calcium, tin, strontium, etc.) to produce temperature-
stable capacitors.
Voltage Effects. Another shortcoming of ceramic capacitors is the effect of voltage stress on the crystalline.structure.
Exposure to full rated voltage can cause a capacitance decrease on the order of 5 percent. Capacitors designed for
extremely small size (e.g., highest dielectric constant and thinnest ceramic plate) tend to be more sensitive to voltage
stress. Capacitance decrease caused by voltage stress is relieved after several hours of shelf aging at ambient conditions.
|t should be noted that one of the significant advantages of a ceramic capacitor is its nonpolar characteristic. Ceramic
bodies are available which are capable of withstanding dc voltage of either polarity, and in combination with ac.
Frequency Effects. It should be recognized that a capacitor, in addition to providing capacitance, also provides series
and shunt inductance and resistance. As the resonant frequency of the combination of inductance and capacitance found
in a specific capacitor is approached, it will begin to appear as though it were a resistor. This frequency effect can be
shifted to the higher portion of the spectrum by control of design and installation techniques.
Specification Parameters. The above discussion has served to define application limitations of ceramic capacitors related
to physical characteristics associated with the ceramic body and with construction techniques used in the manufacture of
the devices. These limitations can be described as specification limits for use by manufacturers and using designers.
Deviations from these limits can lead to equipment failure. The next section will describe problems and failure
mechanisms found in capacitors caused by design deficiency, lack of process control, and inadequate quality control.
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Failures Related to Process. A typical ceramic capacitor (Figure 3-1) and a typical assembly flow (Figure .1-2) are
presented together with the suggested controls required to assure a reliable product. The "Critical Process" is defined
for each of the manufacturing steps. Relationship is established between failure causes and the manufacturing process.
Having experienced a specific problem, one could identify those manufacturing steps with potential for contributing to
the failure.
Assembly Flow. The manufacturing flow of a ceramic capacitor is essentially the same for all manufacturers, differing
principally in the degree of process controls, number of production tests, and extent of automation. The assembly flow
as described is typical of what may be expected for capacitors of the type produced to meet MIL-C-39014 (ref 5)
specifications. Significant variables are listed on the typical flow diagram with those operations that are considered
critical for the design of a reliable capacitor° In.process inspection and testing may vary from one manufacturer to
another depending on the sizes of the lots produced and the degree of automation.
ITEM
I
2
3
4
5
•TYPICAL •CERAMIC
ITEM NAME
Leads
Encapsulant
Conductor Plates
Dry Ceramic
End Silver
CAPACITOR DESIGN (Figure 3-1)
MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Gold-plated nickel wire -- MIL-STD-1276, Type N2 (ref 6)
Transfer moldable rigid plastic such asepoxy or diailyl phthalate
Platinum alloy (modified with PI, Au, and Ag)
Barium titanate (modified with Sn. Ca. Mn, Pb oxides)
Silver silicate mixture with B, Na, AI, and K as trace oxides
61 Internal Solder Hi-temp solder (Ag 1.5 or equivalent)
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AA SECTION
_j
I
VID_
Figure 3.1. Typical Ceramic Capacitor
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ASSEMBLY FLOW
General. With reference to the assembly flow diagram (Figure 3-2), the first four operations are considered as proprietary
and some manufacturers will not divulge any information concerning the powder mixing, additives, and viscosity of the
ceramic slurry. An examination of the implementation of the in-process inspection requirements and process control
documents gives an indication of the consistency of quality being built into the parts but not necessarily an indication of
good quality.
Slurry. Improper viscosity of the slurry can result in nonuniform thickness of plates and in lower dielectric strength of
the finished capacitor. An out-of-tolerance condition of electrical characteristics can result from incorrect additives.
Poor registration of stacked laminates results in a wider distribution of capacitance values.
Curing. Firing of the slug (curing} is one of the most critical processes in the production of a reliable capacitor. All
volatiles must be driven out of the green chip in order for the laminates to fuse, thus creating a monolithic unit.
Improper Curing. Improper curing occurs when the external surface of the ceramic solidifies (becomes nonporous) before
internal gases can .escape. This can be caused by poor curing temperature control, excessive volatile material, etc.
Gases trapped within the slug can create voids, deformations, cracks, and even shifting of plates. These types of
discrepancies may not cause failure immediately but result in low quality parts. High temperature insulation resistance
measurement may be used to detect gross discrepancies in the finished capacitors. A visual examination of dissected
specimens will reveal discrepancies that are not detectable by electrical measurements. When improper curing is
established as the cause of failure of a part, the entire lot of parts become suspect and should be scrapped.
Insuring Reliability. it is because of the above considerations that special part "requirements become necessary where
these devices are used in long-life and critical applications. They include: (I) lot rejection because of excessive screening
fallout. (2) failure analysis by the vendor of catastrophic screening failures, and (3) user receiving inspection and envelope
removal.
Assembly Precautions. Termination end silvering, tinning, and attachment of leads require proper cleaning procedures
and good soldering techniques to prevent open or intermittent type failures. Precautions must be taken to avoid thermal
shock during silver firing. Preheating of the slug may be required during tinning and during lead attachment. These
precautions are evident in the process control procedures of a manufacturer that produces high-reliability parts.
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FLOW DIAGRAM
MATERIAL MANUFACTURING
OPERATION
Particle s/ze, purity of[_'y Ceramic /,fix and mill L powder and calciningI r tamt_ra_trs, and amount
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I
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I
Stack laminates and I
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i
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I
[ Fire [_ Programming of tempera-
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I _older _Tin and clean chips _. Good solder wett/ng, andelimination of conductive
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I
I Enner_ncapsulant _-_Undercoat and cure _- Curing of encapsulant
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I
[Electrically test J
I
I I
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I
[Package and ship l
CRITICAL PROCESS
NOTE: For items (_) through _) see Figure 3-1.
OPEN
I
D
A, C
A,C
Figure 3-2. Ceramic Capacitor . Typical Assembly Flow
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
SHORT
H
B, C, D
A
A
PAR DEV MECH ANOI_
HI IV
A2_
B2_ S;
DI
A3, 6;
B2, 4, S;
DI
C3
AT;
_96
A2, $, 6;
B1, 4, 5;
CZ. 3_ Dt
AI, 4;
C1
Al+4;
C1
AI,4;
C1
B3_
C1, 2
A1;
B2; A, C
C1
A, E, C,
E,F
w#h Related Problem Codes
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
General. Failure analysis is a corrective action-related procedure. Only after knowing why a part failed can action be
taken to minimize future failures. Failure analysis findings can show the need for redesign (improvement in materials,
processes, and controls) or proper part application.
Predominant Failures. Failures of ceramic capacitors most frequently result from problems associated with lead attachment
or defective ceramic plates.
Encapsulant Removal. The removal of encapsulating material surrounding the plate structure frequently makes failure
analysis difficult. The depotting (dissolving) operation if not properly conducted, can result in extreme swelling and
introduce such massive damage that the positive identification of the cause of failure is not possible.
Dissection Precautions. Grinding and polishing, if not performed in small increments, can easily pass through the failed
area without detecting its presence.
Failure Analysis Flow. The failure analysis flow diagram, (Figure 3-3) which follows, provides for maximum nondestructive
evaluation of the failed part prior to the dissecting or depotting operation.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 3-3) is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus, one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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+TEST/EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
_WHEN
NONDESTRUCT_EMECHANICAL
i External Visual
Examination
L RadiographicInspection
PROBLEM AREAVERIFICATION
I
NONDESTRU CTIVE
ELECTRICAL
I
I ElectricalM asurements _
I
INDUCING FAILURES
]
I SpecialConditioning
ElectricalM asurements
PROBLEM CAUSE ]VERIFICATION
I
Deporting andExamination
t Dissecti°n and _Examination
Materials Analysis
Spectrographic
Microprobe
Nots all identifying markings
and external damage
If fixed focus X-ray used, photo-
graph in two planes mutually
perpendicular to the longitudinal
axis. If Vidicon (imaging) used,
examine and photograph
anomalies as observed
Measure and record capacitance,
dissipation factor (DF), dc leak-
age (DCL) and insulation
resistance (IR) (at high and low
temperature if necessary)
Baking, temperature cycling, or
vibration only if required to
confirm problem area
Capacitance, DF, DCL, or Ilt
as required" +
Decapsulant may cause severe
swelling of plastic such as to
mark the failure. Proper depot-
ting procedure must be developed
on other than the failed part
May be performed after depetting.
Deporting may be eliminated if
adequate depotting procedure is
not available, Must be performed
in small increments so as not to
grind through the failed zone
May be performed in conjunction
with deporting or dissection.
Analyze all foreign material not
otherwise identifiable
OPEN SHORT
I H
A B
-4_ A,C,D A,C,D
-i_ A,C A,B,D
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
PAR
DEV
Ill
AI, 3,4, 5,'6,7_
BS, 6;
C29 3
A1, 5, 6, 7;
B1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6;
C1, 2
A, B, A, B, A all;
B all;
C, D C, D C all
A, B A2;
B2, 3
MECH
ANOM
IV
A, B, C, D
A
Figure 3-3. Ceramic Capacitor - Typical Failure Analysis Flow with Related Problem
Codes
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SINTERED ANODE TANTALUM CAPACITORS
CHARACTERISTICS
Desi_,n Considerations. Sintered anode tantalum capacitors, which include both wet-slug and solid types, are primarily
used where a relative high value of capacitance is required in a limited space, the disadvantage of polarity presents no
problem, and relatively low voltage circuits are used.
From previous discussions, it can readily be seen that total capacitance is a direct function of available surface area.
The sintering process produces an amorphous solid with a virtually infinite surface when compared to the useful dielectric
surface planes of the previously described lameilate bodied ceramic capacitor. Improvements in volumetric efficiency,
when compared to the nonpolar ceramic, approach 35 times as great for the solid type and 73 times for the wet-slug
type°
Disadvantages of these devices include temperature/current limitations for both types, plus electrolyte containment for the
wet-slug variety.
Both types are self-healing because of the different processes described below, the liquid type proving to be more
effective in this characteristic.
Solid Tantalum Capacitor Dielectric Film Considerations. The so-called solid tantalum capacitor consists primarily of a
sintered tantalum anode with three successive coatings: manganese dioxide (MnO2), coliodial carbon, and silver. The
sintered anode slug is anodized to produce a film of tantalum pentoxide (Ta200 before formation of the MnO,. coating.
The MnO,. coating is formed by pyrolytic conversion of the mangenous "nitrate that has penetrated all pores of the anode
while the slug was immersed in a mangenous nitrate bath. Leakage current conduction is ionic across the Ta,O._/MnO,
semiconductor interface. The principal cause of excessive leakage is presence of impurities at or adjacent to thi_
interface.
Fortunately, the leakage current caused by this dielectric imperfection is not a stable value. The saving factor is the
reaction of the MnO 2 material when conducting current away from the leak fault area. This material, when subjected
to high current densities, becomes hot and reduces to a lower oxide (Mn203) which has a resistivity of approximately
ten thousand times that of MnO, and causes the Ta20 _ to reform. These changes reduce the fault current to a low
level and are a self.healing proce_. Unfortunately, this self-healing effect is only beneficial where the short circuit area
is small. If the area is large, the heat will destroy larger areas of dielectric and result in an avalanche condition that
will destroy the device.
From the above, the synergistic relation between temperature and current density becomes apparent, and compensation
for this phenomenon requires derating of electrical capabilities when the part is used at highertemperature ranges.
Wet-Slug Tantalum Capacitor Dielectric Film Consideration. The wet-slug tantalum capacitor consists of a sintered
tantalum anode that is immersed in a gelled or liquid electrolyte and contained by a silver can with a platinized inner
surface. Again, the sintered anode is anodized to produce a Ta205 dielectric film. The gelled electrolyte is either
sulphuric acid or lithium chloride and acts as a conductor between the anode slug and the cathode (can). From this
discussion, it can be seen that the current transfer is an anodic process. Furthermore, localized leakage, as would be
associated with minor impurities at or near the surface, is self-healed by it local reanodizing. Unfortunately. the leakage
and healing processes have a thermal by-product, and again, the synergistic combination of temperature and current
density must be guarded against by appropriate derating.
Another problem associated with the surface of the wet-slug type is the deposit of silver on the dielectric film. The
silver is leached from the can surface by the sulfuric acid content of the electrolyte. This material interferes with
self-healing and is also associated with drift in value with aging.
Wet.Slull Electrolyte Transfer. Proper containment of the corrosive and conductive electrolyte used in the wet-slug
presents another problem with use of these devices.
In order for the device to retain integrity as a capacitor, electrical insulation must be maintained between the internal
tantalum slug metal and the electrolyte. This problem becomes most severe, in insulating the anode egress lead. Typical
wet-slug designs, until recently, included an eyelet.to-glass end seal. In order to provide hermeticity, a nickel wire
(welded to a tantalum riser emanating from the slug to provide an electrical connection) was soldered in the eyelet as
the final seal operation. It becomes essential to electrically insulate the nickel and eyelet from the electrolyte.
.
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Because of its conductive nature, the electrolyte must be kept from spreading to the inner surface of the glass-to-metal
hermetic seal. For it can, upon spreading across the glass, act as a conductive bridge and produce a shorting condition.
The electrolyte is normally contained in its prescribed area by an elastomeri_ seato With improper fit, such as grooving
of the anode stem and/or displacement by oscillation of the slug under forces caused by vibration° transportation of the
electrolyte into the end seal area becomes relatively easy.
Recently° sealing techniques have been deveiop_l allowing the tantalum riser to seal directly to "theglass° which eliminates
many of _hese problems.
Not to be overlooked is the relatively high rate of expansion of the electrolyte with rise in temperature. The hydraulic
pressure generated by this mechanism has been known to disrupt the soldered portions of the seal and result in spewing
of the corrosive material onto adjacent components.
Specification Parameters. The foregoing discussion has been presented as a guide to define the application limits of
sintered anode tantalum capacitors, as well as the associated inherent physical characteristics and construction techniques
used in the manufacture of these devices. These limitations can be described as specification limits for use by
manufacturers and design engineers° Deviations from these limits can lead to equipment failures° The next subsection
will describe problems and failure mechanisms found in capacitors caused by design deficiency, lack of process control,
and inadequate quality control.
o
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SiNTERED ANODE TANTALUM CAPACITORS
" DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
General. Typical sintered anode tantalum capacitors are shown in Figure 3-4 (solid tantalum) and Figure 3.5 (wet.slug
tantalum). Filures 3-6 and 3-'/describe the typical assembly flow of these capacitors.
TYPICAL SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITOR DESIGN (Figure 3.4)
0TE_._ M
!
.,..
3
4
5
6
7, 13, 14
8
9
i0
II
12
15
16
ITEM NAME
Cathode Lead
Can
Solder "
Silver Coat
Carbon Coat
Anode Stem
Header Assembly
Anode Stem to
Anode Lead Lap
Weld
Oxidizer Surface
Dielectric Film
Tantalum Anode
Solder Seal
Eyelet Seal
Anode Lead
MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Nickel
Solder plated brass
Hi-temp solder
Silver suspension in binder with volatile solvent
Collodial carbon
Capacitor-iprade tantalum wire
Procured glass-metal (hermetic type seal)
Manpnese dioxide
Tantalum pentoxide
Sintered tantalum
00/40 solder
SB-5 solder
Nickel
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Figure 3.4. Typical Solid Tantalum Capacitor
TYPICAL
ITEM
!
2
3
4
6
?
8
9
I0. 12
II
13
14
!._
WET-SLUG TANTALUM CAPACITOR DESIGN (Figure 3_5)
ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Weld Cathode leadto case
Platinization Platinum black inner case coating
Bottom Cup Acid resistant elastomer
Anode Slug Sintered tantalum
Dielectric Tantalum pentoxide
Electrolyte Gelled sulphuric acid
Anode Basic tantalum
Case Fine silver
Compression• Ring Glass.sealing metal
Solder Hi-temp solder
Header Glass Compression glass
Anode Lead Nickel
Spacer Gasket Acid resistant elastomer (internal seal)
Anode Riser Capacitor-grade tantalum wire
16 Header Eyelet Glass.seMing metal
9, II. and 16 comprise the header assemblyNote:
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ASSEMBLY FLOW
General. With reference to the assembly flow diaip'ams (Figures 3-6 and 3-7), the processing, formation, and coating of
the anode slug is considered proprietary by most manufacturers, Some manufacturers will divulge no information with
regard to particle size of tantalum powders, additives, resins, and solvents used in preparation of the sintered tantalum
anode, nor can definitive information he obtained on basic composition or processing parameters for anode coating(s).
A review of in-process control gives an indication of consistency of quality being built into parts, but the user is
dependent on screening, including life test, to establish tentative quality standards.
Anode Preparation. One of the most critical operations is anode preparation. Each of the sequential steps requires
rigorous control. First, the mixing and milling of the basic tantalum powders c_n result in undesirable variations in
particle size. The blending of the required additives, storage, and transfer of the powder mixture prior to pressing can
result in the introduction of contaminants. Second, pressing can result in extremely porous structures and/or poor
adherence to the riser if insufficient pressure is applied, and third, the final sintering, without control of chamber
atmosphere and/or insufficient time and temperature, can result in failure to remove all organics and volatiles and/or
deposit of gaseous contaminants. All of these can result in a nonhomogenous structure that can include localized clumping
and nonuniform distribution of the tantalum particles.
This nonhomogeneous structure leads to nonuniform current densities which precipitates dielectric rupture at relative low
overstress transient, i.e.. scintillations. The surface of a nonhomogeneous anode, furthermore, is not ideal for application
of uniform coatings of the other materials that are required to complete the capacitor.
Fits and Sizing of Wet-Slug Types. Inadequate fits of supporting members (e.g.. bottom clip, depth of crimp, etc.) and
sizing of anode with respect to finished can dimensions can result in devices that are extremely sensitive to damage by
mechanical vibration. In addition to vibration testing during screening, randomly selected samples should be dissected
and physically measured for conformation of proper fit.
Insurinl Reliability. It is because of the above considerations that special part requirements become necessary where
these devices are used in long-life and critical applications. They include: (I) lot rejection because of excessive screening
fallout, (2) failure analysis by the vendor of catastrophic screening failures, and (3) user receiving inspection and envelope
removal.
Assembly Precautions. As the most critical processes are preparation and coating(s) of anode, extreme care should be
taken with respect to adherence to established process controls for these procedures. Compliance can best be monitored
by the in.process electrical test prior to assembly into case.
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FLOW DIAGRAM
TMANUFACTURING l CRITICAL PROCESSMATERIAL OPERATION 1
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
SHOR __ PAR MECHOPEN DEV ANOM
I II HI IV
Tantalum Powder ____Solvents Mill and mix F _ Homogeneity, purity, and
Plastics I . I size of particles
[TantalumWtre I (_ JPressp°wder, t ITantalum Powder _ wire and binder Dimension andPlasticizer [ [ into slug " density controli
I'_terT_slug F
dielectric
[Electrolysis ___J FormSolution I oxide _
L__o
IManganous Nitratea__ Therma_"_ reduction _ Control of current,
I [to MnO 2Solution
® [
Coliodisi Carbon _ Carbon coatSohition J _ ,.
I
o . , _ [Cutanclweldto
I External Lean _ riser
"l Electrical test
t p
I ..... I\ IAssemb,e,_lnce
Can Assembly
_ntadeer As%eZ°b|% s _ isnolf_ertUre, and
Header Assembly[ I I
I _ I Final solder seat
I Eyelet Solder _ (remove fromPreform [ l fixture)
l
l Test
l
l Label
l
Final inspection
I Pack and ship
A8;
E C4
A8;
A C4
Control of atmosphere E AS;
and thermal profile C4 •
Control of current, A2, 8;
solution, temperature, E C4
and time
_ olution_ temperature,
and time
Coverage control E
Welding parameters A
D DI
D
A, E
B2;
Soldering time and E A F, H
temperature C2
-- Soldering time and F H
temperatztre
NOTE: For items O through @ see Figure 3-4°
_,_g,,,3._. sol_ ro,,,ol,,.,c°po_.o..c_°1 A..mbly"_'1o.w.h _.l°,°_ P.obl°.,
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MATERIAL
FLOW DIAGRAM
I MANUFACTURING [
OPERATION CRITICAL PROCESS
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
OPEN SHORT PAR MECH
I II DEV ANOM
III IV
CaseCathode Lead
Clean and weld
I
[Mask and etch case
Platlnize
I Platinie linside case)Acid
[
I Mask removal J
I
Organic Binder _ _zx Ingrements and particle size
[ _ Control of size andResin Press into slug AAnode Stub
[slug L _ Control of thermal pro- A
'l_nterTa r _ ,ile,time,and
"_ atmosphere
Electrolysis dielectric time, and applied
Solut/on current
I ,External Lead Cut and weld Welding parameters Alead
J
I Elecmcat Test I
Spacer Gasket Add gasket andtrim lead
o..r'Bottom Fit anode / Selection of fitCup /
I
] Slug Assembly, ______ Assemble into ICupt and Gasket ] I case
I Electrolyte _ Dispense[ k Volumetric controll [ electrolyte I
'Header Solder seat _ Soldering time andtemperature
I
I Roll crimp _ Depth and pressure
I
I Test l
I
[ Mark and sleeve J
I
[ Final inspection I
I
[ Pack and ship ]
Weld parameters
Mask location
A
E
E
A4, 8;
C4
A4, 8;
C2,4
A4, 8;
C2, 4
A2,3,8;
A, D B2, 5
C2
E H A4
F H
A, G B2 B, F,H
NOTE: For items (_ through _ see Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-7. Wet-Slug Tantalum Capacltor- Typical Assembly Flow wlth Related Problem
Codes
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SINTERED ANODE TANTALUM CAPACITORS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
General. Failure analysis is pedormod to establish remedies for the cause of part failure. It is used to define changes
(where required) in component application criteria and/or installation and testing procedures. Very often it reveals subtle
modifications of materials and processes used in part manufacturing and/or screening that can enhance application
capability of the part.
Predominant Failures of Solid Tantalum. Failures of solid tantalum capacitors most frequently arise from rupture of the
dielectric because of overstresses.
Predominant Failures of Wet-Slug Tantalum. The most common failure problem for wet-slug tantalum capacitors is short
(including high dc leakage)° This type of failure is associated with the rupture of the dielectric film caused by overstress
and/or conductive bridging (displacement of the electrolyte)_ The displacement of the electrolyte is caused by mechanical
overstress (vibration) or thermal overstress° leading to electrolyte seepage around the gasket. Physical leakage of
electrolyte sometimes causes corrosion damage to other equipment.
Precautions. The predominant cause of abortive failure analysis is improper" decanning with resulting loss of traces of
shorting paths on can imerioro on inner surface of seal, or on anode slug. Also, it may cause fracture of the internal
leado disruption of anode slug coating, and relocation of deposits on inner surface of the seal. If care is not exercised
in removing the anode coatinss, when analyzing a solid tantalum capacitor failure, n_eaningfulfilm rupture and discoloration
wii| be destroyed before being analyzed or recorded. AI| of these factors can lead to erroneous assumptions as to the
cause of the failure.
Failure Analysis Flow. Failure analysis procedures for solid or wet-slug tantalum capacitors are very similar. Therefore,
Figure 3-8 describes the failure analysis flow for both types of capacitors. Differences in procedures are indicated on
the chart. The chart provides for maximum nondestructive evaluation of the failed part prior to the dissection or
depotting operation.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 3-8) is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus, one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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TEST/EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
_i_ WHEN RELATED PROBLEM CODES
ALLURE (see foldout in the Appendix)
PAR MECH
LOOK_ DPEN SHOR_ DEV ANOM
FOR _ I II III IV
NONDESTRUCTIVE l
MECHANICAL I
I
I Externa'. _J Note all identifying markings and external
VisuaI Examination _ damage (photographs preferred).
RadiographicInspection _'_
I
I PROBLEM AREAVERIFICATION
NONDESI_RUCTIVE
ELECTRICA L
I
I ElectricalM asurements _--
i
INDUCING FAILURES
[
SpecialConditioning _--
I
Electrical __M asurements
PROBLEM CAUSE
VERIFICATION
If fixed focus X-ray used, photograph in
two planes mutually perpendicular to the
ionEitudlnnl axis.. If imaging used, photo-
graph observed anomalies.
Perform fine and gross leak test in non-
conductive media. (MII.,-STD-202,
Method 112, Cond. C)
Measure and record capacitance, dissipa-
tion factor, do leakage, and insulation re-
sistance (at high, room, and tow tempera-
ture as required)
Baldng, temperature cycling and/or
vibration as required to confirm failure
(monitored)
As required, repeat electrical measure-
ment made under static and/or dynamic .
environmental conditions to detect induced
changes in electrical parameters
Remove can. Examine inner surfaces of
can and seal assembly plus outer surface
of anode slug. Record (color photos pre-
ferred) all observed anomalies. Proper de-
lidding procedure must be developed on
other than the failed part.
Selectively remove silver, carbon, and
manganese-dioxide anode coatings in three
independent, successive operations.
Observe and record (color photos pre-
ferred_ nnornnli_s on surfaces.
If anomalies are observed on stripped
anode, photograph (S. E.M. technique) and
analyze (microprobe). Dissection and
examination at point of anomaly can deter-
mi.A It_ fiend.
I
Decanning andExami ation
I
olid Ta Only [
Anode Coating [---
_ Anode
Examination
A, B, E,-_ F F, G, H
-4P
A1, 4;
A A, C B2;
C1, 2, 4
"_ F" B2 H
-4_
A1;
A A,B,D B2,3,5;
C1,2
B, G,H
.-D
-4P
A1;
A A, D B2, 3, 5;
C1, 2
A2, 3;
A,E A,D,E B2,5;
C1, 2
.%2,3,8;
D, E B5;
C1, 2, 4
A2,3,8;
D, E BS;
C4
Figure 3.8. Solid and Wet-SluQ Tantalu¢, Cap.acitors . Typical Failure Analysis Flow
with Related Prol_lem Codes
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GLASS CAPACITORS
CHARACTERISTICS
_° Glass capacitors were developed primarily for the purpose of providing a replacement part for mica capacitors.
Since mica is imported_ the concern that the source might not he available during time of war led to the design of a
capacitor using glass as a dlelectric in lieu of mica. in 1951 a Signal Corps specification. MIL-C-11272 (ref ?). was
released as the first MIL-Spec concerning fixed, glass dielectric capacitors. In 1963 a Navyspecification, MIL°C.23269
(ref 3). was released as the first established reliability specification for fixed, glass dielectric capacitors. Both specifications
are still active, however, parts designated as CYXX procured to MIL-C-II272 are no longer standard items for use in
design except as replacement parts.
Desilln Considerations. Glass capacitors may be used in applications requiring capacitance stability in the most severe
space environments, including radiation. The glass capacitor is less sensitive to nuclear radiation than any other type of
capacitor. Glass capacitors are available in capacitance values ranging from 0.5 pF through 10.000 pF. in tolerances as
tight as "" I percent, and voltage ratings of 300 volts and up. They exhibit excellent capacitance retrace capability over
a wide temperature range, show essentially zero dielectric absorption, and have a high degree of capacitance stability at
frequencies up to one megahertz.
These capacitors are used in radio and radar transmitters for by-pass and coupling in UHF and VHF applications. They
have been used in antenna coupling, high voltage power supplies° high voltage osci!lators, resonant filters, and delay lines.
Porcelain° quartz_ and other formulations of glass are used as dielectrics in the design of variable capacitors. Each
dielectric possesses individual characteristics and limits the range of capacitance that can be provided for any .particular
design configuration. The glass used in fixed capacitors consists of two types, i.e.. porcelain and glass ribbon. Porcelain
capacitors have a capacitance temperature coefficient of 105 ± 25 ppm/*C. (also available in 0 -. 25 ppm/*C), as compared
to 125 • 40 ppm/°C exhibited by capacitors constructed with the glass ribbon.
The glass has a slightly better volumetric efficiency but the difference is not sufficient to make this a major design
consideration. Both procelaio and glass ribbon types are comparable to mlca in volumetric efficiency at capacitance
values of approximately 5.000 pF.
Reliability. Glass capacitors have been used with good success throughout the aerospace industry. Temperature, moisture,
shock, and vibration within the limits of space environmental specifications have essentially no effect on the performance
characteristics of this type of capacitor. The primary failure mode is a short occurring between the plates caused by
breakdown of dielectric. Failures of these capacitors are a t'are occurrence and those that have failed usually did so at
a high voltage and high temperature_ The cause can usually he traced to the existence of air bubbles in the glass ribbon
from which the dielectric was made. Voltage conditioning at 3 to 5 times rated dc voltage ispart of the MIL-C-23269
(ref 3)° Group A inspection, and is performed on 100 percent of all pans supplied as failure rate "M" or better. The
high voltage used to bum in these parts is probably the reason one seldom sees any failures of this Wpe of capacitor.
Failure rate "°M°' (I.0 percent/I,000 hours) is the best failure gate presently listed in QPL 23269 (ref 8). This should not
be construed as an indication of the reliability limit of glass capacitors. The demand for this type of capacitor procured
to the military ER specification has apparently been of insufficient quantity to economically justify the additional testing
required for qualification to lower failure rates. The manufacturers have no present plans to obtain qualification to any
higher reliability level.
Reliability of the glass capacitor is partly due to its simplicity in construction which consists of three basic materials.
The conductive element of aluminum foil, (or silver in the case of the porcelain type), the glass dielectric which is the
same as the case, and the lead wire. These materials when properly processed and assembled form one of the most
reliable capacitors available today.
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GLASS CAPACITORS
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Assembly Flow. The assembly flow as shown in Figure 3-10 is typical for fixed capacitors of glass ribbon type
construction, and does not encompass all glass capacitors. Some manufacturers necessarily perform more material
processing steps, some of which are proprietary. The flow diagrams for some glass capacitors closely approximates that
shown for ceramic capacitors.
TYPICAL GLASS CAPACITOR DESIGN (Figure 3-9)
ITEM ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
! Lead Modified Dumet. gold plated
2 Dielectric Glass ribbon
._ Conductor High purity aluminum foil
4 Cover Glass Same as dielectric
5 Foil to Lead Weta
o
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Figure3-9. Typical Glass Capacitor
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ASSEMBLY FLOW
General. With reference to the assembly flow diagram (Figure 3-I0). the processing of materials for this type of glass
capacitor, once the assembly is started, consists of cutting, stacking, processing, welding, and fusing. The cutting
operation may be considered critical from a reliability standpoint. The first cutting operation consists of notching the
foil to form the conductive plates. Any rough edges, burrs, slivers, etc., will reduce the dielectric thickness of the
finished capacitor resulting in lowering the insulation resistance. A second cutting operation consists of separating the
capacitors from a multiple capacitor strip. This operation must he controlled to a tolerance sufficiently close to allow
proper case edge thickness following the "clean and cut apart" operation, i.e., the conductive element must he centered
in the glass case. Also. the sharpness of the cutters directly affects the degree of chipping and cracking of the glass
case and dielectric.
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RELATED PI(OBLEM CODE. _
FLOW DIAGRAM (see foldoul in the Appcndixl
+u, L++++ +DEV .\NOMOPERATION IIl IX"
[ Conductor (Fofli_"_N°tch fall '._- Sharpness of cutters A, C_D
I
I Dielectric [ t__lStack and trim [___Proper layer registration(Ribbon Glass) _ tab F and clean in ss of cut A _ I, 3, 7
. Weld schedule A, D
Cover Glass
Purity and homogeneity of
.glass_ temperature, Ume_ C,[I
and atmospheric condition
I Purity and homogeneity of
(fuse) glass_ temperature_ time, C_ D B4, 5and atmospheric condition
I
Clean and l Sharpness of cutters and
cut apart ,F accuracy of cut
I
ILeak test and
finalvisual I
I Cleanliness of plating
_bathg temperature, time,
Gold [-----uniformity of platingplate leads
I thickness
I Fil_ Inspection !
I
IQ.c. Tes.ng I
I (Groups A and B)[
IAddition_ I.D. [
las r+quired I
I
I
1
A5,6; F
B5
Figure 3-10. Glass Capacifor - Typical Assembly Flow wlfh Related Problem Codes
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GLASS CAPACITORS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
General. Failure analysii is performed to establish remedies for the cause of part failure. It is used to define changes
(where required) in component application criteria and/or installation and testing procedures. Very often it reveals subtle
modifications of materials and processes used in part manufacturing and/or screening that can enhance application
capability of the part.
Predominant Failures of Glass Capacitors. The most frequently occurring type of failure has been shorted plates resulting
from breakdown of dielectric due to an!rapped air in the glass during manufacture, or due to rough edges on the foil as
a result of a poor cutting operation.
Dissection Precautions. Capacitors made of transparent glass may not require dissection to determine the cause of
failure. However, if required on either transparent or opaque glass, care must be taken to grind and polish with sufficient
skill to avoid chipping or cracking the glass. Small increment cuts should be made to avoid grinding through and missing
the area of failure. _/
Failure Analysis Flow. The failure analysis flow (Figure 3-11) is shown only as a guide, and the specific procedures to
be followed should be based on the type of failure to be analyzed.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 3-11) is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus. one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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TEST/EXAMINATION
NONDESTRUCTIVE [
External Visual Hxam/nation
I
I RadiographicInspection
PROBLEM AREA [VERIFICATION
i
NONDESTRUCTIVE
ELECTRICAL
nectr/cal
Measurements
1
INDUCING FAILURES
I
Special
Conditiouing
t
Electrical
Measurements
PROBLEM CAUSE [VERIFICATION
Dissection andExamination
I
Materials Analysis
Spectrographic
Microprobe
PROCEDURE
LOOK
FOR
WHEN
FAILURE
NOte all idontify/ng mark/ngs and exter-
nal damage
If fixed focus X-ray used, photograph
/a two planes mutually perpendicular to
the Iongltudlnalads. If Vidlcon (Imabdng)
used. examine and photograph anomalies
as observed. For units that are trans-
parent X-ray is not required. For units
with high Pb content in the glass X_ray
may be of no value°
Measure and record capacitance, dis-
sipation factor (DF). dc leakage (DCL),
and insulation resistance (IR) (at high
and low temperature if necessary)
H Temperature cycling, or vibrationonly ff required to confirm problem area
Capacitance, DF, DCL, or [R as required
Transparent - 6-1/2 minutes in Zygio p_ne-
trant, including 3 minutes under 20 psig,
dry_ and inspect under ultraviolet light°
Opaque _ in saturated steam atmosphere of
5 psig for 20 to 30 minutes
Put in suitable potting material and dissect.
Must be-performed in small increments so
as not to grind through the failcd zone
May be performed in conjunction with de- t
potting or dissection. Analyze all foreign Imaterial not otherwise identifiable
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldunt in the Appendix)
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV ANOM
I II Ill IV
A,B,C.
A C F
A,E A,C
A2;
I) BI.5;
('I,:S;
I)
o
o
¥igure 3.1L Glass
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Capacitor - Typical Failure Analysis
Codes
Flow with Related Problem
ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Ceramic. Solid Tantalum. Wet-Slug Tantalum. Glass. and Miscellaneous
Capacitors are shown below. They are listed according to the Problem Area - most frequent to least frequent occurrences.
except the Miscellaneous are listed by type. The "'ALERT ITEM NO." (first column) references each summary back
to the "Problem Area/Cause. and Suggested Action" table.
CERAMIC CAPACITORS
ALERT !
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I OPEN Opens or intermittent
GSFC.70-04 Lead separation opens were caused by
the separation of
leads from the
capacitor element.
2 OPEN During acceptance
GSFC 8-29-67 Cold solder test, the capacitor
connection was effectively open
at 75"C.
These failures were caused by the application
of excessive soldering heat during assembly of
the capacitors into equipment without any
provision for protecting the device by thermal
shunting.
Failure analysis revealed an internal cold
solder connection between a lead and the edge
of the capacitor electrodes. A low •
temperature (60/40) solder had been used.
3 OPEN A failure was
MSFC 11.13-67 Inadequate lead experienced during
bonding temperature cycling.
Failure analysis revealed inadequate lead
bonding, little or no solder flow, lead
misalignment, and generally poor workmanship•
4 OPEN Leads broke at
$4-A-72-O1 Broken Leads swaged round lead
transition during
installation of
capacitors
An X-ray criterion was used to screen out
units havin 8 less than 0.025 inch of epoxy
between the bottom of the ceramic chip an,
the external surface of the case. but this did
not eliminate the defective capacitors.
5 OPEN
K9-71-21 Cracked ceramic
Capacitors tested
open. short, showed
high leakage and out
of tolerance
capacitance.
Radiographic inspection indicated the ceramic
had been cracked during the manufacturer's
molding process.
1 SHORT
GSFC.70-04 Solder reflow
Shorts were caused
by the reflow of
solder within the
capacitor into voids
and cracks in the
ceramic dielectric.
These failures were caused by the application
of excessive soldering heat during assembly of
the capacitor into equipment without any
provision for protecting the device by thermal
shunting.
5 SHORT
K9-71-21 Cracked ceramic
Capacitors tested
open. short, showed
high leakage and out
of tolerance
capacitance.
Radiographic inspection indicated the ceramic
had been cracked during the manufacturer's
molding process.
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NOo
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
6
GSFC-69.13
SHORT
Contamination -
solder between
electrodes
A short was detected
in the capacitor
during bench test on
a breadboard circuit.
Failure analysis disclosed voids in the epoxy
seals were filled with solder which bridged the
capacitor electrodes. Low melting solder, used
internally, flowed into the voids because of
excessive soldering temperatures and time
during installation of the capacitor into the
circuit°
7
GSFC 10-3-67
SHORT
Breakdown of
dielectric
During a checkout
experiment, 140 Vdc
was placed across the
terminals of the
capacitor° A 20 V
positive spike (in
addition to the 140
volts) existed at
turn-on. The
capacitor failed in the
short mode.
Failure analysis confirmed the short, and
internal visual examination revealed a dielectric
puncture at the edge of the electrode
metallization.
8
G4-A-72.02
SHORT
Shorted electrodes
Capacitors failed
short during thermal
vacuum testing of
Earth Sensors.
Failure analysis revealed delamination of the
ceramic dielectric element and shorting of the
electrodes.
5Go70-01
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
TEMPERATURE
COEFFICIENT
Failed temperature
coefficient test
Sample piece part
testing indicated a
temperature
coefficient, problem
when tested to
MIL-Cogl (gel 9).
Of the 39 samples tested, 24 exceeded the
specified capacitance change.
K9-71-21
10
J5-72-01
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
LEAKAGE AND
CAPACITANCE
OUT OF
TOLERANCE
Cracked ceramic
Capacitors tested
open. short, showed
high leakage, and
showed capacitance
out of tolerance.
Radiographic inspection indicated the ceramic
had been cracked during the manufacturer's
molding process.
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
INSULATION
RESISTANCE
Deformed plates
Capacitors
demonstrated low IR
when tested at high
temperature.
Manufacture." believed that the pressure used
when fixing the green ceramic into the
monolithic block was too great.
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CERAMIC CAPACITORS
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./
OIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
II
GSFC-71_I
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
INSULATION
RESISTANCE
Breakdown of
dielectric
Capacitors were
rejected for failure to
meet the specified
I000 megohm
insulation test.
The manufacturer stated the problem was
associated with a single batch of defective
ceramic.
Bi-68-02
12 t EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Damaged leads
Capacitor lead
cracking occurred
during welding.
producing
unsatisfactory cracked
welds.
Failure analysis of leads with high tensile
strength showed chemical analysis conforms to
MIL-STD-1276 (ref 6). However. tensile
strength tests showed "hard" leads to be 112
kpsi instead of 82 kpsi. Residual stress was
retained in the lead wire because of inadequate
annealipg after c01d working.
S4-_9-01
13 EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Cracked case
Fractures were
observed in the cases
of large case size
capacitors after the
equipment was
subjected to
temperature cycling.
These fractures only happen on large case size
units and only if the ratio of resin and epoxy
is incorrect, or if they are not completely
mixed.
14 EXTERNAL Tape recorder
B2-A-7245 MECHANICAL malfunctioned during
ANOMALY functional test.
Improper marking
Failure analysis revealed that 0.01 ttF
capacitors were mislabeled as 0.1 _F. Cross
sectioning of one improperly marked capacitor
and one properly marked capacitor showed a
difference in the number and spacing of the
plates.
SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITORS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
15 OPEN Capacitor failed Failure analysis revealed an inadequate solder
D5-68-OI, OIA Termination during vibration test. bond between the slug and the base of the
metallization capacitor. This resulted in failure (open)
• separation (slug to during vibration testing.
case)
16 OPEN
T9-A.72-OI Lead separation
Radiographic
inspection of
capacitors revealed a
dual lead between
pellet and end cap, a
fractured internal
lead, and a defective
weld.
Failure analysis by the manufacturer revealed
the problems were caused by human error,
and damage.
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SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITORS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NOo
PROBLEM AREA/
Ca USe
PROBLEM.
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
17
BBRC-68.01
SHORT
Breakdown of
dielectric
One capacitor tested
short upon receipt°
Another shorted after
t00 hours of
additional screening at
50 Vdc at 85°C.
Failure analysis disclosed a direct short
through dielectric film with evidence of high
current after initial dielectric breakdown
(caused by burn-in power supply through
slo-bio fuse). Flaws not picked up during
initial screenings, or that deteriorated with
time° were probable cause of breakdown.
18
K9-71-03
SHORT
Contamination -
internal solder balls
Radiographic
inspection of
capacitors disclosed
internal solder balls.
Solder balls were,caused duri?g lead tinning
operation which melted the internal solder. It
was established that the capacitor leads were
immersed into the solder pot too close to the
capacitor body.
19
MFSC-71_03. 03A.
03B
SHORT
Contamination o
solder between
tubelet and case
Capacitor shorted due
to reflow of internal
solder.
lnvestigatioo revealed solder from the tubelet
had melted and flowed internally between the
tubelet and case, causing a short. Excessive
heat during retinning of the lead. installation
on the board, or rework of the board solder
connection was indicated.
20
J._oT0-OI. 01A
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Wrong anodes
Leakage current
exceeds specification
in 35 to 100 percent
of devices following
burn-in.
Information received from manufacturer
indicates that 35-volt anodes were used instead
of the IO0-volt anodes which should have been
used.
21
R4-71-01, 0IS
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DCLEAKAGE
B_akdown of
dielectric
Capacitors exhibited
high dc leakage,
larger than typical dc
leakage versus
temperature, and
unstable dc leakage°
Problems were caused by marginal
performance parts coupled with overstressed
test conditions by the user.
22
L 1-70-01
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DISSIPATION
FACTOR
Poor solder bonds
Several capacitors
exhibited increasing
dissipation factors
subsequent to shock
testing.
Failure analysis of three units showed a.poor
solder bond to the anode. No other
discrepancies were noted. It was concluded
that the increasing dissipation factor was due
to poor solder bonds to the silver-coated
anodes.
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WET-SLUG TANTALUM CAPACITORS
ALERTI
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
23
MSC-68-11
ELECTRICAL
' PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Incorrect tantalum
risers
- LOW
CAPACITANCE
Improper cathode
preparation
A high failure rate
(47 failures out of
325 parts) resulted in
the entire lot being
rejected.
Failure analysis revealed that the leakage
current failures were caused by incorrect
length tantalum risers, and that capacitance
loss was caused by improper preparation of
the cathode.
24
GSFC 10-31-67
ELECTRICAL : Subject capacitor
PARAMETER developed excessive
DEVIATION - HIGH leakage current during
DC LEAKAGE . vacuum temperature
Electrolyte leakage cycling.
Failure analysis determined that electrolyte was
leaking through the teflon seal and being
trapped under the epoxy coating cre.ating adc
leakage path from the lead weld to the case.
The electrolyte leakage about the lead was
caused by different expansion coefficients
between the Teflon and the lead.
25
LeRC 7-18-66
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Defective internal
seal
During and after
random vibration,
subject capacitors
were observed to go
out of specification
on dc leakage.
Investigation revealed an electrical leakage path
from the anode to the case created by
electrolyte migration through the elastomer
bushing. It was also noted that the capacitor
is of marginal design in that the slug is not
always held firmly in place by the retainer
cup, allowing the slug to oscillate during
vibration and pump electrolyte through the
bushing.
26
CG-70-02
OPEN
Lead separation
Failure of a printed
wiring board was
traced to a faulty
capacitor.
An investigation showed that the external weld
on the anode lead had separated.
27
KSC-71-05
EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
- Defective seal
Visual inspection of a
failed capacitor
indicated electrolyte
leakage.
Failure analysis confirmed the leakage which
was caused by deformation of the Teflon
sealer probably resulting from crimping the
case during fabrication.
28
F3-72-02
EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Defective seal
Capacitors" glass
headers leaked acid.
The manufacturer confirmed that over etching
(a lead cleaning operation) caused the failure.
29
Sg-A-72-02
EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Defective seal
Several capacitors
were found leaking
around the seal area.
The manufacturer stated the problem was due
to a worn die in the closing machine.
30
MSFC_2_3
EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Defective seal
Electrolyte was found
leaking from a
capacitor.
Failure analysis showed leakage paths
occurring under, around, or through the
brazing material used for the final sealing.
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GLASS CAPACITORS
ALERT t
iTEM NO./
GIDEP NOo
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
31
IM.70.04
OPEN
Lead not fused to
plates
The capacitor would
open at approximately
9O°F and above.
Failure analysis revealed that one lead was not
fused to the plates. The method of lead
attachment is by pressure and heat.
Indentation on the plates indicated that
pressure had been applied hut apparently no
fusion took place. Operation of the capacitor
at elevated temperatures caused an open.
32
GSFC-68-05
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
SERGES
RESISTANCE
Void between end
cap and capacitive
clement
Capacitor failed
during a thermal
cycling test.
Failure analysis of the capacitor revealed a
I000 ohm series resistance. Analysis and
examination of the failed capacitor and other
capacitors° revealed voids between the end cap
and capacitive element.
33
D7-71-02
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
CAPACITANCE
Decrease in
dielectric .constant
Glass capacitors were
rejected because the
capacitance value was
below that specified.
During storage at a temperature below the
Curie point (45°C) there is a decrease in the
dielectric constant due to a change in the
crystalline structure of the dielectric which
causes a decrease in capacitance. Failure
analysis by the manufacturer revealed that the
production guard band for capacitance value
sort was insufficient to preclude aging rejects
for "V" characteristic capacitors.
MISCELLANEOUS CAPACITORS
TYPE;
ALERT.t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
AIR. VAR
34
L9-70-01
OPEN
Poor stator
terminal solder
connection
Trimmer capacitors
exhibited intermittent
failure.
Failure analysis revealed a low quality solder
connection inside the capacitor. Reflow of the
connection because of wave-soldering the
assembly caused the connection to degrade
further°
AIR, VAR
34
L9.70-01
UNADJUSTABLE
Contamination -
solder resin in
moving parts
Trimmer capacitor
would not adjust.
Solder resin was found in moving parts.
Analysis indicated resin was present prior to
installation.
AIR, VAR
35
JPL-68_02
SHORT
Contamination
metal particles
within the
capacitor
Short circuits
occurred in three
capacitors subjected
to subsystem
vibration.
Examination of the capacitors revealed metal
particles within the interior of the capacitor,
determined to be due to thread galling and
flaking. The-thread wear developed under
normal adjustment procedures and is directly
related to the quality of the threading and the
quality of the gold plating.
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MISCELLANEOUS CAPACITORS
TYPE;
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
AIR, VAR
36
GSFC-68. I0
SHORT
Deformed plates
.2 "
Repetitive alignment
problems and
• excessive currents
upon initial turn-on
were experienced
with transmitter
assemblies.
Internal examination revealed that the plastic
insulator disk used as a "stop" had slipped
out of position and was jammed between the
stator and rotor cylindrical plates causing them
to deform and short. Additional investigation
disclosed that the plastic "stop" diameter was
smaller than required to provide a press fit
with the center rotor cylinder. This condition
was attributed to shrinkage of the plastic after
the punching operation.
ALUM, ELECT
37
GSFC 4-8-66
OPEN
Internal lead
separation
During sine wave
vibration at 20 g
(peak.to.peak) the
capacitor failed as an
open.
Lack of end spacers caused motion of the
rolled foil inside the capacitor case. After a
redesign., using slightly compressed end
spacers, the vibration problem was solved.
However, a chemical reaction between the
electrolyte and the plastic end spacers caused
the capacitor to fail in life testing.
ALUM, ELECT
38
KSC-71.07
OPEN
Internal lead
separation
Capacitor in an audio
amplifier failed.
Failure analysis revealed an open circuit at a
point where the positive electrode first
encounters the electrolyte. Cause was an
electrochemical reaction in which the lead
between the positive electrode and the
aluminum electrode is dissolved.
ALUM, ELECT
39
R8.69-01
SEAL
DEGRADATION
Incompatibility of
materials
Use of *a halogenated
solvent wash can
cause deterioration of
the elastomer end
seal.
Aluminum electrolytic capacitors manufactured
in accordance with MIL-C-3901g (ref 10) are
exposed to subsequent increased failure
liability by subjecting them to any type of
halogenated solvent wash. This failure
mechanism is temperature, voltage, and time
dependent.
The risk of faihnre can be reduced by strict
process control of the wash cycles combined
with the use of an epoxy barrier over the
positive end seal of the capacitor.
MET-FILM
40
R4oA-72-01
EXTERNAL
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Improper marking
Two Jots of
capacitors were
received with
interchanged voltage.
Some 600 Vdc capacitors were marked with
the code for 200 Vdc, and some 200 Vdc
devices were marked with the code for 600
Vdc.
MET.MYLAR
41
DS.A.72.OI
OPEN
Lead separation
Capacitors exhibited
intermittent open
circuit during package
or system level test.
Failure analysis revealed the bond between the
lead spiral and metal end spray was broken.
X-ray examination prior to disassembly was
found to be inconclusive as to the integrity of
the end connection.
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MISCELLAN EOUS CAPACITORS
TYPE;
ALERT 1
iTEM "NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
M ET-PAPER
42
JPL 5-I1.66
OPEN
Internal lead
broken
Capacitor failed
(open) during
vibration test.
Internal visual inspection revealed that lead
wire had broken at the point where the lead
wire passes through the metal eyelet in the
glass end seal. This condition was caused by
loose construction of the capacitor element_
Vibration tends to cause intermittent and open
circuits°
MICA
43
GSFC-68-08
MYLAR FOIL
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
INSTABILITY
Damaged lead.tin
contact foil
Instability in a
subcarrier oscillator
was traced to two
faulty capacitors.
Failure analysis of the miniature, single
dip-coated mica dielectric capacitors revealed
damaged lead-tin contact foil. This problem is
att_buted to exposure to excessive temperature
during soldering the units into the equipment.
The miniature° thin.walled units are more
susceptible to such damage than the larger°
heavily_coated MILoCo5 (ref l I) styles.
If the miniature must he used, silver contact
foil should be specified and heat-sinking
provided during soldering operations.
OPEN Capacitor Failure analysis revealed that the capacitor had
44
MSFC 10-3_7
Improper bonding,
lead-to-foil
intermittently open. inadequate bonding (little or no solder) of the
pigtail to the capacitor foil, resulting in
intermittent or permanent open circuit when
subjected to vibrutiono
PAPER
45
LeRC 12-7_4
OPEN
Improper bending,
lead-to-foil
Capacitors exhibited
intermittent open
during vibration
testing.
Failure analysis revealed that the capacitor
failed in an intermittent open mode at the
lead-to-foil junction.
Manufacturer states that the problem is due to
poog workmanship associated with improper
heat adjustment and insufficient swaging
compound.
POLYSTYRENE
46
GSFC 4-8-66
OPEN
Improper lead
attachment
Capacitor developed
intermittent open
during temperature
cycling test between
+_'C and +50"C.
Intermittent condition
lasted for periods of
10-15 seconds during
temperature
transitions.
Failure analys;.s revealed poor resistance weld
between the capacitor lead and the tab insert.
The lead was resting on the insert so that a
mechanical contact was made. Under thermal
stress, the tab insert would bend away from
the lead causing the open circuit.
POLYSTYRENE
47
F6._8-01
SHORT
Breakdown of
dielectric
All capacitors tested
shorted when
received in a lot of
75 each, and a lot of
49 each.
Failure analysis disclosed a direct short
through dielectric films. If capacitors exceed
85"C, permanent damage can result.
MISCELLANEOUS CAPACITORS
TYPE;
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
TA FOIL
48
F3-72.O3
OPEN
Lead separation
Leads fell off a
capacitor•
Manufacturer used incorrect weld schedule to
butt weld replacement leads.
TA FOIL
49
MSC lIo15-65
SHORT
Electrolyte leakage
Capacitors short as a
result of 125°C
thermovacuum test.
The tantalum connecting lead wire i_ soldered
to a nickel wire internal to the capacitor, h
is at this point (between the nickel anode wire
and case) that a short circuit is produced
when sufficient electrolyte leakage occurs
through the center of the seal.
TA FOIL
50
GSFC 6-22-67,
Add 7.6-67
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Internal seal
defective -
Approximately 25
percent of 150 units
submitted to incoming
inspection exhibited
excessive dc leakage
between insulated
terminals and case.
Manufacturer attributes the dc leakage to
improperly cured insulating material on the
internal surface of the glass sealed header
allowing electrolyte to escape from the inner
case.
TA FOIL
51
GSFC-71-06
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
DC LEAKAGE
Contamination -
metallic particles in
the mylar sleeving
Capacitors displayed
low terminal-to-case
insulation resistance.
Failure analysis revealed: (I) a metallic
contaminant embedded in the mylar sleeving
insulating internal metal-cased capacitor
elements from the outer metal can. and (2) the
internal epoxy potting compound was tacky
and poorly cured. A 398°K bake for one hour
cured the epoxy.
TA FOIL EI.ECTRICAL
52 PARAME.TER
J5-68-01 DEVIATION - LOW
CAPACITANCE
Faulty anode
lead-to-foil welds
Of 55 units tested, 35 - Failure analysis attributed the problem to
failed after burn-in machine and operator error,
due to low
capacitance_
NOTE:
Io Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of connectors and to suggest
approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The connector section is presented with the following organization:
General
Basic failure problems associated with connectors are identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
Subtopics - Treatment of Specific Types
I. Connector type background.
2. For those in the process of selecting parts and manufacturers or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of one selected type. Particular
emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
3. Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is .arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal that problem.
Connector Types. Connectors have been divided into subtopics according to their physical configuration. Cylindrical
multipin and RF connectors have been discussed in depth as they are the types most commonly used in equipments.
Other subtopics dealing with adapter, rectangular, etc. type connectors include only summaries of ALERT reports.
FAILURE MODES
Failure Categories. Part level failure problems associated with connectors may be lumped under four basic categories:
catastrophic opens, catastrophic shorts, mechanical and electrical parameter deviation, and mechanical damage. It must
he recognized that catastrophic opens and shorts are worst-case conditions of certain electrical parameter deviations.
ELIMINATING DEFECTIVES
Problem Solving Approach. The approach taken in this section will be to identify the user-encountered problem areas
associated with a particul_ type of connector, then provide suggestions for eliminating those connectors prone to
exhibiting such problems at the finished connector level, the design level, and at the manufacturing level.
Design Level. Certain design compromises'are inevitable, however, reliable equipment can be built if. these compromises
are recognized and proper precautions are taken in the equipment design to minimize the effects of these compromises.
Design deficiencies must be identified and eliminated at the manufacturer's facility.
Manufacturing Level. The most carefully conceived design can he brought to nought if it is manufactured in an
environment lacking necessary controls over critical materials and processes and allowing substandard workmanship. The
technique for removing those potential reliability degraders is to take action to correct the manufacturing conditions by
applying controls and providing inspection points.
.
°
4o3
FAILURE ANALYSIS
_e. A primary objective of failure analysis i_ to identify failure mechanisms at a level .,uch that corrective action
is feasible. Knowing nothing more about a connector than that it is shorted does not allow effective corrective action.
If we learn that the open is caused by silver sulfide, we now have identified a mechanism suitable for corrective action.
The silver can be eliminated, or the conditions that enhance creation of the sulfide can be c_ntrolled.
Failed Part Rarity. A part in a failed condition must be considered by its owner as a jewel, a "'once-in-a-million"
occurrence, a phenomenon he may never again be privileged to witness. Only if one starts from that position may there
exist a reasonable chance of performing a successful failure analysis.
Failure Verification. After recording all identifying external markings, and performing a thorough external and radiographic
inspection, the first requirement is to verify the failure. Too often the wrong part is removed from the circuit, or an
equipment test error, rather than a part failure, results in a good part being delivered for failure analysis.
Analysis Direction. The process of analyzing a failure, performing those steps necessary on a •suspect.device which will
result in the identification of a specific correctable failure mechanism, requires the coordination of a series of specialized
skills by one having knowledge of failure mechanisms, device design, and manufacturing techniques; and the experience
necessary to organize this combination of skills and knowledge into a practical plan of action.
When to Analyze. Many part failures occur for which no corrective action is planned to be taken. In many cases it
is most cost effective to simply scrap the defective part and replace it with one that performs properly. Where it is
necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur, a portion of this section is devoted to describing some
of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis.
Reliability/Life. It is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the part level (analysis of design and
manufacturing, and effective failure analysis), that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
404
TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING CONNECTOR
MALFUNCTIONS
General. The majority of connectors are supplied to users as unassembled _'oups of component parts in order that they
may be assembled onto wires or other system components. It follows that screening in the usual sense is a fruitless
procedure as the findings are invalidated by the subsequent disassembly for incorporation into the final configuration.
On the otherhand, a review of the ALERT reports found Jn this section will reveal that the reported malfunctions fall
into four broad categnries: (I) design inadequacies, (2) manufacturer process control. (3) installation procedures, and (4)
installation/rework tooling, and if the problems can be properly categorized, they should be amenable to control or
correction.
The techniques required, in their order of application, are: configuration analysis, meaningful inspection at time of
receipt, adequate failure analysis, and maintenance of a good failure history.
Configuration Analysis. The first item consists of ascertaining the construction and geometrical arrangement of the
component parts of the connector in the final assembled form plus the materials of construction, including platings, of
each component. This information is assessed to determine the possibility of enhancement of corrosion and other forms
of degradation caused by the presence of materials that can exude attacking monomers and compounds such as sulphur.
The possibility of galvanic corrosion can also be determined at this time. Furthermore. this information is the basis
from which application notes and incoming inspection instructions are prepared.
Receiving Inspection. Meaningful inspection at time of receipt is more than a mechanical check of identification and
damage. A review of the information obtained by configuration analysis will reveal other significant items that. must be
controlled, such as thickness and porosity of gold plating on pins and contacts..Control of gold plating on incoming
items is only afforded by destructive metallurgical analysis on a sampling basis.
Failure Analysis. Analysis of failed or malfunctioning connectors is too often limited to disassembly/dissection of the
failed device. As connectors are normally assembled and installed by the user. it is cogent to review the history of the
connector with respect to prior storage, assembly, and usage. For frequently it is only by this comprehensive review
that the true cause of a so-called "shop error" can be traced to a design inadequacy or manufacturer processing error.
rather than inadequate shop instructions, procedures, or tools.
Failure Records. Every known failure and malfunction of a connector should be recorded in one central location with
respect to actual cause of failure as determined by competent analysis, plus identity of connector and vendor. Periodically,
histograms should he constructed for those failures associated with each device. Systematic review of this information
can lead to design modifications, improvement in manufacturer's process control, and improvement in shop procedures
and tools.
4.5
CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN AND RF CONNECTORS,
CHARACTERISTICS
Basic Considerations. A connector is a device consisting of a plug and a receptacle that provides a mechanical disconnect
ability between the various components/subassemblies within an electrical circuit. To insure reliability, the completed
connection must be electrically and mechanically stable° Mechanical instability can contribute to subsequent malfunctions
such as increased resistance, intermit,ants, opens, etc. The connector plug or receptacle is the eermination of internal
circuit leads and/or cables. Connections are made to the individual wires by crimping, soldering, welding, and/or the
clamping action of internal mechanical closures. The coupling system between the plug and receptacle of a connector
typically is one of several styles: push-pull, bayonet, screw-on, or rack and panel° Connectors are available in various
configurations such as cylindrical multipin, RF, NEMA (household appliance type), rectangular, and printed wiring types.
In order to give the reader some insight into the differences that may be encountered, the two types most commonly
employed in aerospace systems, cylindrical multipin and RF. are briefly discussed below.
Cylindrical Multipin Connectors. Cylindrical multipin connectors consist of a regular array of individual contacts within
a cylindrical protective shell. The most commml construction provides for connection by entry of a pin contact into a
female socket contact for each circuit. The pins are mounted in the plug or receptacle connector section by implanting
into an insulation insert that may he firm or resilient. The female socket, consisting of a tubular insert or holder that
contains a conlacting spring, is also moun!ed in the plug or receptacle connector _ction by implanting into an insulation
insert that may be firm or resilient° Positive mating retention between plug and receptacle is provided, generally, by a
locking mechanism, such as bayonet, push-pull or engaging screw threads. (The physical arrangement of these componenes
may be seen in the exploded view of. a typical connector found in Eigure 4-1.) The pins and socket components may
or may not be removable and replaceable. In the event that localized repair cannot be accomplished by replacemem of
one of these components, inadvertent damage to only one pin or socket .can cause the replacement of the entire unit.
One of the primary characteristics of this type of device is that all connections must be made simultaneously. Cocked,
bent° or broken pins or contacts can result in a malfunction. An obvious disadvantage is that minute contamination
within a female contact would not he visible, but could result in an open circuit cjondition and/or damage to the contacting
surface of either the pin or contact.
RF Connectors. RF connectors normally consist of only one pin and socket connector co-axially mounted within a
metallic protective shell that also serves as a shield against stray electrical fields. The other physical features are similar
to the above description of the cylindrical connector with exception of construction of the female contact and rigidity of
insert material. The female contact is normally a simple split cavity within the approximate center of the contact, and
the required flexure is limited by the resiliency of the center contact material. Usually the insulation insert tends to be
firm°
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CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN AND RF CONNECTORS
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Desilln Considerations. Sillnificant consideration that must be observed in the design of connectors include the following:
I. Adequate conductivity.
2. Surfaces that are resistant to corrosion, tarnishing, and attack by any component of the environments that will
be encountered during the life of the device.
3. Surfaces that are resistive to delFadation by abrasion.
4. Inherent positive mechanical stability. •
_° Configuration to minimize entry of possible,contaminants, including moisture and degrading gases.
6. Physical design that minimizes inadvertent damage at time of installation and/or subsequentconnection/disconnection
operations. Not to be overlooked, the design should be amenable to economical repair.
Fabrication Considerations. From the information at hand, the following areas .are those over which the manufacturer
must maintain stringent control: contaminants, potting mixing and application, dimensions of finished components, and
piatin8 procedures. The 'most significant of this is plating for without adequate control, the plating can be friable,
porous, or too thin. Any of these conditions can increase the possibility of abrasive damage and/or corrosion..
i.
Installation Considerations. As connectors are generally supplied to the user as groups of individual components that are
assembled onto the appropriate wire to form a connector, a significani amount of the difficulties encountered with
connectors are created at time of installation. The use of improper or wrong tools often results in bent pins, cracked
or split insulation inserts, etc. which result in subsequent malfunctions, it is imperative for the successful use of
connectors that the installing personnel be prbperly instructed and be supplied with appropriate tools.
Special Parameters. The above discussion has served to define application limitations of connectors related to physical
characteristics associated with the materials used and with techniques used in the manufacture and installation of the
devices. These limitations can be described as specification limits and application notes for use by manufacturers and
using designers. Deviations from these limits can lead to equipment failure. The next subsection will describe problems
and failure :mechanisms found in connectors caused_by design deficiency, lack of process control, and inadequate quality
control.
TYPICAL
ITEM NO. ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
I Plug Shell O-Ring Silicone rubber
2 Socket Contact Body Leaded copper
3 Socket Contact Spring Leaded copper
4 Pin Contact Beryllium copper
._ Contact Retaining Beryllium copper
Sleeve
6 Front and Rear Insert Transfer moldable plastic
? Grommet Silicone rubber
CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN CONNECTOR DESIGN (Figure 4-1)
8 O-Ring Silicone rubber
9 Retaining Nut Aluminum alloy
4.7
ITEM NO. ITEM NAME
|0 l.sert Retaining Beryllium copper
Spring
........... | i ............ Seal ................ Silicone rubber
12 Snap Ring Corrosion resistant steel
13 Mounting Washer Aluminum alloy
14 Mounting Nut Aiuminum alloy
- I.'; Receptacle Housing Aluminum Alloy
16 Insert Seal Silicone rubber
17 Follower Aluminum alloy
18 Plug Retaining Nut Aluminum alloy
19 Plug Shell Aluminum alloy
-_0 Washer Teflon
21 Locking Spi'ing Aluminum alloy
22 Coupling Ring Aluminum alloy
23 Rear Coupling Ring Aluminum alloy
I
-_4 Front Coupling Ring Aluminum alloy
MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
o
4.8
Figure 4-I. Typical Cylindrical Multipln Connector
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CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN AND RF CONNECTORS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
I
General. Failure analysis is a corrective action procedure. Only _ter i_nowing why a parr failed can action be taken
to minimize future failures° The results of failure analysis can show the need for redesign, improvernen_ _n installation
and esting _echniques, changes in application information, and/or modification of ghe basic pan by improvement of
materials, processes and control thereof as used in the fabrication of the part. i
Predominant Failures. The principal failure mode for all connectors is an open condition. The open condition is
generally caused by contamination interfering with the normal operational mode of the contacts.
Failure Analysis Flow. The failure analysis flow diagram (Figure 4-2 which follows) provides for maximum nondestructive
evaluation of ghe suspect part prior to application of any destructive techniques.
Relationship Io Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedures (Figure 4-2)is relaied to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus° one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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TEST/EXAMINATION
NONDE._TRUCTIVE ]MECHANICAL
i
External Visual _ ___
Examination
I
Rad/ota_phicInspection
[PROBLEM AREA
I VERIFICATION I
I
NONDESTRUCTIVE
ELECTRICAL l
I
i parameter
Verification
[
INDUCING FAILURES
I
I Coud/tioning
I
Verification _--
PROBLEM CAUSE
VERIFICATION I
,Disassembly
I
Retrieval and
Extmlnattou
I
i-oi
L-- HMicrochemistryMicroprobeSpectrographic
PROCEDURE
Record all identification turks and damage
' (photographs preferred)
If fixed focus X-ray is used, photograph in
two mutually orthogonal planes as _equ/red to
record any inter/or anomalies. If Vid/con
(imaging) is used, examine and record "
anomalies as observed
Verify values of all parameters using methods
as described in the applicable specifications.
These tests should be performed in the as-
received condition, either in the mated or de-
mated state, and then repeated in the opposite
stete as applicable. The mechanical parame-
ters, such as separation force, should be
performed as an adjunct to these tests
Temperature cycling, vibration, immersion
and exposure to high humid/W, shock, etc.,
only if required to confirm problem area
Repeat applicable parameter verification tests
and record any observed changes
Progressively disassemble and record all
observed anomalies
Solvent clean all component parts of the
disassembled connector and recover all
d/nlodged films and particulate material.
Identify constituent materials of the d/s-
lodged materials and their source
MetullurLdcally section components as re-
quired to provide positive identification of
voids, weld defects, plating anomalies, etc.
May be used in conjunction with any of the
foregoing destructive analysis techniques.
Analyze all foreign mater/al not otherwise
identifiable
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV DAM
I II HI IV
E A.B" A,B,C,
F,G
AtB, C,
E,G,H
all all
Figure 4.2. Cylindrical Multlpi. and RF Connectors -"Typical Failure A.alysig Flow with
Related Problem Codes
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Cylindrical Multipin, RF, and Miscellaneous Connectors are shown below°
They are listed according to Problem Area-most frequent to least frequent occurrences, except the Miscellaneous are
listed by type°
CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN
ALERT NO) PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION
CONNECTORS
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
ARC 4-3-67 OPEN A discontinuity was
Defective found in one pin
component during systems test.
An over-drilled solder well in a connector pin
resulted in collapse of the pin during original
fabrication of the connector; Continuity was
provided by "friction '° contact between the
two broken sections. The continuity was
destro),ed during incorporation of the defective
connector in aerospace equipment.
$9o71-01. OPEN Pencil clip retention
$9.72-0l Defective mechanism was found
component to be improperly
formed on the female
contacts.
The clip was caused to lie in one of the two
following improper positions in relation to the
contact, resulting in an open.
I° Too far into the contact° allowing the
mating connector to crush it.
2. Not placed far enough into the contact.
MSFC-A-72-11 OPEN A discontinuity was
Defective discovered during
component' functional test.
Engagement ends of five socket contacts (split
line, open entry type) were spread resulting in
zero withdrawal forces causing discontinuity.
Contact cavities in hard plastic insert of
connector prevents entrance of oversize pin
contacts or test probes.
MSC-68-09 OPEN Pin collapsed after
Application melting.
problem
Improperly sized circuit breaker fa/led to trip
during probe testing of pin.
MSC-68-05 OPEN
Incorrect part used
Connector parts
would mate
mechanically but
would not provide
electrical continuity.
Two pin containing plugs were inadvertently
connected with a screw-on coupling.
MSFC-68-22 OPEN
Contamination
Electrical
discontinuity was
observed after mating
of connector°
Connector pins were coated with Carnuba wax
for lubrication.
D4-70-3o3 A OPEN
Installation
procedures
Excessively recessed
pin contacts in
inserts.
Solder procedures other than those
recommended by manufacturer can soften
adhesive used to secure location of pin
contacts. This can result in axial relocation of
the inserts°
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CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN CONNECTORS
ALERT NO. I PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
o .
O4-A-72-01 OPEN Connectors with Improper seating can result in open or short
Installation back.loaded insertable circuit.
procedure contacts are subject
to contacts recessing
if not properly
seated.
KSC 3-30-67 OPEN
Missing parts
Open within circuit
caused equipment
malfunction.
One pin in plug had less retention than other
pins in same plug. Comparison of the
removed pin with similar pins revealed that the
retaining ring within the pin was missing.
SMD.68-075 OPEN
Inadequate design
Contact pin fails to
contact socket
properly.
The pins and sockets of this connector are
fixed by hard potting resulting in the pin
contacting only the retention spring. The
retention spring has a high resistance.
MSC-Tb01 OPEN
Inadequate design
Connector failed
intermittently open in
the shield circuit.
Investigation revealed the crimp support sleeve
had been finger tightened, the thread utilized
is a 12-28 with I-I/2 threads of engagement.
and a star type Iockwasher is the locking
device. Manufacturer has redesigned the
connector with a finer pitch thread, no locking
device, and a specified torque value.
M SFC-72-04 OPEN
Inadequate design
Misalignment of pins
and sockets occurs
when using coupler
adapters from one
manufacturer to
couple connectors
from a different
manufacturer.
Worst case tolerance build-up occurs wherein
the pin contacts may not engage the spring
member of the socket contacts. Situation is
caused because the critical mating dimensions
are controlled differently - receptacle
controlled from the nose of the connector
while the adapter is controlled from the rear
of the device.
KSC 9.16-64 OPEN
Contamination
Silver sulfide film
found on surface of
gold-plate
When gold is plated over silver, the silver
tends to slowly diffuse through the gold.
With time, a thin film of silver will form on
the surface. Exposure to the atmosphere
normally presents enough sulphur to form
silver sulfide.
MSC°71.02,02A OPEN
Incorrect part
dimensions
Connector pin would
not mate with the
socket in the mating
connector.
The distance between pin end to shell face
was in excess of that specified. Investigation
by the manufacturer disclosed that improper
manufacturing, inspection, and test procedures
had been used.
MSFC-TI-05 OPEN
Incorrect part
dimensions
Five contacts could
not be inserted in the
holes in a CV type
connector insert.
Analysis revealed the contact retention
shoulders were oversize.
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CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN CONNECTORS
ALERT NO. t PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
MSC I0-I 1-66 SHORT An equipment fire
• Contamination resulted from loss of
(moisture) hermeticity and
resulting entry of
moisture.
Potting, used to seal out moisture° was faulty
and not properly bonded because embedded
Teflon coated conductors were not etched.
Evidence of moisture was found adjacent to
connector pins.
D4_9_I SHORT Pin shorted to
Contamination connector shell by
metallic sliver.
X-ray examination of the defective connector
revealed a metallic sliver in the silicone
insulation insert.
D7o70_2 SHORT Broken fine of
Broken component retention clip shorted
pin to connector
shell.
Analysis established that a defective removal
tool was being used and was causing multiple
varieties of damage to the retention, clips.
G3o70_1 MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOSS
OF HERMETICITY
Bond failure
Socket seal bond
failed because of
contamination.
Gross !eakage around sockets occurred as a
result of failure of the socket seal bond.
Investigation revealed that failure was caused
by improper cleaning at time of application of
adhesive, which resulted in entrained
contamination.
KSC 12-13-67 MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
RETENTION FORCE
Defective
component
Shell rotated because
of faulty preload
coupling springs
Improper heat treating of preload coupling
springs resulted in the springs taking a
permanent set.
MSFC.71-15 MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
RETENTION FORCE
Defective
component
Polarizing index pins
fell out of connectors
subjected to vibration
The polarizing pin did not have sufficient
retention to withstand specified vibration
levels°
F3._8_01o F3.68.O2 MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
RETENTION FORCE
Defective
components
Improper locking
action observed
during pre-flight
check
Dissection of a connector revealed detent holes
in the coupling nut were not located or shaped
in accordance with specification requirements.
B8_9_l MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
EXCESSIVE
MATING FORCE
Process out of
control
Connectors were
difficult to mate
Defective manufacturing processes, including
dimensional discrepancies and plating
variations, resulted in difficulty when
assembling the mating connector.
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CYLINDRICAL MULTIPIN CONNECTORS
ALERT NO. 1 PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION '_ PROBLEM ANALYSIS
K4-71-03 MECHANICAL Coupling rings fell off When the minimum interference fit (C-ring into
PARAMETER connectors during coupling ring groove) is approached, the
DEVIATION - mating connector thrust washer has a diametrical
CONNECTOR movement, which combined with the
COMES APART egg-shaped distortion of the coupling ring
Inadequate design during mating, results in the C-ring unseating
and the connector falling apart.
MSC l_7_ MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Contamination
(corrosion)
Gold-plated pins were
discolored by a black
film (silver sulfide).
Protective cap that is placed over open
connector ends when connector is disengaged
was fabricated from black butyl rubber, which
contains elemental surfur. Some of the caps
were also discolored by a yellowish film.
D7-70-01 MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Incorrect part
dimensions
Individual pin barrier
seal not properly
seated when
periphery seal
compressed.
Molded barriers of pin insert were not
dimensioned in accordance with specification
requirements.
MSFC-68.3A MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Incorrect part
dimensions
Cavity retention
device was damaged
during rework.
Insertion-bullet-shank length portion of the
contact was not per specification. Insertion of
the socket would cause damage to the socket
cavity retention device.
KSC_7_2 MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Chemical attack
The silicone insert
was damaged when
cleaned by immersion
in Freon-TF.
Many hydrocarbon cleaning agents, such as
Freon, trichloroethylene, will damage virtually
all rubher-like compounds when in contact
with the elastomer for any appreciable length
of time.
• EI-70_I MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Inadequate design
The rear threaded
part of the connector
turned out of the
shell during rework
and caused damage to
the sealing grommet.
A slight rotary motion on the rear thread part
applied a rotary motion on the
grommet/hard-insert bond and distorted the
sealing cavities in the grommet.
E9_9_7 MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Process out of
control
Connectors broke
during cable
manufacture.
Shell insert retention grooves had been
machined to wrong dimension which resulted
in localized thinning of the shell wall.
G4.A-72_I MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Process out of
control
Excessive bonding
material spillover into
connector cavity from
insulator sandwich
bonding operation,
and excessive
misalignment of
sandwiched insulators
Condition prevented contacts from properly
seating with normal insertion forces.
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RF CONNECTORS
ALERT NOo I
(GIDEP)
PROBLEM AREA/
Cou$o
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
DT.A.72-08 OPEN
Incorrect part used
Contacts would not
intermate.
The crimp version and solder version contacts
for the same connector body will not
intermate.
K9.7i.06 OPEN
Contamination
Connectors showed a
high insertion loss.
Failure analysis revealed some devices were
dimensionally out of specification and others
contained metallic particles on the recessed
Teflon surface.
_9.A-72-01 OPEN
Contamination
Box level continuity
problems were
isolated to a
connector.
Failure analysis revealed that the screw
threads of the contact interconnect had
Locktite coating which formed an insulating
film between the threads°
C6-71o03 OPEN
Process out of
control
Receptacle separated
at the brazed body
joint following test.
Microscopic examination of the failed joint
reveale.d that the silver solder preform had not
been heated sufficiently to melt the solder.
Analysis also revealed defective center
conductor threads and Locktite comamination.
G4-7O-01 SHORT
Incorrect part
dimensions
Center conductor of
coaxial cable shorted
to connector shell.
Improper seating of center pin contact results
in short circuit failure of the mating coaxial
cable. This condition causes the center socket
of the mating plug connector to be forced
back, buckling the center conductor of the
coaxial cable and shorting to the shell of the
connector.
MSC.A.72.01 ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
EXCESSIVE RF
LEAKAGE
Inadequate design
Connectors exhibited
excessive RF leakage.
Isolation was -60 dB
at 2 to 3 MHz.
should be' .90 dB
minimum.
Analysis revealed that the shield was not in
positive contact. Addition of a swage washer
provided positive metal-to-metal contact by
clamping the braid from the outside.
LaRC 3-2-67 MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Inadequate design
Pin entered between
socket and insert and
split insert.
The connector construction allowed the end of
the pin to be displaced from the center line by
weight of the coaxial cable or some other
similar force. Since there is no provision for
guiding the pin into the socket, entry of the
pin between the socket and insert results.
LI_9_I MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Process out of
control
Coupling nuts came
off of connector
when subjected to
pull test.
Inadequate swaging of coupling nuts resulted
in about g percent of them coming off of the
connectors. Other mechanical defects
indicated inadequate machining and inspection
control.
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE.
Incorrect part
dimensions
The coupling nut of
the coaxial plug
separated from the
connector body.
The rear faces of the retaining ring groove
were machined improperly with a sloped
instead of a square face.
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MISCELLANEOUS CONNECTORS
TYPE; .
ALERT NO.'
(GIDEP)
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
ADAPTER
KSC-70-13
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION.
POLARITY
REVERSAL
Specification error
Signal though the
adapter reversed
polarity
Adapter had wrong key configuration because
of error in MIL-C-3655/,I (ref 12).
HUBBELL
GSFC-70-10. 10A
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
Installation
methods
Connector overheated.
arced, and caused a
minor fire.
The connector was improperly installed.
Copper tips (supplied by the manufacturer) for
the stranded wires in the cable to which the
connector was attached were not used.
JACK
KSC-71-01
OPEN
Process out of
control
Intermittent failure of
normal-through
contacts to make
continuity.
Analysis showed some jacks had cross-pin
contactor not centered in plunger mechanism.
while some had a larger or sironger spring
which "binds in the barrel and prevents the
plunger's return to normal contact position.
Contact resistance varied from 20 milliohms to
infinity.
RECT
KSC 11.17-66
OPEN
Process out of
control
Open circuits were
observed in electrical
terminal distributors.
Weld failures in a female-to-female contact,
intended to connect two patching wires to a
single pin, resulted in loss of continuity.
RECT
KSC-69-19
OPEN
Contamination
Flow of solder flux
or potting compounds
in nonhermetic
connectors can cause
increased contact
resistance or
intermittents.
Laboratory analysis revealed that the contacts
of nonhermetically sealed connectors may
become contaminated by solder flux or potting
compounds. Solder flux is difficult to detect
visually as it is extremely thin and transparent.
However. after the contacts have been
engaged and disengaged, the normal rubbing
action will transform the flux into an opaque.
whitish deposit.
RECT
K SC-71-04
SHORT
Contamination
Connectors
demonstrated
intermittent shorts
between pins
Investigation revealed shorts were caused by
corrosion or contaminant particles forming a
bridge between pins. Cause of the problem
believed to be a flow of air (with traces of
hydrogen sulfide and moisture) over the
unprotected base of the connectors.
RECT
GSFC 69-12, 12A
MECHANICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - LOW
RETENTION FORCE
Vendor testing
Socket contacts failed
a contact separation
test during test prior
to fabrication
Investigation revealed that the crimp which
secures the contact sleeve to the contact had
failed, allowing the sleeve to slide toward the
rear of the contact. This condition was
caused by excessive force applied to the
contact sleeve during a retention test
performed by the vendor.
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MISCELLANEOUS CONNECTORS
TYPE; .
ALERT NOo' PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
RECT MECHANICAL During assembly by
GSFC-70-05 PARAMETER user. abnormally high
DEVIATION mating forces and
EXCESSIVE contact insertion
MATING FORCE forces were observed
Process out of
control
Defective processing, including misalignment of
socket insert components and inclusion of
out-of-round retention clips, resulted in
abnormally high force requirements for
insertion of contacts and mating.
RECT MECHANICAL During mechanical
MSFC 7-12.67 DAMAGE inspection, cracked
Bent and cracked .and bent components
were observed.components
A commercial part produced without any
" special test or inspection requirement.
RECT MECHANICAL Broken female
Eg-68_q6 DAMAGE contact found during
Process out of acceptance testing of
control cable assembly
Fracture occurred at necked.down center area
of crimp barrel. Depth of hole exceeded
tolerance and penetrated into solid part of
shank.
RECT MECHANICAL Subminiature plugs
XI-71-OI DAMAGE and receptacles failed
Process out of during torquing
control operations.
The female jacking hardware and the female
sockets contacts fractured because the holes
had been drilled too deep in both the jacket
socket and socket contact. This action
resulted in a very thin wall of material being
lefto
RECT MECHANICAL Transistor socket
KSC-71-03, 03A DAMAGE leads were broken
Broken leads when mounting the
sockets in a printed
wiring board hole.
Leads were forced to bend, decreasing their
bend radius, because the printed wiring board
did not contain relief slots.
PRINTED OPEN Loss of signal was
CIRCUIT BOARD Defective experienced at the
Y 1-72-01 component connector/card
interface during
chassis check-out.
Examination of connectors revealed: (I)
cracks along back_ (2) bowing of connector
body, (3) decrease in contact pressure of
center contacts, and (4) movement of contact
element out of contact with the board.
Failure analysis by the manufacturer disclosed
cracking of the insulator body during use
caused by internal stress cracks which
occurred during manufacture.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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INTRODUCTION
_e. The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of fasteners and
to provide approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
General. Fasteners. as opposed to other attaching methods such as soldering, brazing, bonding, etc. described elsewhere
in this publication, are permanent or removable attachments. Although fasteners can be fabricated from phenolics and
other plastic materials, the majority are constructed from metals, with an emphasis on the higher strength alloys such as
A-286 CRES, for self-evident structural reasons.
Mechanical Fastening Systems. These may be divided into two general classifications:
I. Permanent: such as rivets, Iockbolts, etc.. which normally require the destruction of a part to disassemble
(obviously not for routine maintenance).
2. Removable: consisting of threaded components, for which removal is accomplished during routine maintenance
without destruction of any pan.
Problem Description. The problems are first defined by use of specific examples cited in ALERT reports, and then by
using the broader base of information available from other industry and government investigations.
Problem Prevention. Problem prevention is dealt with by providing relevant information with respect to tooling, design
factors, and inspoctJoncriteria as applicable.
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
Problem areas and causes associated with Fasteners are shown below. Suggested actions fer minimizing the problems
are indicated as applicable° The "ALERT ITEM NO. '° relates each entry to the summaries of ALERT reports which
are presented in the last portion of the Fastener Section,
FASTENERS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
NUT FRACTURE
Process control I
BOLT HEAD FAILURE
Process control 2
SCREW SEIZURE
Process control 3
NUT SUPPORT BRACKET FAILURE
Process control 4
Adequate inspection at time of receipt.
• including metallurgical examination as required.
Manufacturer institute adequate QC
procedures.
o
NUT CRACKED
Hydrogen embrittlement 5
Adequate inspection at time of receipt,
including metallurgical examination. Testing
for hydrogen embrittlement should be specified
in the procurement document.
NUT FAILURE
Stress corrosion/hydrogen embrittlement
Control use and location of materials that
accelerate corrosion of structural members
subject to mechanical stressing.
CRACKED STUDS
Faulty material 7
Specify correct material on the procurement
document. Manufacturer institute adequate QC
procedures. Metallurgical inspection at time of
receipt
BROKEN SCREW
Improper material 8
BOLT HEAD FAILURE Limit use of stress-corrosion sensitive materials
Stress corrosion 9 for fabrication of structural attachments.
IMPROPER LUBRICANT Do not use cetyl alcohollubricated or green
Incompatibility of materials 10 dye coded fasteners in LOX atmosphere.
CRACKED LOCKWASHERS Cadmium plated steel parts should be tested
Hydrogen embrittlement II on a lot basis to insure that parts meet the
required physical properties. Testing for
hydrogen embrittlement should be specified in
the procurement document;
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THREADED FASTENERS
REMOVABLE (THREADED) FASTENING SYSTEMS
General. The following discussion will center on the removable type of threaded fasteners, with particular attention to
the medium-to-high strength alloys, such as A-286 CRES and 6AL-4V titanium. While the majority of fasteners being
used are of the permanent type, the problems associated with removable fasteners receive the most attention.
Rim0vable Fasteners. This classification includes bolts, studs, nuts, piatenuts, inserts, tapped holes, along with a large
array of retained panel and other special fastening systems. Torque is applied either to the bolt head or the nut element
through such external drive configurations as the hexagon, 12-point, or spiine; and through such bolt head internal
recesses as the Torq-Set, Hi-Torque, Phillips, Tri-Wing, square, and hexagon shapes.
Lockin B Methods. The mechanical Or frictional locking element of the threaded fastening system is designed to prevent
separation under vibration° This locking effect is achieved in the bolt by the use of plastic (nylon, vespel) inserts, by
controlled thread deformation, or by providing drilled holes for safetying in either bolt head or the threaded end.
Similarly, the nut element may have plastic inserts, crimped or deformed threads, or have castellated provisions for
safetying. Another separate part, the lock washer, is a less desirable device. In aerospace applications, its use should
he avoided if the contamination (metallic/finish particulate matter) generated by it can affect electronic circuitry or
interfere with optical equipment. In other fields, factors such as the cost of stocking and handling a separate component
and the potential loss of the lock washer upon routine disassembly should be considered.
ALERT Problems. Some of the ALERT reports summarized herein are problems representing various facets of inadequate
quality control practices. Others reflect the fact that the designer failed to consider all environmenta! factors as well as
the strength requirements affecting his selection of a fastening system.
Galled/Stripped Threads. A major problem area in threaded fastening systems is the galled or stripped thread. This
failure mode is potentially present whenever a locking element is required or if the improper thread lubrication is used.
Other factors could be oversize or undersize threads or incompatible materials. The usual indicator is excessive torque
on installation or removal.
Choosing a System. It is suggested that the designer choosing a fastening system use care to see that the combination
of nut and bolt delivers the locking force desired, free of excessive torque. Normally the requirement of compliance
with MIL-N-2_027 (ref 13) is specified. A simple bench test of the actual parts can verify performance. In addition,
the smoking and outgussing of the materials involved should be considered if applicable to the design. On critical
applications, consideration should be given to assuring adequate identification of system components.
Excessive • Torque. Excessive torque leads to the consideration of another problem -- the "cammed out" internal
wrenching recess in the bolt head. This occurs when the driving tool damages the recess as torque is applied. This
results in having to drill out and replace the damaged bolt. The solution lies in the selection of the proper recess, or
external wrenching bolt head configuration (and tool) and, as above, matching the nut "crimping" to the bolt material.
Vibration/Fatizue. Vibration and fatigue can be of major concern to the designer in the selection of the proper threaded
fastening system. Fatigue characteristics of high strength materials (160.180 ksi and above) have been improved in recent
years by the application of rolling techniques to the forming of the thread configuration as in MIL-S-8879 (ref 14) and
to the head-to-shank fillet. This is particularly true in the A-286 CRES material in the higher strength ranges. Recent
innovations in threa_ design, i.e., the thread an_e and lead control, have resulted in a better load distribution. Extensive
testing has demonstrated an increase in fatigue life on the order of 20 percent.
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RECESS SYSTEMS
DISCUSSION
Definition. A recess is defined as a manufactured groove, slot, or depression in the heads of bolts and screws through
which torque is applied by use of a driver. A recess system implies a parallel, controlled description of the matching
series of driver configurations.
e
General. The history of recesses is similar to the mousetrap. Many shapes have been developed over the years with
both desirable and undesirable features. As a result, a designer should avoid the use of several recess types in his
designs because of the cost aspect, not only for the stocking of parts, but for the various tools required and the repa!r
work generated by the possible use of the wrong driver. Each succeeding recess design attempts to present a unique
feature. Inherent in this approach is that the recess design attempts to prevent misuse of earlier types of driver.
Trade-offs. A recess is a series of design compromises. Too deep a recess weakens the head-to-shank strength. Too
shallow a recess results in lowered torque transfer capability. "Camout'" can occur when the flank face of internal
wrenching element slopes too much or is too close to the center of the recess.
Recess Requirements. The following factors should be considered in the selection of a recess:
Io The torque required to be transmitted.
2. The internal wrenchin 8 element. This torque transfer surface should be situated along a radial line and extend
as far as possible away from the recess center. This surface area should be consistent with the torque requirements
and the strength of the bolt material. The surface should be perpendicular or have a reverse slope to reduce
axial loading of the driver.
3. The bolt head shape. The type best suited for a recess is the flat fiilister protruding head or the 100-degree
.flush head. These configurations provide maximum wrenching surfaces at the outer extremities of the recess.
4. Recess forminlg method. The recesses are generally formed in the bolt heading process or machined afterwards.
The formed or forged recess is better from the strength standpoint but does not necessarily provide the best
recess design.
PRESENT RECESS SYSTEMS (MAJOR TYPES)
I. Phillips: Reed & Prince. These recesses are similar o both are cross shaped. The Reed and Prince has narrow
walled legs; the Phillips legs are wider and the center is opened to provide for a stronger shanked driver. Both
of these recesses are classed as low torque drive.
2. Internal Sockets (Square. Hexagon. Splint). As the name implies, the recess openings are four or six sided or.
in the case of the splint, prov!ded with 10 radially aligned, vertical, torque transfer elements.
3. Pozi-Drive. This is the basic Phillips recess changed by adding another cross at 45-degrees to the main drive.
The purpose of these narrow, pointed recess legs is to seat the driver more firmly.
4. _ This curved-bottom, slot-like recess is machined so as to provide a reverse slope to the torque
ti'ansfer surface. This provides for tool retention in the recess under torque load.
.';. Torq-Set; Tri.Wine. These recesses are similar in design. The Torq.Set four and the Tri-Wing three wing
surfaces are offset so that the insertion torque is transferred along a radial line for maximum efficiency.
6o Multi-Torque. This recess is formed by machining two narrow parallel keyways or slots in the bolt head.
7. CIutch. This recess is similar in appearance to the Hi.Torque except that groove-is wider and there is no reverse
slope to the wrenching elements.
8. Six-Cess. This recess resembles the internal splint socket with the exception that the center opening for the
driver shank is smaller in diameter.
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TORQUE VALUES FOR BOLTS
LOW CARBON SILICON ALUMINUM
BOLT ._FFEI, l_-s ('lIES BRASS BRONZE 245T-4 315 CRES MONEL
SIZE
IH-LB IN-LB IH-LB _ IH-LB IN-LB IN-/.,B
2-."_;
2-04
_-4is
"b-.".,|
4040
4-4s
•",,-40
.%'44
6-32
0-40
N-32
,"lo:ll;
I0-24
10-32
I14"°20
1/4"-2s
5/IG"-iM
.5/Iil"-24
:l/lli.i. 1(i
:IIM'-2.1
711l;"- 1,1
711t;"-20
1/2"-13
!/2"-'-'0
9/16"-12
9110"- li',
51S"- 11
0/8"-19
3/4"-I0
3/4"o15
7/8"-9
7/8"-14
1"-8
1"-14
1-1/8"-7
1-1/8".-12
1-1/4"-7
1-1/4"-12
1-1/2"-6
1-1/2"-12
2.2
2.7
"L.5
4.0
4.7
.5.9
t
6.9
is..5
is.V
10.9
17.is
19. is
•_1).is
20.7
ft.5.0
90.0
129
139
212
2:12
:I3S
"U;l
44;5
4x7
61"l
668
1000
1140.
1259
12"10
1919
1911
2832
2562
2.5
"3.0
3.9
4.4
5.2
Ii. 0
7,7
9.4
9.6
12.1
10. M
22.0
22.S
31.7
75.2
94.0
132
142
23(;
239
376
400
517
541
682
752
1110
1244
1530
1400
2328
2318
3440
3110
2.0
2.5
3.2
3.6
4.3
5.4
6.3
7.7
7.9
9.9
10.2
18.0
18.6
25.9
61.5
77.0
107
llG
192
212
317
327
422
443
558
815
907
1016
1249
1220
1905
1895
2815
2545
2.3
2.8
3.6
4.1
4.8
6.1
7.1
8.7
8.9
11.2
18.4
20.4
21.2
29.3
68.8
87.0
123
131
219
240
349
371
480
552
632
697
1030
1154
1416
1382
2140
2130
3185
2885
1.4
1.7
2.1
2.4
2.9
3.5
4.2
5.1
8.3
6.6
10.8
12.0
13.8
19.2
45.8
57.0
80
88
143
157
228
242
313
328
413
4.56
718
798
980
0,58
1495
1490
2205
1998
2.6
3.2
4.0
4.6
5.5
8.9
8,1
9.8
10.1
12.7
20.7
23.0
23.8
33.1
78.8
99.0
138
147
247
271
398
418
_2
555
713
787
1160
1301
1_2
1558
2430
2_0
3595
3250
2.8
3.1
4.0
405
5.3
6.7
7.8
9.6
9.8
12.3
20.2
22.4
25.9
34.9
85.3
106.0
149
160
266
294
427
451
584
613
774
855
1330
1482
1832
1790
2775
2755
4130
3730
FT.LB FT-L.B F'I_-LB FT-LB FT-LB FT-LB FT-LB
383
361
485
447
822
651
34O
322
432
396
732
579
265
251
336
308
570
45O
337
318
428
394
727
575
432
408
546
5O4
93O
732
413
39O
823
48O
888
703
499
470
627
675
1064
840
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TORQUE VALUES FOR NUTS - INCH-POUNDS
BOLT° STUD,
OR
SCREW
SIZE
Coarse Fine
Thread Thread
8-32 6-36
10-24 10-32
1/4-20
1/4-28
0/16-18
8/16-24
3/8-10
3/8-24
7/16-14 !
7/16-2o
1/2-13
1/2-2o
9/10-12
9/10-16
5/6-11
5/8-18
3/4-10
3/4-16
7/5-9
7/6-14 .
1"-8
1"-14
1-1/8-6
1-1/8-12
1-i/4-6
1-1/4-12
ON STANDARD BOLTS, STUDS AND SCREWS
HAVING A TENSILE STRENGTH OF
126_ 000-140_ 000 PS_
Shear-type Nuts
(AN320, AN364,
or Equivalent)
Tension-type Nuts and
Threaded Machine Parts (AN310,
AN366, NAS679A, NAS1291 C,
MS21043 or Equivalent)
ON BOLTS, STUDS, AND
SCREWS HAVING A
TENSILE STRENGTH OF
140,000-160,000 PSI
Any Nut, Except
Shear-type (Used for
NAS1281, MS21042)
ON HIGH STRENGTH BOLTS,
STUDS A_D SCREWS HAVING
A TEN_LE STRENGTH OF
160,000 PSI AND OVER
Any Nut, Except
Shear-type (Used for
NAS1291_ MS21042)
7-9 12-15 14-17 • . 15-18
12-15 20-25 23-30 25-35"
25-30 40-60 45-59 60-69
30.40 50-70 60-80 7_-90
46-55 80-90 86-117 90-144
60-85 100-140 120-172 140-203
95-110 160-185 173-217 185-248
95-110 160-190 175-271 190-361
140-18.5 235-255 246-342 255-428
270-300 450-500 476-628
240-290 400-480 440-636
290.410 490-690 585-840
500,756
480-792
690-990
300-420 500-700 600-846 700-990
480-600 800-1.000 900-1,220 1.000-1.440
420-540 700-900 600-1.125
660-780 1,100-1, 300 1,200-1, 730
700-960 1,1-'10,1,600 1,380-1, 925
1,300-1,500 2,300-2,800 2.400-3!600
1,300-1,800 2,200-3,000 2,600-3.570
1,500-1,800 2,600-3,000 2,760.4,660
2_200-3,000 3,700-$,000 4,350-5,920
2,200-3,300 3,700-8,500 4,600-7,260
3,300-4,000 5,600-6,500 69000-6,650
3,000.4,200 5,000-7,000 6,000-10,280
4,000-5,000 6,600-8,000 : 7,950-11,000
6,400-0,600 9,000-11,000 10,000-16,750
900-1.350
1.300-2.160
1,600-2,250
2,600-4.500
3,000-4,140
3,000-6,300
6,000-6,840
5,500-9,000
6,500-10,600
7,000-13,500
8,000-14,000
11,000-22.600
• Torque Requirements
Torque values for tightening MS nuts are similar
to values specified for AN nuts. The limiting factor
for torque limits is the bolt or screw on which the
particular nut Is utilized. For example, ao MS nut
having a tensile strength of 100,000 psi could be
utilized on an equivalent strength bolt and be torqued
accordlugly. However, if a 160,000 psi MS out is
used co a bolt having a tensile strength of 140,000
psi, then the torque for the 140,000 psi range would
apply° The torque values for AN, HAS, and MS
nuts are listed In the aheve table.
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Fasteners are shown below. The "ALERT ITEM NO." (first column)
refers each ALERT back to the "Problem Area/Cause and Suggested Action" table.
FASTENERS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I NUT FRACTURE Three NASI022A
MSFC-65-OI Process control nuts failed by
cracking dur/nl;
fabrication of an
aerospace structure.
Minute cracks existed in used as well as
unused nuts. These cracks were in the milled
slots and were covered by cadmium plating.
2 BOLT HEAD
MSFC-68-05 FAILURE
Process control
Cap screws, used in
aerospace equipment,
were found with
cracked heads,
internal wrenching
flats rounded out.
and/or beads broken
from shanks.
Analysis indicated inadequate manufacturing
and heat treating.
3 SCREW SEIZURE Panel screws that
E9-69-(}8 Process control could not be removed
after installation.
Examination revealed oversize threads and
pitch diameters, improper heat-treating, cracked
recesses, plus a variety of recess sizes.
4 NUT SUPPORT Tensile loading of the
LeRC-67-12 BRACKET bracket causes
FRACTURE complete separation
Process control of nut from the
bracket.
The anchor nuts have forming-cracks that
propagate into a network of small grain
boundary fractures due to excess heat-treating
as evldenced by surface decarburization to a
depth of .005 inch. Expansion of the epoxy
potting compound during thermal cycling,
applies tensile stress to anchor nuts, which
results in complete fracture.
S3-72-1
NUT CRACKED
Hydrogen
embrittlement
Nut elements (2 lug
floating nut plate}
were found cracked
after some years of
service
Failure analysis results indicated hydrogen
embritdement.
6 NUT FAILURE During check-out of
MSC 2-7-67 Stress ,an aerospace system,
corrosion/hydrogen failure of four
embrittlement frangible nuts was
discovered
The failure is believed to be initiated by stress
corrosion and/or hydrogen embrittlement in a
region of high stress resulting in cocked
loading of the nut and its washer. Analysis
revealed ammonium fluoroborate (NH+BF4) on
the fractured surface of the n_. Subsequent
torquing of good nuts that had been immersed
in NN4BF 4 resulted in fractures occurring in 7
days or less.
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FASTEN ERS
ALERTt
iTEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
G|DEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
CRACKED STUDS Used and unused
D7.69-04 Faulty material studs exhibited cracks
with internal
corrosion.
? Metallographic examination disclosed that
failure was due to intergranular corrosion
caused by improper carbide solution treatment.
Studs were made from a rod material that was
not properly solution heat-treated and
water-quenched prior to fabrication. The
stainless characteristic of this material (Type
: 304 stainless) can be destroyed by chromium
' . _ depletion at the grain boundaries during slow
- cooling through the sensitization temperature
. . • • i+ . : ,. _ .
_ +. - range.
8 BROKEN SCREW Cap screws failed in. Spectrographic analysis indicated the screws
B2-71-02 Improper material shear, were made from an improper material+
•9 BOLT HEAD During rework of Metallu_'gical analysis revealed stress corrosion
MSFC-69-3 FAILURE aerospace equipment, as the failure mode. caused by the combined
Stress corrosion the head of one forces of stress and corrosive environment.
flange bolt was The bolt, which had been installed for 2-I/2
partially sheared years, was fabricated from 7075-T6 aluminum
when torqued to 140 alloy, a material that is susceptible to stress
inch-pounds, corrosion cracking.
10 IMPROPER Hi-lok fasteners made The lubricant and dye are not LOX
MSFC.A-72-09 LUBRICANT of A286 alloy compatible.
Incompatibility of cadmium plated used
materials cetyl alcohol lubricant
and green dye color
coding.
I I CRACKED Lockwashers cracked
D4.A-72-02 LOCKWASHERS during torquing of
Hydrogen vehicle attach bolts..
embrittlement
Metallurgical evaluation revealed the washers
had cracked under strain due to hydrogen
embrittlement. The embrittlement resulted
from the application of an insufficient
post-cadmium plating baking process.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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. ISECTION-6_FUSES/CIRCU PROTECTIVE DEVICES
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of fuses/circuit protective
devices and to suggest approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The fuse/circuit protective device section is presented with the following organization:
: ?
General
I. Basic failure problems associated with fuses/circuit protective devices are identified based upon ALERT and
industry experience.
2. Where applicable, a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished parts having a potential for failure.
Subtopics - Treatment of Specific Types
I. Fuse/circuit protective device type background.
2. For those in the process of selecting parts and manufacturers, or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of selected types and describing the
manufacturing sequence necessary to produce the part. Particular emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing
deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal that problem.
Fuse Types. Fuse/circuit protective devices have been divided into subtopics according to their internal construction.
This section of the publication includes a detailed discussion of the subminiature hermetically sealed fuse, which is the
design most frequently used in aerospace applications. Other subtopics such as circuit breakers, fuseholders, sealed
cartridge type fuses, and solid state type fuses are included as sumnlaries of ALERT reports.
FUSE FUNDAMENTALS
What a Fuse Should Do. A fuse is a device that can be used to open an electric circuit when the current flow level
exceeds the current carrying versus time ratine of the fuse. The fuse must be installed in series with the current flowing
in that circuit so that all current to be interrupted flows through the fuse element. Ideally the fuse should carry its
rated current without opening the circuit and only open the circuit when its current carrying versus time rating is
exceeded• The primary characteristics for fuses are current carrying capacity versus time, maximum current that can be
interrupted, and maximum voltage. These primary characteristics are dependent on the physical size and spacing of the
current carrying components and the construction materials used.
Practical Considerations. Analysis indicates that because of the physical imperfections in materials and laws that govern
their properties, a fuse cannot be simply defined by its current carryins capacity and voltage rating. Physical considerations
force us to recognize such compromising characteristics built into the fuse as mechanical stability (sensitivity to vibration
caused malfunction), insulation resistance, dielectric withstanding voltage, thermal stability, time required to open circuit,
maximum interrupt current, the effect of the media in which the fuse is located on its operation, i.e., liquid, free air.
vacuum, ambient temperature, moisture, conformal coating if used (such as epoxy), and others. These characteristics are
a composite result of materials and processes used in fabrication, plus mechahicai design considerations.
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FAILURE MODES
Failure Categories. Part level failure problems associated with the fuses may be lumped under two basic categories:
catastrophic opens and catastrophic failures to open. A catastrophic open would be classified as fuse premature opening
and interrupting current flow due to mechanical breaking of the fuse element, or any similar type interruption of current
other than the fuse element opening within its specified normal opening range due to current flow level. A catastrophic
failure to open would be classified as failure to open when current level passing through the fuse exceeds the fuse rating
without interruption. This is most commonly due to some electrically conductive material bridging or shorting fuse
terminals together parallel to the fuse element. It must be recognized that catastrophic opens and catastrophic failures
to open are worst case conditions of certain electrical parameter deviations. Failure analysis must be made at the part
level in order to determine the cause of these conditions and proceed to corrective action.
ELIMINATING DEFECTIVES
Problem Solving Approach. The approach taken in this section will be to identify the user encountered problem areas
associated with a particular type of fuse, then provide suggestions for eliminating those fuses prone to exhibiting those
problems at the finished fuse level, the design level, and at the manufacturing level.
Finished Fuse Level. Recognizing that the typical consumer is faced with using finished devices that are on hand.
information is provided for screening - sorting the bad ones from the good. Sqgsestions are made for subjecting the
fuses to environmental stresses (capable of identifying defective units, but well within the safe operating margins for
properly made units). This reliability technique has found use not only for sorting, but for providing assurance that the
manufacturer has controlled his processes.
Design Level. While screening has proven to be an effective reliability tool. it dues not cOrrect the fundamental problems
of design compromises and worse yet, design deficiencies. Design deficiencies must be identified and eliminated at the
manufacturer's facility.
Manufacturing Level. The most carefully conceived design can be brought to nought if it is manufactured in an
environment lacking necessary controls over critical materials and processes, and allowing substandard workmanship.
Again, defectives produced as a result of these conditions can be removed using a screening, but since no screen is 100
percent effective, a more desirable technique for removing these potential reliability degraders is to Lake action to correct
these manufacturing conditions by applying controls and providing inspection points.
FAILURE ANALYSIS •
I
_e. A primary objective of failure analysis is to identify failure mechanisms at a level such that corrective action
is feasible. Knowing nothing more about a fuse than that it is open does not allow effective corrective action. If we
learn that the open is caused by a weak terminal wire bond, we now have identified a mechanism suitable for corrective
action. The bonding of the terminal wire can be strengthened, thereby improving the reliability of the design.
Failure Verification. After recording all identifying markings, and performing a thorough external and radiographic
inspection, the first requirement is to verify the failure. Often the fuse is shown to have operated normally by interrupting
a current that exceeded the fuse rating.
Analysis Direction. The process of analyzing a failure, performing those steps necessary on a suspect device which will
result in the identification of a specific correctable failure mechanism, requires the coordination of a series of specialized
skills by one having knowledge of failure mechanisms, device design, and manufacturing techniques; and the experience
necessary to organize this combination of skills and knowledge into a practical plan of action.
When to Analyze. Many part failures occur for which no corrective action is planned to be taken. In many cases it
is most cost effective to simply scrap the defective part and replace it with one that performs properly. For those cases
where it is necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur, a portion of this section is devoted to
describing some of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis.
Reliability/Life. it is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the-part level (screening, analysis of design
and manufacturing, and effective failure analysis) that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
o
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PROBLEM/SCREENING SUMMARY
Scope. The ALERT Summaries represent only s small sampling of the total fuse/circuit protective devices usage
experience. In order to provide a more comprehensive compilation, experience from a wide variety of sources (including
users and suppliers) is presented. This summation is an accumulation of knowledge and experience gained in dealing
with fuse failures and in avoiding those failures, it addresses itself to the causes and effects of failure, and shows the
suggested preventive actions that will allow identification of fuses having latent or incipient defects.
This summary is aimed toward identifying fuse problem areas and failure causes. Having identified problems, and
recognizing that the typical user is concerned with eliminating this problem from a group of fuses on hand, suggestions
are made for performing screening. These screening suggestions are based primarily upon industry experience. The
problem areas have been grouped under the basic categories of premature open, failure to open, parameter deviation, and
mechanical anomaly.
ALERT Item No. Where directly applicable, the "ALERT Item No." of the ALERT report describing a specific cause
for a failure is listed against that cause. Thereby, a cross reference is provided between e specific failure cause found
in the "ALERT Summaries" and the broader failure experience/avoidance knowledge shown in this presentation.
Contamination (lncludinll Corrosion) Problem. Experience has indicated that a sign'.'ficant contributor to a fuse/circuit
protection device failures is presence of contamination, either as particulate matter or corrosion products. Particulate
matter is of two types, conductive and nonconductive. The conductive material,, fortunately, is generally detectable by
proper X.-ray screening, and Consists of solder balls, metal flashings, etc. This material can result in failure due to
parameter deviation, etc.
The nonconductive material is difficult to detect as it is usually material from the body or case. Presence of this
material can result in failure to open as well as premature open. As the case or body material for many of the
fuses/circuit protective devices is commonly a semifransible material, dissection can introduce debris of the same. type
that is causing the problem, thereby causing the investigation results to be of doubtful nature.
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND
FUSES
SUGGESTED ACTION
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION o SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspect|on and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN None° Application poblem. Fuse should have
Corrosion 1.2 been sealed and used in moisture proof holder.
OPEN • All screening tests listed. Manufacturer
Cracked substrate 3 establish transient voltage limits and application
instructions with heat sink use during
application of heat to terminal leads.
PARAMETER DEVIATION All screening tests listed. Review of entire
Cracked substrate 4 • assembly and process with increased control,
lest and visual inspection at critical points.
FUSEHOLDERS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspection and
Cause NO. Tests")
SHORT Visual Examination and Functional Test
Design deficiency ._
CIRCUIT BREAKERS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspection and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN All screening tests listed with emphasis on
Contamination 6 Visual and Radiographic Inspection.
Latching difficulty 6
Improper positioning of part 7
PARAMETER DEVIATION None. Application problem. Circuit breaker
Undesirable tripping 8 not qualified for environment in which it was
used.
PARAMETER DEVIATION All screening tests listed with emphasis on
Inability to latch 9,10 Visual and Radiographic Inspection°
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SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
Basic ScreeninB. The screening inspections and tests suggested for fuse/circuit protective devices included in the
Problem/Screening Summary are as follows: .
I. Temperature Cycling
2. Run-in
.I. Seal Test
4. Electrical and Mechanical Characteristics Measurements
5o Visual Examination
6. Radiographic Inspection
7. Dielectric Withstanding Voltage
8. Insulation Resistance
9. Terminal Strength
_e. The purpose of the sereening is to allow detection of parts that: (I) have been improperly processed by the
manufacturer, (2) contain contaminants (including films and corrosion), (3) have poor solder or weld connections, or (4)
have any other anomalies that could result in a failure under normal operating conditions.
Additional Screeninll. In cases where specific characteristics are critical in the function of the using equipment: e.g.,
voltage drop. resistance, terminal strength, etc., such critical parameters should be added to the requirements of these
screening tests.
Envelope Removal/Dissection. The basic approach taken here is to subject each of the devices to a test procedure in
order to make a one-by-one acceptance that the internal construction materials, processes, etc., from part-to-part, are
homogeneous so that the devices can be treated as a uniform lot. If the devices are not produced under similar design
criteria and manufacturing controls which permit a homogeneous lot to exist, a single screening procedure may not be
the optimum for all units. For this reason, it is frequently desirable to examine the design and construction. This is
accomplished, first, by a nondestructive radiographic inspection; and second, by performing a destructive envelope removal
or dissection on a limited sample of devices. This procedure is more meaningful if a design/construction baseline has
been established as a comparison criterion.
I. TEMPERATURE CYCLING - MIL-STD-202. METHOD 102 (5 cycles) (ref 2)
General. This environmental exposure will assist in detecting a variety of design and manufacturing deficiencies
resulting from materials with incompatible temperature coefficients of expansion, inadequately joined materials,
and materials with improper chemical composition.
Complementary Tests. Seal, Insulation Resistance at high temperature extreme, and Run-in tests will normally
detect degradation and catastrophic failures resulting from Temperature Cycling exposure.
2. RUN-IN TEST (CIRCUIT BREAKERS ONLY)
The Run.in test is normally performed as an adjunct to Temperature Cycling. It consists of actuating the circuit
breaker for 100 cycles or more during the final temperature cycle at both high and low temperature extremes.
The primary function of this test is to detect thermally induced misalignments caused by thermal mismatch of the
materials used in construction and fundamental errors in mechanical design of the device. It is useful, also, to
detect incipient defects caused by thermal and/or mechanical fatiguing, such as stress corrosion, on the individual
components of the circuit breaker.
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3. INSULATION RESISTANCE - MIL-STD-202, METHOD 302. CONDITION B (ref 2)
This test measures the resistance offered by the insulating members of the circuit breaker to an impressed direct
voltage tending to produce a leakage current through or on the surface of these members. Low insulation
resistance, by permitting the flow of large leakage currents° can disturb the operation of circuits intended to be
isolated by forming feedback loops. This test is especially helpful in determining the +extent to which insulating
properties are affected by deteriorative forces, such as heat, moisture, oxidation° etc. It is normally performed
while the circuit breaker is stabilized at high temperature during final cycle of thermal cycling.
Insulation resistance on fuses is measured between fuse terminals after overload blowing of the fuse. It is a lot
destruct test performed on a sample lot taken from fuses that have successfully passed all nondestruct screening
tests°
4. DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE - MIL-STD-202, METHOD 301 fief 2)
5.
The dielectric withstanding voltage test consists of application of a voltage higher than the rated voltage for a
specified time between mutually insulated portions of the fuse/circuit protective device, or between insulated
portions and ground. This is used to prove that the device can operate at its rated voltage and withstand
momentary overpotentials caused by switching surges and other similar phenomena. It serves to. determine
whether insulating materials and spacings within the device are adequate. After application of the specified
overvoltageo the device is examined for evidence of arcing, flashover, and insulation breakdown.
SEAL TEST (HERMETIC DEVICES ONLY) o MILoSTD-202, METHOD" 112 fief 2)
General. The purpose of this test is to verify the integrity of the hermetic seal. Typical failure areas occur
where materials are fused, brazed, or soldered to make the final seal. The seal test will detect manufacturing
defects, damage resulting from handling, seal failures resulting from mismatched coefficient of expansion of
materials, etc., which can result in the intrusion of contaminating atmospheres that result in corrosion an&'or
contamination.
ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS (ELECTRICAL FOR FUSES
INCLUDES SAMPLE LOT DESTRUCT TESTING; MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS APPLIES TO CIRCUIT
BREAKERS ONLY)
These tests are designed to verify that the following fuse/circuit protective device characteristics are within
specification requirements: operate and release forces, voltage drop, resistance, and operating position. Because
of the variety of designs found in the various kinds of fuse/circuit protective devices, exact methodology for
testing will not be defined, except for contact resistance. The test employed for measurement of contact resistance
is MIL-STD+202o METHOD 307, and applies to circuit breakers only.
7. VISUAL EXAMINATION
Precap visual examination at the manufacturer's facility is recommended as a screening requirement. During the
precap visual, just prior to sealing the body or housing, all internal surfaces of the body or housing and contact
surfaces are carefully examined for evidence of any loose particles, film contaminants, or other foreign material.
For this examination a 20 power minimum magnification microscope is used.
8. RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION
9.
In those cases where loose internal metal particles or misalignment of the components, etc.. is a problem. X-ray
insp¢ctionn of each fuse/circuit protective device is recommended as a screening requirement after sealing or final
assembly operation.
TERMINAL STRENGTH (FUSES ONLY)- MIL-STD-202. METHOD 211. TEST CONDITION A (ref 2)
Terminal strength testing includes a five pound axial static pull applied to each terminal separately in turn with
the fuse body held stationary. Loose or defective terminals can cause strain to be applied to the ftise element
resulting in catastrophic open or loss of hermetic seal resulting in parameter deviation. Normally this test will
precede seal testing.
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SUBMINIATURE HERMETICALLY SEALED FUSES
CHARACTERISTICS
General Considerations. Fuses are devices that interrupt the flow of current in response to current level stimuli
accomplished by the melting of a conductive bridge between two terminals. The melting normally occurs in the midpoint
of the element because each end cap lead assembly provides limited heat sinking resulting in a thermal gradient along
the length of the element with maximum occurring at midpoint. Due to surface tension considerations the melt back
results in semiglobule formation on each end of the separated ends of the element. Degradation of the surfaces of the
element or application of excessive transient mechanical forces can degrade or cause false operation of the installed fuse.
Not to be overlooked in any discussion of operational limits for fuses are the insidious atmospheric effects such as shift
in time to open because of low atmospheric pressure, etc.. generally associated with nonhermetic fuses.
Atmospheric Effects. The nonbenign effects of atmospheric environment on nonhermetic fuses can be divided into two
broad categories, altitude or vacuum effects, and atmospheric composition effects. At altitudes above 10,000 feet, the
reduction of thermal conductivity of air continues until it reaches its minimum in space. Fuses that operate within
prescribed limits at sea level are prone to decrease in time current levels in space. Effects on nonhermetic sealed fuses
resulting from atmospheric composition include increase in corrosion and/or film deposit on element surfaces caused by
presence of moisture or other reactive substances in a gaseous form.
Transient Force Effects. The majority of fuses used in aerospace are the subminiature hermetically sealed type with
wire lead terminals. This design is easy to mount on circuit boards with the fuse body held in place by epoxy bonding
without any strain on the terminal leads. The epoxy type mounting minimizes the effect of transient mechanical forces
(shock and/or vibration) b!" providing both damping and rigid mounting. This type mounting distributes the externally
applied transient mechanical forces evenly over the entire fuse body and tends to eliminate transient forces encountered
in service. The epoxy bonding material circuit board, and conformal coating (conformal coating is generally used) tend
to absorb and thereby reduce the level of externally applied transient mechanical forces transmitted to the fuse.
Temperature Effects. The heat generated by the resistance to current flow in the fuse element bridging the fuse terminals
provides temperature rise with current increase until the melting temperature of the_ fuse element is reached causing the
element to open and interrupt the flow of current. The time required for the fuse element to open is a function of
current level of flow through the fuse, fuse element resistance, fuse element melting temperature, ambient temperature,
and thermal conduction of the media surrounding the fuse body. Generally the fuse current rating and time to open.
versus current level, are established in free air at a temperature of 25°C. For low temperature extremes of -55°C the
rating is increased 10 percent, and decreased 10 percent for high temperature extremes of 125°C. Locating the fuse body
in a surrounding media with more or less thermal conductivity than free air will increase or decrease respectively the
time to open slightly; however, this effect is minimized to some extent in hermetically sealed fuses. Heat applied to the
fuse terminals during tinning and soldering processes can damage the fuse, therefore, heat sinks should be provided.
Current Application Effects. The current applied to a fuse during all testing prior to end item use should be rigidly
controlled to the current rating level of the fuse. The fuse should not be subjected to current levels equal to the current
rating for any single period of continuous current flow exceeding five minutes and sufficient time must be allowed
between these applications of current for the fuse element temperature to stabilize at ambient temperature. As a safety
factor a period of 24 hours between each five minute continuous rated current application is recommended. Failure to
observe this rule may reduce the life and degrade the fuse reliability. These fuses generally are designed and have been
qualification tested to carry rated current for a minimum period of four hours. Normally the measurement of voltage
drop across the fuse requires that rated current flow through the fuse element for continuous periods of five minutes
maximum. Generally the voltage drop is measured after a rated current flow period of one to five minutes during which
the fuse element temperature, resistance, and voltage drop have stabilized. For all other testing, such as measuring fuse
resistance, the level of current flow through the fuse should be less than 10 percent of the rated current of the fuse.
Installation. Application of strain or pull on the fuse terminal where it is fastened to the fuse body must be avoided.
Strength of terminals is a prime consideration and fuses are usually 100 percent screen tested by a 5 pound axial pull
on each terminal. Fuses that have overstress or excessive heat applied to the leads prior to. or during, installation may
(I) open prematurely causing an open type catastrophic failure, or (2) fail to open if excessive heat remelts internal solder
and forms internal solder bridge between terminals.
Specification Parameters. The foregoing discussion has served to delineate application limits of fuses because of physical
characteristics associated with their design and materials of construction. These limitations can be described as
specification limits for use by manufacturers and using designers. Deviations from these limits can lead to failures.
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SUBMINIATURE HERMETICALLY SEALED FUSES
DESmGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Failures Related to Process° A typical subminiature hermetically sealed fuse (Figure 6ol) and a typical assembly flow
(Figure 6-2) are presented together with the suggested controls required to assure a reliable product. The "Critical
Process" is defined for each of the manufacturing steps. Relationship is established between failure causes and the
manufacturing process. Having experienced a specific problem, one could identify those manufacturing steps with
potential for contributing to the failure.
Assembly Flow. The assembly flow diagram is presented to give an insight into the construction method used in
fabrication of a typical subminiature hermetically sealed fuse. The processes and control thereof will vary with each
different manufacturer° This flow has been included in order that the user may gain an insight into the types of problems
associated with manufacture of the devices. Significant variables are listed on this flow diagram with those operations
that are considered critical for the design of a reliable fuse. In addition,: the operations have been indexed to the
problem area code which will be found on the foldaut in the Appendix.
TYPICAL SUBMINIATURE HERMETICALLY SEALED FUSE DESIGN (Figure 6-1)
|TEM ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
| Outer Sleeve
2 Body
3 Fuse Element
4 End Cap
5 Lead
6 Solder
Plastic tubing per AMS 3632
Ceramic, Grade L3B per MIL-I-10 (ref 15)
Depends upon current rating. Typical: nickel. 50/50 copper/silver,
99.90_ copper
9010 brass alloy per MII.-C-21768 (ref 16)
Soft copper per QQ.W.343
98.00_ tin, 2.00_ silver
6ol0
Figure6-I. Typical Subminiature Hermetically Sealed Fuse
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SUBMINIATURE HERMETICALLY SEALED FUSES
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
General. Failure analysis is a corrective action related procedure. Only after knowing why a part failed can action be
taken to minimize future failures. Failure analysis findings can show the need for redesign (improvements in materials.
processes and controls) or proper part application.
Predominant Failures. Failures of subminiature fuses can result from problems associated with contamination, mechanical
separation, or loose particles.
Case Opening or Deliddine. As previously described in the Problem/Screening Summary, detection of native particulate
contamination; i.e., contamination that existed prior to failure analysis, is of primary significance in establishing the actual
cause of fuse failure. Extreme care should be exercised in case removal so that mechanical separation of element at
area of break, internal bridging, or other cause of failure, remains as is and presence of debris generated by the act of
delidding is identifiable and thereby does not lead the analyst to false conclusions as to the cause of failure.
Pre-Analysis Investigation. For accurate failure analysis knowledge of actual conditions at time of failure occurrence.
detailed factual history of operation and environment the fuse was subjected to is required. This information must be
reviewed carefully in those cases where analysis shows the fuse failure verified. In many fuse failure investigations the
fuse element is shown to have opened normally as designed and in those cases the cause of the high current level that
opened the fuse element must be looked for in the using assembly, or in other external sources. Radiographic inspection
can detect if the fuse operated normally.
Failure Analysis Row. The failure analysis flow (Figure 6_3) provides for maximum nondestructive evaluation of the
failed part prior to the dissecting operation.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 6-3) is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus. one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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Figure 6-3. Subminiature Hermetically Sealed Fuse - Typical Failure Analysis Flow wlth
Related Problem Codes
6-15
ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports against Fuses, Fuseholders, and Circuit Breakers are shown below.
FUSES
ALERTt
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I OPEN
KSC-68-13 Corrosion
Approximately 15 to
20 percent of a hatch
of I°000 fuses tested
open although visually
they appeared to be
good.
Failure analysis revealed a separation of the
fuse wire from the soldered end cap.
Chemical analysis of corroded wire tips
showed the presence of chlorides, indicating
the presence of flux. Since the fuses are not
hermetically sealed, the flux had combined
with moisture to cause the corrosion and
eventual open.
2 OPEN
KSC 724)4, 04A Corrosion
Intermittent indicator
light problem revealed
an open fuse.
Failure analysis determined that the fuse
element had failed due to corrosion.
3 OPEN
ARC 12-22-65 Cracked substrate
Random occurrence
of f_lures due to
opens.
Failure analysisrevealed failures were due to
cracked substrates caused by uneven heating
during soldering. Short leads (3/16 inch)
coupled with not using thermal shunts, caused
the uneven heating.
4 PARAMETER
K4-70.02 DEVIATION
Cracked substrate
Fuses were found to
contain cracks or
fissures in the
substrate material.
These coochoidal
fractures affected
their physical
property (i.e.,
resistance, time to
clear).
Most of the defects noted were found to
occur during the manufacturing cycle prior to
encapsulation.
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FUSEHOLDERS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
R8-70-01
SHORT
Design deficiency
Fuseholder would
allow circuit
continuity even
though fuse was
blown.
Cause was a change in molding techniques and
mechanical configuration internal to the
fuseholder. Malfunctioning holders showed a
)-fluted interior surface and fiat contact
surface on the base terminal. Triple fluted
surface allowed the bottom ferrule of the
fuseholder to move laterally when pressure
was exerted on the base terminal, and short
circuit against the middle terminal's soldered
connection.
CIRCUIT BREAKERS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
6
K4_9-O4
I. OPEN
Contamination -
plastic chips
between contacts
2. LATCHING
DIFFICULTY
Loose plunger
guide
Failure modes
experienced were:
(1) open circuit when
latched. (2) difficulty
in latching, and (3)
inability to latch.
Cause was chipping of the plunger assembly
with the following results: (I) attempt to
close the circuit breaker with a chip between
the contacts resulted in a bent contact arm
and a permanent open condition, and (2) chips
and/or a loose plunger guide resulted in
various latching difficulties. Chipping is
caused by mechanical interference from a
defective plunger assembly. Shock and tensile
testing on the plunger assembly level has
duplicated the breakage as to location and
nature of breakage.
7
DT-A-72-10
OPEN
Improper
positioning of parts
Circuit breakers failed
open during testing at
150 percent of rated
cuiTent.
Investigation revealed that the armature
tailpiece failed ,to engage the lock drive link.
The failures were attributed to improper
positioning of the armature tailpiece, the
frame, and the lock drive link relative to one
another.
8
KSC.68-08, 08A
PARAMETER
DEVIATION
Undesirable
tripping
Circuit breakers
tripped during a
launch and cut off
power to monitors.
A testing program on the subject circuit
breakers indicates they can be used in all
areas subject to the following condition:
When used in high vibration areas the circuit
breakers should be: (I) rigidly mounted to
prevent amplification of vibration effects, (2)
pinned to increase resistance to vibration and
shock, and (3) exercised previous to any
periods of vibration to guarantee that the
mechanical trigger is in the full-on position.
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CIRCUIT BREAKERS
ALERT1 PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
ITEM NO./ Cause DESCRIPTION
GIDEP_ NOo
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
9 PARAMETER Circuit breaker would
D?-A-72-11 DEVIATION not hold in the dosed
Inability to latch position.
Failure analysis revealed a broken handle
crank assembly. Visual examination. 40X
magnification° of 15 installed handle crack
(polyphenelene) assemblies disclosed _ with
fractures at the point of rivet attachment to
the catch. The stress oriented fractures had
resulted from incorrect (off center) upset of
the rivet.
I0 PARAMETER Circuit breaker failed
MSC-72-0._ DEVIATION to latch,
Inability to latch
The malfunction was attributed to bent pivot
rivets, internal tolerance build-up, and case
shrinkage, which allowed the plunger to
bottom out prior to latching.
NOTE:
8. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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INTRODUCTION
_e. The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of fluid sealing
devices and to suggest approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
Problem Definitions. As the existing ALERT reports contain only three failure modes that are directly applicable to
fluid seals, the problems are defined from the broad base of information available from industry and government
investigations. This section will he limited to the more commonly used fluid sealing devices -- gaskets and flanges,
dynamic and static seals, as well as gasket seal materials.
Problem Prevention. Problem prevention is dealt with by providing information, with respect to known procedures, to
reduce failures that can he attributed to the major problem areas -- installation, application, basic design, and original
component fabrication.
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GENERAL FLUID SEALING DEVICES
General. Fluid seals are devices used to effect separation of gaseous or liquid environmer.gs at points Of structural
transition and at movable component interfaces. Seals used in applications where the involved surfaces do not have
relative motion are commonly called gaskets. An example of a structural transition seal is the gasket used in the internal
combustion engine between the cylinder head and the basic engine block. This seal completes separation between three
distinctly separate environments - ambient air, cooling fluid, and combustible gases. An example of a seal for a movable
component interface is the gland seal around the shaft of a rotary pump. separating the fluid being pumped from the
ambient surroundings. This type of seal is commonly known as a dynamic seal, and is used to effectively separate the
various environments at movable interfaces where there may be reciprocating longitudinal movement as well as rotary
motion.
Leakage Types. The most common type of failure for fluid sealing devices is leakage, classified into three basic types:
(I) permeation, (2) molecular, and (3) viscous flow. Permeation. as the name_implies, is a capillary flow directly through
the material. This is primarily because of the degree of porosity of the batch material from which the seal was fahricaled.
Molecular flow is a similar phenomenon, but it occurs at the interface surfaces and is caused by a finite unoccupied
space between the two surfaces of the interface° Molecular flow is proportional to the pressure differential between the
separated environments. Viscous flow also occurs on the interface surfaces and is encountered when the minimum
cross-sectional area of the leak path becomes large in comparison to the mean free path requirement for gas flow.
Viscous flow leakage rate is proportional to the difference between the square of the internal pressure and the square of
the external pressure.
Other Failure Mechanisms. In addition' to leakage (limited loss of contained fluid), fluid sealing devices fail by rupture
because of inadequate back-up rings and excessive pressures, and the introduction of corrosion products or other
contaminants. Rupture may be caused by excessive pressure differentials applied to the sealing device, or by shearing
mechanical forces applied in an unforeseen rotational mode or as an excessive transverse force. Corrosion products and
other contaminants may be caused by normally anticipated environmental considerations, or they may be the result of
galvanic corrosion and/or contaminants in inadequately filtered fluid. Because of differences in construction and application
between gaskets and dynamic seals, more specific failure mechanism information is found on the following pages.
.
.
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GASKETS/FLANGES
What is a Good Gasket Seal. Gasket seals consist of three basic elements: (I) a semicomp_essiblegasket material, (2)
compression flanges, and (3) attachments or other devices for applying compressive forces. Gaskets, as well as other
static seals, are of two types; face gaskets that are squeezed between two flange faces, and diametrical gaskets that are
squeezed between two flange raised face diameters. The basic psket material may be a resilient material, an elastomer,
a plastic coated metal, or a metallic compound or alloy. The gasket may he of the crushable type (with all sealing
supplied by the applied compressive forces) or may be of the "self-energizing" type (with some of the sealing force
supplied by pressure from the contained fluid). The basic function of the gasket seal is effective when all of these
elements are properly combined. The gasket material will plastically flow to fill all of the asperities of the mating
surfaces to the extent required to meet the n0.1enkage requirements of the fluid system.
Basic Gasket Requirements. One of the most elementary design considerations is that the configuration (geometry and
dimensional requirements) be suitable to the application. Loss of flatness, nonparallelism, and improper surface finish
and/or thickness can result in a nonuniform application of the compressive forces. The resulting distortion, caused by
nonuniform stress, can with time result in molecular or viscous leakage. Structural integrity, with respect to both static
and dynamic physical properties, is considered to he n prime requirement. Creep and cold flow of elastomeric materials
and Teflon can cause lateral expulsion of the gasket material -- resulting in loss of the required compressive loading.
Contamination can also affect the seal integrity.
Basic FIanle Requirements. The primary design requirements for flanges are: (I) choice of proper material, (2) thickness,
(3) bolt circle diameter, and (4) the most suitable finish of that area for gasket interface, Configuration consideration
should include location and control of dimension of any required grooves for flanges designed for O-ring seals. One of
the salient features of many gasket designs is the compressive force applied by these grooves; this is extremely significant
with those gaskets that are dependent upon the O-ring or similar construction.
Basic Compression Device Requirements. The most common compression device is a group of bolts. The basic design
requirement of any compressive device system that may be used is static, but having dynamic structural integrity.
However, the number and arrangement of the bolts or other devices should he of prime concern in order to provide
adequate uniform compression, removing any possibility of an inadvertent fracture of the flanges.
Environmental Requirements. The separable items that must be considered as environmental influences include: (I)
reactions to the system fluids. (2) temperature (system-induced and from the ambient surroundings), (3) pressures (system
and external), and (4) mechanical force loading and vibration. The primary consideration, with respect to the system
fluid, is that the materials used must be nonreactive to the system fluids. The other environmental effect that requires
amplification is mechanical force loading. This includes such external loads as axial force, tension, bending moments,
shearing forces, vibration, and other cyclical force application. Application of these forces can lead to distortion because
of cold flow or creep, and fracture or rupture as n direct action or as n result of stress fatigue.
7.5
DYNAMIC SEALS
What is a Good Dynamic Seal. The description of a dynamic seal is not as simple and str,dghtforward as that of a
gasket. Dynamic seals must accommodate both rutary and linear motion. The sealing mechanism may consist of slingers°
controlled flow (labyrinth) joints, sliding contact seals, and linear reciprocating motion bellows. Dynamic seals° like static
seals, may be face or diametrical seals. With the exception of the bellows type, dynamic seals are unlike static seals
in that they are not normally designed to fill all of the surface asperities. Therefore, they are not normally absolute
seals but function as controlled leakage devices.
The two basic considerations in the design of a dynamic seal is the allowable leakage rate and the required operating life
of the seal joint. Initial leakage rate decreases when the sealing stress is increased.
To simplify the following discussion of fundamental requirements for dynamic seal components, dynamic seals will be
considered to consist of two principal components; (I) sealing mechanisms, and (2) housing/shaft combination. Sealing
mechanisms will be treated as a broad term that includes bellows, sealing surfaces of labyrinths, bushings and gaskets.
and contacting/containing materials that provide the actual seal.
Stalin 8 Mechanism Requirements. A prime design requirement for dynamic seals is that the configuration (geometry and
dimensional requirements) he suitable to the intended application. Improper surface mating can result in distortion.
excessive leakage, and/or galling and eventual seizure, Failure to require correct material structural attributes, with
respect to both static and dynamic physical properties, can result in creep and cold flow, distortion° stress fatigue, and
fracture. Creep, cold flow, and distortion can all result in either galling, binding and seizure, or excessive leakage.
Inclusion of contamination and unsuitable chemical combinations can result in surface scoring, corrosion, fluid contamination,
and other property degradations.
Basic Housing/Shaft Requirements. Primary design considerations of dynamic seals for housings/shafts, like those of
sealing mechanisms, include configuration, material composition and physical integrity, and freedom from contamination.
The failure modes resulting from violation of these fundamental concepts are repetitive. In addition, special attention
should he given to insuring that the shafts are properly designed, i.e., in accordance with specification MIL.G.5514 (ref
17). Deviation from the basic specification can result in resistance to transverse stress and distortion because of unequal
thermal expansion/contraction. Also. as many housings are of cast construction, provision should be made to prohibit
the use of housings with any degree of porosity, or voids and inclusions. These anomalies can result in a localized
reduction in structural strength which may cause increased leakage at operational pressures.
Environmental Considerations. Design considerations with respect to the environment, are the same for the dynamic
seal as for the static seal with one major exception -- stresses applied by the various elements of the environment (such
as mechanical force, pressure, and temperature) can result in binding, galling and/or seizure prior to the occurrence of
excessive leakage, and/or fracture. The most insidious of these stresses is differential pressure because of thermal
reactions of materials that have mismatched coefficients of thermal expansion. Thermal equilibrium calculations, made
to provide operating limits of fluid/ambient atmosphere temperature combinations, should include a safety margin to
accommodate frictional heating of thermally distorted sealing mechanism surfaces.
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GASKET/SEAL MATERIALS
General. It is always a good design policy to specify the performance desired. Along with this. it is recommended that
the responsible design organization, or even the individual desiguer, avoid specifying how to compound materials or
processes. Permit the seal manufacturer to examine the requirements, considering temperature ranges, pressures, and the
medium to be sealed, and arrive at a solution to the given problem. It is more than likely that through his vast
knowledge, derived from chemical analysis, tests, and actual applications, that the manufacturer is the best source to
provide the required compatible seal.
Qualification. The functional requirements are best known to the design engineer. Upon receiving those seals that were
recommended and provided by the seal manufacturer, a test should be instigated to expose the seal or seals to the same
conditions that would be encountered in actual service. Periodic checks for seal configuration changes should be made
and recorded covering the entire temperature range that the seal would "'feel" in actual operation. All test data derived
should be carefully recorded so that this data may be used as a ready reference for future applications.
Qualification Results. A review of all test data acquired will be the basis for selection of that seal that would best suit
a specific design requirement. This data can be reapplied to other seal requirements.
Seal Configurations and Materials. Numerous gasket/seal manufacturers are producing seals in other than the O-ring
configuration. They are also producing seals in varied geometry. Some of these configurations are identified as a "'V",
"U cup". "W", and lip and flange seals. These seals are made from a wide variety of eiastomer/rubber materials and
some are manufactured from a variety of 300 series and precipitation hardened stainless steels. The basic applications
are for dynamic, static, and port seals.
There is also an area where the prime psket/seal manufacturers have designed, made, and marketed seals primarily for
vacuum systems and components working in vacuum systems.
Seal Selection Responsibility. it becomes the responsibility of the design engineer to design his component, realizing its
operational environment, and select those pskets/seals that are best suited for his design configuration.
Seal Interface Compatibility. The designer should be aware that a unique design of'the Ip'oove, shaft, or bore might be
required in special seal applications.
In keeping with the universal byword on standardization, the primary choice of seals should be those that fit MIL-G-5514
(ref 17) specification requirements. The materials from which these seals are made are to be selected for their chemical
compatibility to the medium in which they are installed. As an aid to the designer, the following tables should be
referred to. These tables are being periodically extended as new compounds are discovered through extensive chemical
research. The gasket/seal manufacturers coordinate their efforts with the rubber/elastomer batch material manufacturers
in researching better and new compounds in an effort to meet the constantly changing demands of industry.
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COMMONLY USED COMPOUNDS
NITRILE (Buna N). Nitrile seals sccount for the VaSt majority of elastomeric sealing materials utilized today. This
material is resistant to most petroleum products and is used for all petroleum based hydraulic fluids and nonuomatic
fuels and-solvents° Effective temperature ran_ is -65 to ÷250"F.
FLUOROCARBON RUBBER. In applications where the temperature is expected to exceed the 250_F mentioned as the
upper limit for nitrile compounds, Viton (fluorocarbon rubber) may he used up ;o a maximum of 400°F. This material
has excellent resistance to most petroleum products, including aromatic fuels and solvents, and the high temperature
synthetic lubricants.
ETHYLENE-PROPYLENE. For phosphate-ester service° specifically Skydrol 500 now being used in hydraulic systems of
all commercial aircraft, ethylene-propylene is the only material which should be considered. Please note that this material
is not resistant to petroleum products and will he severely deteriorated if exposed to petroleum base lubricants or fluids.
For assembly and lubrication of ethylene-propylene compounds, phosphate-ester base fluids and silicone lubricants are
recommended.
CHLOROPRENE (NEOPRENE) RUBBER. Seals of chloroprene are most often used where their combination of
moderate resistance to both air (oxygen) and many petroleum products is required. They are also recommended for
sea|ing many of the Freon refriBerants. Effective temperature range: -65 to +300°F.
SILICONEo Where long term exposure to dry heat is expected, silicone seals are suggested. The three materials
mentioned above perform best when bathed in a fluid, however, silicone can provide long service at high temperatures
without a protective atmosphere of a fluid system. Silicone also has moderate resistance to most petroleum base
products. Due to poor abrasion resistance, silicone compounds should he limited to static scaling applications which
require good heat resistant material.
Standard compounds in each of the basic elastomers mentioned above are listed for your convenience on the following
page. Most of these materials in standard sizes can he obtained from stock or with a minimum delay in delivery, Please
note that for military applications, standard military materials may be specified by the applicable AN or MS number
listed in the left hand column of the standard military compound chart. When order/ng an industrial compound the size
as well as the material must he specified.
o
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GUIDE TO FAILURE ANALYSIS OF FLUID SEALING DEVICES
General. Failure analysis of disabled or malfunctioning static and dynamic seals cannot be readily performed in the
conventional manner. That is, it is seldom feasible to remove the suspect item to a laboratory, functionally test it to
verify and identify the failure mechanism and cause, and to verify the analysis by disassembly. The removal of the
device normally includes disassembly, either partially or totally, which can relieve lhe failure-inducing stress and/or create
additional damage thai can obscure the true cause of failure. For this reason, an alternate analysis procedure is
recommended below.
Failure Modes and Causes. The predominant failure modes of seals include leakage (permeation, viscous, and molecular
flow), mechanical damage (including rupture), fluid contamination, and (for dynamic seals only) mechanical failure such
as galling, binding, and seizure. The most common causes of failure are damage during storage and installation.
Misapplication and design/fabrication inadequacies are significant factors that are not to be overlooked with seals employing
elastomeric materials.
Recommended Failure Analysis Procedure. As removal and partial disassembly of the suspect seal can obscure the true
failure cause, the analysis should be initiated with the defective seal remaining installed in the failed condition. The
majority of failures are readily visible, or can be located by local analysis (helium sniffer or spot chemistry). The
handling and storage history, and installation procedures that have been used should be thoroughly investigated prior to
removal of the device. For additional information that is relevant to the cause of failure, the part should be removed
for further analysis only after these actions have been completed with unsuccessful results. Additional analytical
procedures (if required) include prolp'essive disassembly, examination for dimensional errors and/or damage, chemical and
metallurgical examination of all possiblecorrosive products, anomalous contaminants, and suspect materials of construction.
in the event the malfunction is repetitive, uninstalled parts should be subjected to the same detailed analysis.
The following list of failures and associated causes is provided as a guide to be used in the on-the-spot investigation.
The list is not a complete inventory of failure modes and causes, and should be extei_d by investigating personnel with
time and experience. The "Associated Causes" are:
I. Damage During Storage and Installation
2. Misapplication
.1. Design Inadequacies
4. Manufacturer Fabrication (including process-out-of-control)
COMMON SEAL FAILURES, MECHANISMS, AND ASSOCIATED CAUSES
Failures
Leakage
Permeation
Excessive Pressure
Overage Elastomeric Material
Incompatible Gasket Material
Insufficient Sealing Stress
Porous Housing Casting
Molecular and Viscous Flow
Damaged Seal Surface
Contamination
Insufficient Sealing Stress
Dimensional Errors
Thermal Distortion
Flange Creep
Gasket (Elastomer) Cold Flow
Design Configuration
Strain Due to Applied Mechanical Forces
Excessive Internal Pressure
Deteriorated Gasket (Age or Chemical Attack)
Misalignment
Misapplication
Associated Causes
i-- -[--
X
X
X g
X
X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
7
X
X
X
7-11
Failures AssociatedCauses
! 2 3
J
Mechanical Damage
Environmentally Induced Fracture
Stress Fatigue
MisaliBnment Strain
Transient Mechanical Force Strain
Thermally Induced Strain
Excessively Applied Sealing Force
Corrosion
Rupture
Excessive Internal Pressure
Excessive Temperature
Housing Casting Material Anomalies
Shock and Impact
Installation Damage and Misfit
Fluid Contamination
Particulate
Included Contamination
Installation Damage
Corrosion
Material Surface Decomposition
Nonparticulate
Contamination
Materials Surface Chemistry
Mechanical Failure (Dynamic Seals Only)
Galling. Binding and/or Seizure
Material Incompatibilities
Thermal Induced Strain
Misalignment
Transient Mechanical Force Strain
Dimensional Errors
Excessive Seal Stress
Contamination
Corrosion and Wear Products
X X
X X X
x
x. x
x x,
x x
x x
x x
x
x x
x
X X
X
X X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
x
X X
x
X X
X
X X
X
X
X
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REDUCTION OF FAILURE INCIDENCE IN FLUID SEALING
DEVICES
Introduction. Because of the limited amount of ALERT reports on seal failures, the following data are based upon
industry-wide experience. The general scheme employed is to provide insight into the elimination of those failure causes
previously listed under the heading of "Common Seal Failures, Mechanisms and Associated Causes." The organization
follows the "Associated Causes" of that listing.
Damage During Storage and Installation. One of the most common causes of seal failure is premature removal of seal
components from their protective enclosures, and inadequate protection of the exposed seal components and assemblies.
This procedure frequently leads to inclusion Of particulate contamination and scuffing of the seal• Damage is also
incurred to precision-machined surfaces of the flanges, ports, and sealing surfaces. Another common shop error is the
use of tools and installation aids that have burrs and sharp edges which cause inadvertent damage to these same surfaces,
both nonmetallic and metallic° Inadequate shop instructions can cause misalignments and application of undue strains.
such as excessive sealing force. Not to be overlooked, is the too common omission of required components or the
installation of wrong components during assembly. A review of the shop-caused failures, in conjunction with this
information, will reveal that properly prepared shop instructions and adequately trained personnel should definitely reduce
the number of seal failures.
Misapplication. It is imperative that the system designer be apprised of the thermal and pressure limits which should
not he exceed_l without causing irreversible damage to the seal. The materials of composition of the seal should also
be analyzed in order that the using designer is informed by application notes of limits on allowable fluids. The proscribed
fluids should not "be limited to those that corrosively or degeneratively attack materials, but should include those fluids
that can act as electolytes with respect to the materials used in the construction of the seal.
This latter information is required to reduce the incidence of galvanic corrosion. The designer, furthermore, must be
provided with adequate information to preclude installation/mounting design that will not subject the seal to misalignment
or undue mechanical forces due to any of the known or anticipated environments. The above listed design limits should
be enforced bY system design reviews and/or pt;oof testing in the presence of a seal specialist (as a participator).
Desitm Inadequacies. Basic seal design problems can be divided into two major areas: (!) material problems, and (2)
configuration.. One of the more serious material problems is obtaining system compatibility of each material with respect
to its chemical composition, interaction, and thermal expansion/contraction matching. Another basic design problem is
retained physical integrity (with respect to dynamic physical properties) such as permeability, creep, and cold flow. The
problems associated with design, configuration are the normal engineering problems of proper geometry and satisfactory
tolerances: The user's assurance of a proper solution of these problems is accomplished only by a thorough design
review and a" proof testing program. This design review should include consultation with material specialists. The
prototyl_e testing program is mandatory in confirming or establishing those operational limits that are required for a
specific application.
Fabrication Inadequacies. Manufacturer fabrication errors are too often written off by use of the phrase -- "processing
out-of-control". Unless the cause and effect of these failures are established through mutual cooperation between user
and manufacturer, the underlying cause of the malfunction is seldom eliminated. The primary analysis should be based
on a mutually acceptable document such as manufacturers' drawings or a configuration analysis of the subject device
(prepared as a part of the initial device design review). The analysis of each significant repetitive failure should be
submitted to the manufacturer for his rectification. Another factor in controlling manufacturer errors is the continuing
knowledge!that an adequate process control program is being employed by the manufacturer. This information is obtained
by review of processing and its control (as a part of the original design review) and periodic surveillance to assure that
all changes in processing and control thereof are acceptable to the user.
Based upon the above actions and statistical failure history, 'the user can delineate procedures for the proper inspection
of seals nod seal components at the time of receipt. It is only with continuing surveillance of seal materials that the
user can effect control of failures which in part are caused by manufacturer fabrication errors.
Failure-Records. Every known failure of a sealing device should be recorded at a central location. The individual
records should include source, complete part identification, and failure mode mechanism and cause. Periodically,
histograms should be constructed from this information for •each seal tyl_e that has had any significant usage. The
information derived from a review of these statistical charts can he useful in improving user's shop instructions and
installation procedures, rectifying errors in application notes, improve basic seal design, eliminate manufacturer process
control oversights, and improve the basic specification for the device•
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued apinst Gaskets and Seedssureshown below.
GASKETS
ALERT NO. PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
D7-69-07 DEFORMED Flanges have a lower Heat treat (T-6) condition of Conoseal gaskets
FLANGES bearing strangth than made of 707._-0 material and Teflon coated,
Incompatibility of the gasket material, will deform reusable mating flanges which
materials have a lower bearing strength than the gasket
materiedo
SEALS
ALERT NO, PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
(GIDEP) Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
MSFC-71-17 SPRING FAILURE Intermediate seed Investigation revealed that a inconel garter
Corrosion failed on an engine spring (which holds the carbon seed segments
oxidizer, in place) had failed due to corrosion caused
by galvanic action between the inconel spring
and carbon in the presence of moisture.
MSFC-70-09 FUEL LEAKAGE
O-ring deterioration
Fuel leakages were
discovered on Saturn
manifold assemblies.
Failure analysis attributed leakage to O-ring
seal deterioration consisting of an increase in
hardness and compressive set. Material
analysis of the O-rings revealed that a
significant amount of plasticizer had been
removed because of the solvency effect ot the
fuels on the O-ring material.
MSFC-71ol0. iOA OUT OF
SPECIFICATION
Incompatibility of
materials
Engineering review
revealed that seeds
used in Apollo
program were similar
to other seeds which
had failed LOX
impact test.
Seals under question contain g-6 lead-tin alloy
coating as did the other seals which had failed
to meet LOX compatibility requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
_eo The objective of this section is to identify the major problems associated with use of basic materials and to
provide approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
Problem Definitions. The problems are defined first by use of specific examples cited in ALERT reports, and then by
using the broader base of information available from other industry and government investigations. This section provides
information on cleaning and solvents, metallic materials, conformal coating and potting, and nonmetallic materials.
Furthermore. cleaning and solvent problems, and titanium (from the metallic materials subsection), are dealt with in
depth.
Problem Prevention. problem prevention is dealt with by providing relevant information with respect to application
techniques, design limits, and gest/inspection criteria as applicable.
o
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
Problem areas and causes associated with Materials are shown below° Suggested actions for minimizing the problems
are indicated as applicable. For ease of reference, Materials have been placed into four categories: (I) Cleaning/Solvents,
(2) Contormal Coating/Potting, (:3) Nonmetallic Materials, and (4) Metallic Materials. The "ALERT ITEM HOG" relates
each entry to the summaries of ALERT reports which are presented in the last portion of the Materials Section.
CLEANING/SOLVENTS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO, SUGGESTED ACTION
SOLVENT ATTACKS CONFORMAL COATING
Incompatibility I
ALUMINUM CORRODED BY SOLVENT A_FACK
Incompatibility 2
SOLVENT ATTACKS ELASTOMER
lncompa!ibility 3
SOLVENT ATTACKS PLASTIC
Incompatibility 4
SOLVENT ATTACKS ALUMINUM
Incompatibility ._
SOLVENT ATTACKS PLASTIC
Incompatibility 6
CONTACT CLEANER ATTACKS DIELECTRIC
MATERIALS
Incompatibility 7
SOLVENT ATTACKS SILICONE RESINS
Incompatibility 8
I. Limitations of application should be
adequately delineated in well defined
cleaning/solvent procedure prior to approval
for use. Included in this procedure should
be a comprehensive listing of those
solvent/material combinations that are
acceptable.
2o Solvent/cleaning procedures should be
monitored by competent personnel to limit
inadvertent misapplication due to
misunderstanding or lack of specific
knowledge of permissible solvent/material
combinations and/or specific approved
methods.
SOLVENT CONTAMINATION Adequate inspection/sampling at time of receipt
Manufacturer process control 9 and/or release for use.
SOLVENT TRANSPORTS CONTAMINANTS Documentation of approved cleaning methods
Inadequate cleaning method 10 and monitoring thereof.
CONFORMAL COATING/POTTING
|ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.. SUGGESTED ACTION
POTTING SOFTENS WITH AGE Use only tested and approved materials
Basic composition I I
POTTING SOFTENS WITH AGE Use only reversion resistant polyether based
Basic composition |2 polyurethanes that meet the hydrolytic stability
requirements of MIL-M.24041o
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CONFORMAL COATING/POTTING
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
ENCAPSULANT CRACKING Provide thermal limits in instructions and
Excessive temperature 13 application notes
ENCAPSULANT CRACKING Cure microballoon filled potting materials at as
Inadequate process 14 low • temperature as possible to minimize
exotherm and shrinkage. Applying and curing
resin in successive layers may be necessary to
minimize exotherm and shrinkage problems°
CRACKED CONFORMAL COATING
High curing temperatures
Cure conformal coating/potting materials at as
low a temperature as possible to lessen
material shrinkage problems. Polyurethanes
are susceptible to moisture absorption and may
require degassing after application to minimize
reaction with absorbed moisture.
COATING SOLVENT ATTACKS COMPONENTS Include list of noncompatihle materials in
Incompatibility 16 instructions and application notes.
SOFT POTTING MATERIAL Adequate inspection at time of receipt
Manufacturer error 17
POTTING REVERTS BACK TO UNCURED When thick sections or total confinement
STATE 18 application of RTV silicone rubbers are
Basic composition required, use only RTV silicone rubbers that
meet the revision requirements of
MIL-S-23586, Grade BI or B2.
CRACKS IN SOLDER CONNECTIONS
Incompatibility 19
Avoid materials that decompose from normal
anticipated environments including high
humidity
POTTING COMPOUND CAUSES SHORT
Incompatibility 20
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
MATERIAL FLAMMABILITY Determine all application limits before approval
Incompatibility 21 for usage
CRACKED RUBBER
Ozone attack 22
SILVER WHISKER CONTAMINATION Do not use sulphur bearing material in
Sulphur attack 23 proximity to silver or nickel
RADIATION DAMAGED MATERIALS Identify and control all nonbenign
Excessive radiation 24 environments
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NONMETALLIC MATERIALS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Couse + NO, SUOGESTED ACTION
TEFLON SHRINKAGE Adequate inspection at time of receipt
Process variables .. 25
FUNGUS NUTRIENT MATERIALS Verify significant material parameters at time
Inadequate specification limits 26 of receipt and approval
DRAWINGS DEPOSIT CARBON Use a different toner
Incompatibility 27
FLUOROLUBE DEGRADATION Forbid use of fluorolube in proximity to
Chemical attack 28 aluminum
HONEYCOMB DELAMINATION Perform adequate evaluation tests before
Voids/environment 29 approval
TAPE INDUCED STATIC CHARGE
Material physical properties
STATIC CHARGE ON ANTISTATIC FILM
Incompatibility
STATIC CHARGE ON STYROFOAM
Incompatibility
30
31
32
CORROSIVE ACID FORMATION
Incompatibility 33
Perform adequate design review before initial
approval for usage
ONE COMPONENT RTV SILICONES CAUSE
CORROSION
Incompatibility of materials
34
Do not use one component RTV silicones that
liberate acetic acid during cure; use only the
one component silicone sealants that meet the
noncorrosion requirements of MIL-A-46146.
PITTING
Incompatibility of materials 3._
Polyurethane foam material should be
inspected periodically for reversion. Inert
barrier materials should be placed between
polyurethane foam and metallic materials.
SOLVENT CONTAMINATION Use tubing materials that are compatible with
Incompatibility of materials 36 solvent being used.
ABS DETERIORATION in applications that require a continuous stress
Unreliable creep data 37 state, ABS plastics should be tested in the
proposed environment (including air) to
determine the age life under the maximum
•continuous design stress.
POOR ADHESION
Improper curing 38
When silicone rubber materials are used as
adhesives, the procurement specification should
specify testing of the silicone rubber/primer
combination.
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NONMETALLIC MATERIALS
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
PLATING DEFECTS
Inadequate process 39
A 50 percent sulphuric acid treatment should
be used prior to the electroless copper
deposition process when processing flame
rctardant printed wiring boards.
METALLIC MATERIALS
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
TITANIUM EXPLOSION
Pyrophoric reaction with LOX and impact 4O
Provide designers with listing of application
limits for titanium that includes physical and
chemical compatibility considerations
TITANIUM CRACKING
Notch sensitivity to anhydrous methanol 41
Buffer methanol with controlled amount of
water. Refer NASA TDN 3868, "Stress
Corrosion and Cracking of Ti-6AI-4V Alloy in
Methanol.'"
TITANIUM FRACTURE
Stress corrosion due to contact with N204 . 42
Control N"2"O"4" composition. Specify
limits on NO content. Refer NASA TM
X-59615, "A Case History of Titanium Stress
Corrosion in Nitrogen Tetroxide.'"
MERCURY CONTAMINATION
Mercury spillage 43, 44
Limit use of mercury and mercury containing
equipment in and around flight hardware.
Limits should be based on a safety/hazard
analysis of design, fabrication, and usage of
hardware.
STEEL EXPANSION JOINT FRACTURE
Inadequate design 45
Include metallurgical considerations in design
of metallic components that are subjected to
nonuniform stress applications
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C LEAN ING/SOLV ENT$
General. The following information is primarily concerned with the more commonly used "'cold cleaning'_ techniques in
which the cleaning media is used at room temperature. However, this information is applicable for use at elevated
temperatures provided that proper precautions are taken with respect to acceleration of attack and other thermally induced
side effects, such as breakdown, are taken into accounto The _eil known laboratory rule that the rate of action doubles
with each 10"F increase in temperature can be used as a gel_rSl guide° But the thermal characteristics of each cleaning
material should be thoroughly investigated prior to use at any elevated temperature.
Why Use Solvents. A solvent, as the name implies, captures a material by dissolving it and causing it to go into
solution with the solvent. Theoretically, a solvent will attack a selected material, such as a contaminating film, and
remove all of it without damaging the desirable materials adjacent to the contaminant if the proper kind and amount of
solvent is used. Subsequent removal of the solute, i.e., solvent plus entrained contaminant, will result in a "clean"
surface. This is a common procedure used in construction prior to painting, application of protective conformal coatings.
bonding, and also to provide entry for rework and/or failure analysis of defective components. The success in removal
of the desired material without damage to the surrounding area is highly dependent on cleaning methodology described
in the following paragraphs.
What is a Good Cleaning Method. A cleaning method is that procedure that prescribes and controls that application of
a cleaning media for the removal of nondesirabie materials such as contaminants° It follows that a good cleaning method
defines the applicable cleaning media including required modifications, thermal limits to be observed, required amounts,
usage life, or provisions for maintaining the integrity of the media, application methods and control thereof, and subsequent
removal of solute, deposits, and other debris. A better insight into the difference between good and inferior cleaning
methods can he gained by a review of some of the undesirable practices and their results.
Sloppy techniques, such as wiping on, can result in damage to adjacent materials and components. Use of excessive
temperature can result in decomposition of the cleaning media into highly corrosive monomers and compounds. Further-
more, decomposition products that result from improper usage of cleaning agents can combine with constituents of the
environment and/or materials being cleaned and result in undesirable secondary products that can he corrosive, contaminat-
ing, or conductive.
Safety/Hazard Considerations. Some of the materials used as cleaning agents are flammable or explosive and many of
them are toxic or contact desiccants. Therefore, cleaning procedures should delineate adequate handling precautions with
respect to inhalation, ingestion, and/or contact with skin. or mucous membranes to preclude the possibility of injury such
as chemical burns.
Other Precautions, As described previously, solvent cleaning will theoretically remove a nondesirable material causing
the material to go into solution with the solvent. Subsequent removal of the solute will result in a clean surface.
Unfortunately. the solute often acts as a transportation media for the contaminant, and subsequent evaporation of the
solvent will deposit the entrained contaminant in another location (often undesirable). An example of this phenomenon
is found in the connector section of this handbook. A soldered connector was solvent cleaned to remove flux remaining
after the soldering operation. After removal of the solvent, the flux was found redeposited on the contacts of the
connector resulting in an open condition upon final installation of tJ',econnector.
Another failure-causing phenomenon associated with solvent cleaning is the deposit of latent damage-producing ionic
compounds. One example is the cleaning of an open cell elastomer with a chlorinated hydrocarbon. This resulted in
the deposit of chlorine ions on and in the surface of the elastomeric material, Subsequent environmental regimes resulted
in accumulation of moisture on the surface of the elastomer. This moisture combined with the chlorine ions to form a
dilute hydrochloric acid which attacked other adjacent components with disastrous results.
o °
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CONFORMAL COATING/POTTING
CONFORMAL COATING
General
Conformal coatings, liquid organic film forming materials, are applied to electronic components and assemblies to provide
environmental protection. The liquid coating material is applied in a continuous layer to conform to the shape of the
component or assembly. Components mounted on printed wiring boards are the usual form of electronic assemblies that
are protected by conformal coatinp. In aerospace electronic packa_ng applications, the conformal coating protects the
component or assembly from dust and dirt contamination, moisture and salt air exposure, high altitude flashover, and
damage from vibration/shock environments.
Coating Materials
Material Types. Many different liquid organic film forming materials are used as conformal coatings. These coatings
vary from simple solutions of organic resins that "set" by evaporation of the solvent carrier, to chemically curing two
component materials that must be carefully mixed and cured (polymerized) at room or elevated temperature. Epoxy,
polyurethane, and silicone coating materials are predominantly used for conformal coating of aerospace electronic
assemblies. The epoxy resin coating materials are only available as two component chemically curing systems. The
polyurethane resin coating materials are available as two component chemically curing systems and as one component
systems that cure by reacting with either oxygen or moisture in the surrounding air. The silicone rubber coating materials
are available as two component chemically curing systems and as one component chemically blocked systems that require
exposure to moisture in the air to cure.
All of the epoxy, polyurethane, and silicone coatings are available as I00 percent solids materials (no solvent) and as
solvent systems; except for the oxygen and moisture reacting polyurethanes which are available only in solvent systems,
The solvent reduced conformal materials produce thin. 0.000.'; to 0.00) inch thick; coatings that can be applied by
spraying, dipping, or brushing. The I00 percent solids coating materials can be applied in any thickness; normally by
brushing and occasionally by dipping. However, special equipment is commercially available for spraying these high
viscosity 100 percent solids materials. Most of the conformal coatings will cure in approximately 16 to 24 hours at
ambient temperatures, but some of the epoxy and polyurethane coating materials require cures at elevated temperatures
as high as 8.';'C (lg.q'F) for 16 hours. All of the conformal coatings are clear or translucent and component and board
markings can be easily read through the applied cured coating.
Environmental Protection
Usage. Conformal coatings are applied to printed wiring boards to protect the copper circuitry on the board's surface
from environmental contamination and. in aerospace applications, provide high altitude flashover protection, and anchor
small components to the board's surface to prevent component damage during exposure to shock and vibration environ-
ments. The surface of the printed wiring board must be cleaned of contaminants such as dust, dirt, finger prints, body
oils, and solder flux prior to the application of the conformal coating. Contaminants must be removed so that the
conformal coating will adhere to the board's surface and to prevent trapping of contamination underneath the conformal
coating. Improperly cleaned boards will present coating problems and have markedly reduced insulating qualities,
especially at elevated temperatures or when exposed to humidity. All organic conformal coating materials have reduced
insulation resistance properties at elevated temperatures and high humidity levels. A combined elevated temperature and
high humidity environment will cause the ipreatest insulation resistance decrease. Silicone rubber conformal coating
materials have the best high temperature insulation resistance properties.
Primers. Primers are generally required to provide adhesion of silicone coatings and are occasionally required for
polyurethane coatings. Epoxy coatings do not require primers. A thin, 0.001 to 0.00) inch thick, conformal coating
applied to e properly cleaned assembly will provide adequate protection from environmental contamination (dirt, dust.
humidity, salt spray, etc.) and will provide flashover protection at high altitudes (low pressures). ,Heavier coatings may
be required to provide mechanical support for components not mounted flush to the board surface. The conformal
coating must bridge the gap between the component body and the board surface,_andattach the component to the board
so that relative movement cannot occur between the component and the bo_ird. Components not attached to the board
surface can experience sufficient movement to cause lead fatigue and component failure during exposure to vibration and
shock environments. Conformal coatings should not be depended upon to support the heavier or larger components.
Such components, expecially large capacitors which have relatively large bodies and small diameter leads, shoud be
filleted or bonded to the board surface for adequate support.
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Specifications-Military
MIL-STDo27_0 °'Printed Wiring for Electronic Equipment", specifies that when required coni'ormal coatings shall be per
MILoI-46058, with thickness to be 0.001 to 0.003 inch and assemblies containing components made of brittle materials
(glass or ceramic) shall be protected prior to coating with a pliant buffer material such as polyvinylidene fluoride (Kynar),
polyethylene terephthalate (Mylar)° or silicone rubber. MIL.I..46058, "Insulating Compound_ Electrical (For Coating
Printed Circuit Assemblies)," covers epoxy, polyurethane, silicone, and polystyrene conformai coating materials to be
used in military electronic equipment. Thickness of coating applied to printed circuit assemblies shall be 0.001 to 0.003
inch when measured on unencumbered flat surfaces of the printed wiring board. Fillets between connectors, mounting
devices, and components shall be sufficient to provide rigidity and protection for the component and the 0.003 inch
maximum does not apply_ When applying coatings under MIL.I-46058 to assemblies containing glass diodes, the glass
diode shall be fitted with.soft vinyl sleevings os;such other materials which will not deteriorate any par1 of the assembly
prior to application of the coating° Glass envelope style diodes should have stress relieving bends in their leads so that
at least |/4 inch of lead length lies between the body junction and the point of solder application.
Specifications - NASA
gSCoSpec-O-0001A. "'Coatings Conformal. Protective Environmental, for Printed Circuit Assemblies," covers conformal
coatings for use on electrical support equipment, gSC.SpecoE.000i, "Coating. Conformal (Polyurethane). Printed Circuit
AssembHes_ Procedure For°.° covers the application of the KSC-Spec-Q-000| materials to printed circuit assemblies.
Conformal coating thickness is specified as 0.00l to 0.003 inch.
MSFCoProco257Ao °'Coating, Conformal. Epoxy, Application Of," specifies the application of a 0.005 to O.OlOinch thick
epoxy conformal coating to the back side of printed circuit assembliesand specifically forbids application to the component
side. Material specified is MSFC-Speco222o _Resin Compounds, Electrical and Environmental Insulation, Epoxy;" Type
I "'Transparent. Unfilled for Coatings. Encapsulation and Impregnation."
MSFC.Proc-293A, "Coating, Conformal (Polyurethane), Printed Circuit Assemblies, Procedure For," specifies the application
of a 0.005 to 0.010 inch thick polyurethane conformal coating. Material specified is MSFC.Spec-393B, "'Compound,
Printed-Circuit Board, Conformal Coating, Eiastomeric." ,
AHB-535._-2, "Conformal Coating and Potting of Electrical and Electronic _Assemblies," covers the application of
Government or Industry specification conformai coatings (and potting materials) to electrical and electronic assemblies.
The thickness specified for conformai coatings is 0.001 to 0.00._ inch.
Problem Areas
Problem Areas. Problem areas encountered with conformal coatings can be subdivided into the four following categories:
I0 The effects Of the coating or coating process on the electrical characteristics of the assembly
2o
4.
The effects of the coating or coating process on the components attached to the board
Material and process control problems with the conformal coating
Material/environment incomparability problems
Degraded Electrical Characteristics. Problems encountered with degraded electrical characteristics (low insulation resistance)
are usually due to the entrapment of ionic impurities underneath or in the conformal coating as a result of inadequate
cleaning. Occasionally, long term cyclic tests at elevated temperature and humidity levels have caused loss of adhesion
between some polyurethane and silicone rubber coatings forming moisture pockets between the board's surface and the
conformal coating resulting in lowered insulation resistance. Use of the proper primer will prevent the loss of adhesion
between the coating and the board surface, however, primers must be properly cured or separation problems can be
encountered between the primer and the conformai coating.
Interaction° Problems encountered with conformal coating/component sinteractions usually involve either solvent attack
on components or mechanical stress on components and solder connections. Since many conformal coatings contain
solvents, there are usually problems of solvent attack (see section on cleaning) on components, marking inks. paints, and
coatings. The mechanical stress problems are usually associated with the use of thick, hard, conformal coating materials.
Extensive glass diode and resistor breakage problems have been encountered on an industry wide basis when thick epoxy
and polyurethane (high_durometer) coating materials have been thermal cycled.
, I
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Solder connection failures have also been encountered during thermal cycling of transistors due to the expansion and
contraction of hard conformal coating materials trapped between the board surface and the vansistor header.
Coat/hi| Thickness. The aforementioned military and NASA specifications have recognized the stress problems associated
with thick coatings by limiting conformal coating thickness ind requiring the sleeving or "cushion" coating of fragile
parts, if heavier coating thicknesses or filleting and bonding are required for component support only the softer, less
than ._OA durometer, polyurethane and silicone materials should be used.
Improper Material and Process Control. Lack of, or improper, material and process control frequently causes conformal
coating problems. The use of overaged material has resulted in conformal coatings that are tacky or do not conform to
the required hardness value. This is especially true with polyurethanes which are moisture sensitive and slowly lose their
reactivity in partially opened cans. InacCurate weighing, inadequate mixing, and too low cure temperatures or too short
a cure time can:also result in tacky noncured coatings. Cure temperatures that are.too high can cause excessive shrinkage
(causing cracks) and/or loss of curing agent (causing tackiness and incomplete cure).
Incompatibilities, Conformal coating/environmental incompatibilities have caused numerous problems. Heavy. multiple
coatings of solvent containing materials have caused incomplete core •due to solvent entrapment and subsequent tempera-
ture/vacuum environments have caused the conformal coating to bubble up into a foam. Solvent entrapment can also
result in outpssing problems wherein the solvent spews out in vacuum and contaminates adjacent surfaces. Flex/blitzed
epoxy coatings, especially those flex/blitzed with high percentages of polysulfide or polyamide resins, have lowered
insulation resistance and have caused equipment electrical malfunctions when exposed to high temperature and high
humidity environments. Polyester based polyurethanes are also sensitive to high temperature and high humidity environments
and can revert to a liquid alter long exposure to these conditions.
POTTING
General
The term "potting" in its strictest technical sense refers to the embedment of a component or an assembly of components
in a permanent container (pot) using a liquid resin that is subsequently cured (polymer/zeal) into a solid. The term
"'potting" in its broadest usage covers all the processes wherein a component or assembly is impregnated with,
encapsulated, or embedded in a liquid resin that is subsequently cured. For the purposes of this discussion, "potting'"
will be used in its broadest sense.. Potting is used primarily to provide electrical insulation and mechanical support to
components and assemblies, and to provide a heat conduction path so that the heat generated in a power component can
be safely conducted away (especially when the component is operated "in a vacuum environment where convection cooling
is absent). Potting, in foam materials, is sometimes used to insulate components from an external heat source. The
thermal conductivities of the various organic potting materials can be significantly increased by the addition of filler
materials.
Materials
Epoxy Resins. Epoxy resins, because of their over-all excellent electrical, mechanical, and physical properties, are the
most widely used materials for potting of electronic modules and other assemblies of electronic components. The basic
epoxy resin can be almost endlessly modified through the use of selected fillers, flexibilizers, modifiers, copolymers, and
curing agents to make literally hundreds of different epoxy formulations. The epoxy formulations can vary from
semiflexible compounds with low physical properties to hard rigid materials with exceptionally high strength properties.
Almost all of the epoxy potting compounds are two component materials that must be accurately mixed and properly
cured. _ Some of the newer formulations are one component and require high temperature cures.
I i
Polyurethane Resins. Polyurethane resins in the form of lightweight foams and as solid elastomers (rubbers) are used for
potting of electronic modules and other assemblies of electronic components. In addition, a major usage for the solid
elastomers is in the potting (molding) of cable/connector terminations. Compared to t.he epoxies, very few polyurethane
potting compounds are used. Basically. the most widely used polyurethane foams.are in the 2 to 10 pound per cubic
foot density range and the solid elastomer materials are almost all unfilled compounds that vary in hardness from ._0 to
95A duromerer. Almost all of the polyurethane potting compounds (including the foams) are two component materials
that: must be accurately mixed and properly cured (however, most of the two component polyurethane elastomers can be
purchased in frozen, premixed cartridges). One component high temperature curing polyurethanes are now commercially
available.
Silicone R_bbers. Silicone rubbers, seldom used for potting of modules and assemblies, are most widely used for potting
of connectors, high voltage equipment, and high temperature devices. The silicone rubbers vary in hardness from 2._ to
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7._A durometer and most. but not all. of the potting formulations contain fillers. Almost all of the silicone rubber potting
compounds are two component materials that must be accurately mixed and properly cured. One component, high
temperature curing silicone rubber potting compounds are now commercially available. One component, chemically
blocked materials, that cure at loom temperature when exposed to atmospheric moisture are occasionally used as potting
compounds with depths restricted to one quarter inch or less.
Problem Areas
Problem Areas. Improper cleaning and inadequate material and process control can result in the same types of problems
with potting materials as with conformal coatings, in addition, potting materials have many of their own problems that
are characteristic of the particular potting material used.
Epoxy Resins. The epoxy curing reaction is exothermic and many problems have been encountered with high
exotherms causing both heat damage to components and cracks in the potting material. The faster, so called
room temperature curing, epoxy systems are the worse offenders and attention should be paid to the mass of
resin, mold material, mold temperature, and resin temperature when these curing agents are used. High exotherms
or high curing temperatures cause increased shrinkage of the resin and increased internal stress on components.
The use of- metal molds, low temperature preheating of mold and resin, and room temperature gelling will decrease
exotherms considerably in unfilled resins. After gelling, the resin system should be heat cured to stabilize
properties. The use of filled resins and slower curing agents that require a moderate heag cure will lower
exotherms, shrinkage, and stress on componengs.
Shrinkage of the resin during cure, coupled with the differences in coefficients of expansion befween the epoxy
and the components° has caused stresses to be set up in the resin that can break components (usually glass
encased diodes and resistors) or crack the resin during thermal cycling. Fragile components should be locally
coated with a "cushion" of silicone rubber to eliminate cracking when using rigid epoxy potting materials. Metal
inserts, brackets, or other hardware with sharp edges can cause cracking of the resin especially if the resin
thickness is nonuniform or if the metal part is asymmetrical.
Entrapped air in the potting material may cause failure to high voltage components by shorting through the lower
dielectric strength air. This is a severe problem in high voltage, potted units that must operate at high altitudes
(reduced pressure). Internal cracks or separations, due to loss of adhesion. (frequently caused by improper
cleaning, or the use of incompatible materials) that occur in transformer windings or high voltage coils will
eventually cause internal shorts. All high voltage devices should be thoroughly vacuum impregnated and careful
attention paid to materials compatibility. --
2, Polyurethane Foams and Elastomcrs. Polyurethane foam materials require that a certain amount of exotherm be
developed during their processing so that the foam will have the required low density. Attempts at foaming small
parts, or parts containing metal materials that act as heat sinks, often result in foams that have densities of 40
to 60 pounds per cubic foot instead of the intended 2 to 10 pounds per cubic foot. Some foam systems are
highly exothermic and can cause component damage even when small volumes (a few cubic inches) are being
foamed. Inadequate venting or the use of too much foam can also result in high density foam problems.
7.
Polyurethane elastomers are nonexothermic and have very low shrinkage. High coefficients of expansion have
resulted in solder connection cracking when polyurethane elastomcrs are used to embed components strung between
two printed wiring boards. Their marginal adherence and reactivity toward moisture have generated voids and
bubbles that have caused failure in high voltage devices. Some of the lower durometer materials do not offer
sufficient support to large components during shock and vibration environments to prevent fatigued component
leads. The polyester polyurethanes can revert to liquids under high temperature, high humidity conditions,
Silicone Rubbers. Silicone rubber materials are also nonexothermic, have very low shrinkage, high coefficients
of expansion, nonadhcrence to other materials, and insufficient stiffness to support large components. Primers
have to be used to overcome the nonadherence problem. However, there are specific problems with certain
types of silicones that are characteristic of their curing mechanisms° One type of one component silicone material
reacts with moisture in the air and liberates acetic acid which has caused numerous corrosion problems in various
electronic equipments. Most of the two component condensation cure silicone (and the new one component
nonacetlc acid sealants) emit an alcohol by-product during cure that muse be allowed to escape. Curing of this
type of silicone in thick sections or totally confined can trap the curing .by-product and reversion can occur if
this material is subjected to prolonged heating. The reversion resistant addition-cure silicone two component
materials are inhibited and do not cure at the interface when in contact with a large number of other rubber and
plastic materials. Barrier coatings can be used to prevent inhibition problems from occurring when this type of
silicone is used.
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SAFETY HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS
Most of the solvents used in the solvent reduced conformal coating materials are flammable and slightly toxic. Adequate
ventilation is required for personnel safety, and solvents must be allowed to evaporate at room temperature before the
coatings are placed in ovens for curing. All of the base resins, catalysts, curing agents, and hardener portion of all the
different conformal coating/potting materials are somewhat toxic and adequate precautions should be taken to prevent
inhalation, ingestion, and contact with mucous membranes (and the skin in some cases). The polyurethane foams.
c_)nformal coatings, and potting materials contain some free isocyanate and are severe lachrymatorsThese materials and
the amine curing agents used with many epoxy materials should be handled only in a chemical hood or other locally
exhausted area where the fumes are drawn away from the operator.
Skin contact with the uncured materials (especially epoxy resin materials) should be avoided. Prolonged skin contact and
the use of solvents to remove uncured resins from the skin (soap and water or skin creams should be used) can lead Io
dermatitis problems. When an operator becomes "sensitized" to the epoxy resins (through careless handling) severe
dermititis, itching, and swelling can occur to such an extent that this person can no longer work with or around epoxy
resin materials.
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TITANIUM
Why Titanium. The primary reason for the extensive use of titanium in aerospace applicati,_ns is that titanium alloys'
are superior to the most common engineering metals sad alloys in strength-to-weight ratios at temperatures ranging from
,425" to 10O0"F. As an example, titanium alloys may be selected that exhibit twice the strength of aluminum alloys at
room temperature. This same alloy exhibits one-half of its tensile strength at |000"F, while the strength of the aluminum
has become neglible at approximately 425"F. When compared to 302 stainless steel, selected titanium alloys have ten
times the tensile strength at room temperature and approximately three times at 1000"F. In addition, titanium exhibits
much lower coefficient of expansion and thermal conductivity than the more commonly used aluminum and steel alloys.
Not to be overlooked is the resistance of titanium to corrosion by most media, including nitric acid, most inorganic salts
(such as sea water), and most alkalis. The physical properties of the finished titanium component can be readily tailored
by creation of the various alloys (as described in the following paragraphs) plus incorporation of an appropriate
heat-treating regime.
Basic Titanium Alloys and Their Properties. The common description for the available titanium alloys is based on the
metallurgical phase that is predominant at room temperature. The fundamental metallurgical phase is the hexagonal alpha
phase which transforms into body centered beta phase at 1625"F. By inclusion of alloying elements, these two phases
are combined to form an intermediate phase° combined alpha.beta. The principal differences between these three basic
alloys are defined in the following paragraphs.
Alpha Alloys. These include "commercially pure titanium" which is an alloy of pure titanium with a limited amount of
impurities, chiefly oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen. The alpha alloys have highest strength and best oxidation resistance at
elevated temperatures in the range of 600* to I I00"F. They display excellent weldability but are difficult to forge because
of their low ductility° and do not respond to heat treatment. The alpha form can be promoted and stabilized over a
wider range of temperature by addition of oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, and aluminum.
Beta Alloys. These are normally limited to applications that will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of 700°F
because their properties become unstable above this temperature. On the other hand. the formability of the beta alloys
at elevated temperatures is excellent and they can be readily heat-treated. Alloying elements used to promote beta
characteristics include hydrogen, manganese, chromium, iron, molybdenum, vanadium, and columhium.
Combined Alpha-Beta Alloys. These consist of a combination of alpha and beta phases in an allotropic structured matrix
which is formed by selective addition of the alloying elements listed in the foregoing paragraphs. The results of these
additions is the enhancement of one or more properties associated with the phase that is is normally promoted by the
addition. As an example, addition of the proper amount of elemental vanadium promotes generation of the beta associated
characteristics of formability at elevated temperatures and heat-treatability. Subsequent addition of aluminum will promote
the alpha characteristic of improved hot strength. This sequence of events is used with proper controls to produce the
well known titanium alloy Ti-6AI..4V. By judicious selection of alloying additives and techniques, the metallurgist can
tailor a titanium alloy with virtually any combination of characteristics associated with alpha and beta phases, such as
toughness, high physical strength at either hot or cold temperature, heat.treatability, etc.
-Titanium Limitations. Factors that should not be overlooked when specifying titanium is the material's proneness to
hydrogen embrittlement, stress corrosion, corrosive attack by stronger acids (such as hydrofluoric), and pyrophoric
reaction when contacted by certain materials.
The primary 'defense of titanium against virtually all of the attaching mechanisms is a tough oxide film that readily forms
on titanium surfaces with exposure to air at room temperature. Unfortunately this oxide film can be destroyed by
elevated temperature, abrasion, sad/or rupturing impact.
The most potentially dangerous of the listed attacking mechanisms is pyrophoric reaction which includes spontaneous
explosive conflagration. This reaction can be initiated by contact with fuming nitric acid containing less than two percent
water or more than six percent nitrogen dioxide, liquid oxygen on impact, anhydrous liquid or gaseous chlorine, liquid
bromine, hot gaseous fluorine, and oxygen enriched atmospheres. Stress corrosion may occur in some alloys if chloride
salts are present on stressed parts subsequently subjected to high temperatures.
Fabrication Limitations. In addition to the limitations attributable to the built-in material characteristics and/or caused
by the environments that the finished component will be subjected to, the designer should be aware of the following
limitations that should be applied to fabrication processes.
Welding should only be accomplished when using inert gas shielding procedures. This should be done to
prevent interstitial absorption of gases, such as hydrogen, and inclusion of other contaminants. It is' virtually impossible
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to nondestructively detect these anomalous inclusions that can result in subsequent failures caused by hydrogen embrittle.
ment and other fracture mechanisms.
Heat-Treatin 8. This operation should not be done using carbonaceous or hydrogenous (cr_cked ammonia) protective
atmospheres. The elevated temperatures will accelerate the uptake of carbon and/or hydrogen which can result in
metallurgical phase change or hydrogen embrittlemento Heat-treating combined alpha-beta alloy in a carbon rich atmosphere
will result in creation of an outer surface case of alpha alloy.
!
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MEAN COEFFICIENT OF LINEAR THERMAL EXPANSION OF MATERIALS
(10 "6 in/in/°C)
NONMETALS
THERMOSETS (-30 to +30°C) FLUOROCARBONS
Phenolic:
Unfilled
Wood-flour filled
Asbestos filled
Flock filled
Glass filled
Diallyl Phthalate:
Acrylic-fiber filled
Asbestos filled
Glass filled
Alkyd and Polyester:
Asbestos filled
Glass filled
Mineral filled
Silicone:
Unfilled
Glass filled
MSFC-SPEC-379 type I
MSFC°SPEC-379 type II
MSFC.SPEC-379 type III
Silicone rubber
Epoxy:
Unfilled
Mineral filled
Glass filled
Silica filled
MSFCoSPEC-222 type I
MSFC-SPEC-222 type 11
MSFC-SPEC-222 type 111
MSFC-SPEC-222 type IV
MSFC-SPEC-222 type V
Melamine:
Glass filled.
CERAMICS (25 to 200°C)
Steatite
Forsterite
Cordierite
Muilite
Alumina. 99%
Photosensitive glass
GLASSES (25 to 200°C)
Borosilicate (Pyrex)
Fused Quartz
• 204O
37
9-40
55
II
55
40
32
36
30
40
46
8
250
380
350
33
45-65
40
20 .
25-60
95
12.¢
30
30
45
15
7.8,
10
2.3
5.0
6.7
10
5
0.6
Polytetrafluorethylene (Teflon TFE)
Tetrafluoroethylene and
Hexafluoropropylene (Teflon FEP)
Polychlorotrifluoroet hylene (KeI-F,
Halon, CTFE)
Polyvinylidene Fluoride (Kynar_,
Polytrifluorochloroet hylene
Chlorinated .Polyetbers (Penton)
Polystyrenes (Bakelite. Catalin, Lustron.
Styron)
55-60
6O
6O
30
70
31
19-30
Polyethylenes (Bakelite. Tenite. Polyeth.
Polythene):
Low density 80
High density 110-124
0.95 density 150
Polyproplyenes 28-100
Vinyl 30°40
Nylon 18
Polycarbonates (Lexan, Marion) 46-70
Polymides (Nylon 6/6) 58
Acetals (Delrin. Celcon) 42
ACRYLICS
Acrylate and Methacrylate (Plexiglass) 40-6O
MethyI-Methacrylate (Lucite) 40-60
Cellulose Propionate (Forticel) 40-80
Fluorinated Ethylene-Propylene
Copolymer 90
POLYURETHANES
Polyurethane Foam (MSFC-SPEC0418) 70
LAMINATES (0 Lgth Cross Thick
to 60°C)
XXXP Phenolic Paper 20 30 100
XXXPC Phenolic Paper 20 40 200
FR-3 Epoxy Paper 30 40. I00
G-10 Epoxy Glass II 15 60
MSFC-SPEC-377 15 15 60
Silica. used in amounts up to 70 I_ercent by weight of composite, reduces the thermal coefficient of resin (epoxide,
silicone, and phenolic) expansion by a factor of 2.
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MEAN COEFFICIENT OF LINEAR THERMAL EXPANSION OF MATERIALS
(10 "6 in/in/°C)
METALS
Aluminum. pure AI 24.0 Palladium Pd 11.9
Antimony Sb 1!.7 Platinum Pt 7.8
Arsenic As 3.9 Potassium K 8.3
Beryllium Be 12.4 Rhodium 8.0
Bismuth Bi i3.4 Selenium Se 3.8
Boron B 8.3 Silicon Si 7.4
Brass (67Cu, 33Zn) 19.1 Silicon IC chip 2.6
Brass (80Cu° 20Zn) 18.0 Silver. pure Ag 18.8
Cadmium. cast Cd 29.9 Sodium Na 71.0
Calcium Ca 25.0 Solder (60Sn. 40Pb) 24.0
Chromium Cr 8. I Steel (1010) 15.0
Cobalt Co 12.0 Steel, soft I% carbon 11.9
Columbium Cb 7.2 Tellurium Te 16.7
Copper Cu 16.4 Thallium TI 11.5
Gallium Ga 18.0 Tin Sn 23.4
Germanium Ge 14.2 Titanium Ti 7. I
Gold. pure. cast Au 14.4 Tungsten W 4.0
Indium / In 32.4 Uranium U 16.2
Iridium lr 6.3 Zinc Zn 32.4
Iron, pure Fe 11.9 Zirconium Zr 10.6
Iron. cast 4% carbon 11.9 Rhodium 8.0
Lead Pb 28.8 Dumet 7.0
Lithium Li 55.8 Kovar 5.0
Magnesium Mg 25.8 Alloy 52 9.5
Manganese Mn 23.0 Alloy 42 6.6
Molybdenum Mo 4.9
Nickel. cast Ni 13.7
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Materials are shown below° They are listed according to Cleaning/Solvents,
Conformal. Coating/Potting, Nonmetallic Materials, and Metallic Materials° The °°ALERT ITEM NO. °' (first column)
refers each ALERT back to the "Problem Area/Cause and Suggested Action '° table.
CLEANING/SOLVENTS
ALERT1
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I SOLVENT During rework,
R8.68-01 A'I'I'ACKS solvent used to
CONFORMAL remove silicone
COATING humidity seal attacked
Incompatibility resistor's conformal
coating and produced
cracks and flakes
Short time immersion of printed wiring boards
in hot (100°F) toluene resulted in cracks in
silicone based conformal coating. Freon used
as a cleaning agent to remove excessive
soldering flux, resulted in flaking and cracking
of the resistor's conformal coating°
2 ALUMINUM Spacecraft closed-loop
MSC-68-03 CORRODED BY fluid system was
SOLVENT ATTACK contaminated and
Incompatibility corroded after solvent
flushing and cleaning.
Corrosion was caused by a reaction between
aluminum and hydrolyzed Freon TF.
Accumulation and distribution of the corrosion
products resulted in system contamination.
o
3 SOLVENT KeI-F and other
MSC 1.23-67 ATTACKS elastomeric materials
ELASTOMER can degrade with time
Incompatibility after cleaning with
Cry-oxcide and/or
Freons.
Severe swelling and softening of the
elastomers has been observed after sterilization
cleaning with Cry-oxcide and other haiogenated
hydrocarbons. This is particularly true when
the elastomer is in a location where rapid
evaporation cannot occur.
4 SOLVENT
KSC.68-03 ATTACKS PLASTIC
Incompatibility
Methyl Ethyl Keytone
(MEK) cleaning
solution used to
remove epoxy from
plastic panels,
disintegrated the
plastic material.
Cleaning solution used to remove epoxy ink
inadvertently ran down wire-wrap studs and
came in contact with the plastic material at
.the base of the stud° The cleaning material
_'_lisintegrated the plastic material (polysulfoam).
5 SOLVENT
KCS i-24-67 ATTACKS
ALUMINUM
Incompatibility
Rubber seal of
capacitors mounted
on printed wiring
board was destroyed
after immersion
cleaning of assemblies
with trichioroethylene.
Internal analysis of the failed capacitors
revealed corrosion on the ends of the internal
aluminum foils. Chemical analysis established
trichlorocthylene as a contaminant.
Contamination by this solvent caused a
chemical reaction with the aluminum which
resulted in the destruction of the capacitors.
S6.69-01
SOLVENT
ATTACKS PLASTIC
Incompatibility
Molded cases of
resistors disintegrated
after immersion in
Cobehn without
affecting the
resistance value
Cobehn is a triply distilled chloroform
stabilized with a trace of anhydrous ethyl
alcohol and is meant to be used as a fine
spray and not for soaking electronic parts in
it.
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CLEANING/SOLVENTS
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
7
KSC.69.03. 03A;
KSC.69-09
CONTACT
CLEANER
ATTACKS
DIELECTRIC
MATERIALS
Incompatibility
Chlorinated
hydrocarbon contact
cleaner attacks
selected dielectric
materials and leaves a
residual oil film.
Certain chlorinated hydrocarbon based contact
cleaners have been found to attack the
following list of commonly used dielectric
materials: acrylics, ethylene-ethyl acrilate
copolymers, polystyrene, polycarbonates.
polyvinyl chloride, natural and GRS rubbers.
and most of the chlorinated rubbers.
J5-69-01
SOLVENT
ATTACKS
SILICONE RESINS
Incompatibility
Silicone resins and/or
varnishes used on
wirewound resistors
are subject to attack
by trichloroethane.
Trichloroethane is not compatible with some
silicone or modified silicone resins.
9
GSFC-69-03
SOLVENT
CONTAMINATION
Manufacturer
process control
Excessive particulate
contamination found
in solvent
Trichlorotrifluoroethane Type I for clean room
use did not meet particulate matter
requirement of MIL-C-81302 (ref 28).
10
KSC-_8-05
SOLVENT
TRANSPORTS
CONTAMINANTS
Inadequate cleaning
method
Failure of
nonhermetically sealed
components resulted
from solvent
transportation of
contaminants onto
internal contacts.
High failure rate of components due to contact
contamination by flux residue reveals that
extreme care should be taken when cleaning
nonhermetically sealed devices after soldering.
Investigation revealed that the contamination of
these devices is primarily caused by too much
solvent being used when cleaning the
connections. After the solvent evaporates, a
nonconductive filmy residue of flux emains on
the contacts.
CONFORMAL COATING/POTTING
ALERT t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
II
M AA/AFML-68-01,
MSFC-68-27
POTTING SOFTENS
WITH AGE
Basic composition
Potting flowed and
exposed covered
connections
Polyurethane potting compound breaks down
chemically with time and reverts to liquid
slate.
12
KSC-71-02
POTTING SOFTENS.
WITH AGE
Basic composition
Potting material on
cables reverted to
sirupy liquid
Actual revision rate was established as 6 to 8
years depending on location and exposure.
13
MSFC_0_2
ENCAPSULANT
CRACKING
Excessive
temperature
Motor encapsulant
(epoxy) cracked
during vacuum bake.
Analysis revealed that the epoxy encapsulam
would crack and outgas at temperatures above
IO0°C.
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CONFORMAL COATING/POTTING
ALERT I
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
'PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
14
MSPC-72-06
. ENCAPSULANT
CRACKING
Inadequate process
A microballoon filled
epoxy potting material
applied in a thick
section around a
modular assembly
exhibited cracks after
thermal cycling.
The microballoon filler material acts as a
thermal insulator and increases the exotherm
of epoxy resin systems. Thick cross sections
or large amounts of these resins have high
exotherms, increased shrinkage, high external
stresses, and decreased thermal cycling
resistance.
CRACKED
CONFORMAL
• COATING
High curing
temperatures
A polyurethane
conformal coating
material cracked
when processed by
the supplier°
The same material processed by the contractor
at a lower curing temperature did not crack.
Tests showed that 180"F was too high a gel
temperature fur the material. Vacuum
depssing after application may be required to
minimize small bubbles which act as stress
concentration centers.
16
WS-68-02.02A
COATING
SOLVENT
ATI'ACKS
COMPONENTS
Incompatibility
Conformal coating
attacked dielectric
and encapsulant of
capacitor
Coating solvent is not compatible with
polystyrene
17
KSC 3-22-66
SOFT POTTING
MATERIAL
Manufacturer error
Type III polyurethane
material did not meet
Shore hardness
requirements
Tests showed a maximum Shore hardness of
73, whereas 83 =5 was specified.
18
MSFC-72-02
POTTING REVERTS
BACK TO
UNCURED STATE
Basic composition
RTV silicone potting
material reverted to a
liquid.
Reversion ot RTV silicones is caused by
entrapment of volatile curing byproducts and
subsequent exposure to elevated temperatures.
19
KSC-67-6._, 65A,
65B, 6._C
CRACKS IN
SOLDER
CONNECTIONS
incompatibility
Shrinkage of
conformal coating
results in cracking of
solder connections on
printed wiring board
The polyether based polyurethane coatings
contained an unstable isocyanate component.
The isocyanate, when exposed to moisture,
breaks down.
20
MSC 7-18-67
POTTING
COMPOUND
CAUSES SHORT
Incompatibility
Potting compound
component caused
corrosion and shorts
by acting as a
galvanic couple
Analysis of shorted connectors revealed
corrosion associated with galvanic action in
areas adjacent to the potting compound which
contained acetic acid.
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NONMETALLIC MATERIAL
ALERTt
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
21
KSC-67-66A
MATERIAL
FLAMMABILITY
Incompatibility.
NEMA Grade G-10
epoxy-glass board
material will burn
when ignited by hot
wire or flame ,
Epoxy binder is flammable.
22
CG-7O-OI
CRACKED RUBBER
Ozone attack
Stressed areas of
rubber parts cracked
after 6-9 months.
It appeared to be ozone cracking of stressed
rubber.
SILVER WHISKER
CONTAMINATION
Sulphurattack
Silver sulfide
whiskers were found
on silver-plated
connector pins.
Protective cover for connector contained black
rubber (neoprene) gasket which was cured with
a sulphur compound.
24
KSC.67.64
RADIATION
DAMAGED
MATERIALS
Excessive radiation
During X-ray
examination of
selected areas of
equipment, it was
seen that adjacent
components (Teflon
and transistors) could
be damaged.
The excessive radiation was caused by high
output of the X-ray tube and the high number
of exposures in a concentrated area,
25
M SFC -67-03
TEFLON
SHRINKAGE
Process variables
Shrinkage of 114" to
I-.1/4" has been
observed in FEP type
Teflon insulation of
hook-up cabling.
Variation due to differences in processing
between various vendors.
FUNGUS
NUTRIENT
MATERIALS
Inadequate
specification limits
Tests on materials
showed they were not
fungus resistant
The tests indicated that the nonnutrient
properties generally implied in certain materials
are in error.
27
MSFC-68-09
DRAWINGS
DEPOSIT CARBON
incompatibiliiy
Drawing prints
deposit carbon smears
Reproduction process uses a toner that is
carbon based.
28
ARC-68-01
FLUOROLUBE
DEGRADATION
Cbemical attack
A solid residue was
observed that was the
result of fluorolube
dqradation
Manufacturer has stated the fluorolube
breakdown was possible under certain
conditions of time and temperature in the
presence of aluminum and moisture.
29
LeRC I-5-65
HONEYCOMB
DELAMINATION
Voids/environment
During flight a
fiberglas-honeycomb
shroud failed to
separate from a
spacecraft
The available evidence indicates that the most
probable cause was extensive separation of the
inner fiberglas skin from the honeycomb core
in such a manner ihe skin became entangled
with other spacecraft components. The
separation was due to explosive expansion of
the air entrapped in voids as the vehicle
encountered decreasing barometric pressure
with ascent.
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NONMETALLIC MATERIAL
ALERTt|TEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
30
D7-69-01,
KSC-69-12B
TAPE INDUCED
STATIC CHARGE
Materialphysical
properties
Tape exhibited sparks
or blue corona as it
was peeled from the
roll
Tests indicate that certain tapes can produce
up to 35,000 volts of static charge when
peeled from a roll.
3l
KSC-70-08
STATIC CHARGE
ON ANTISTATIC
FILM
Incompatibility
Samples of plastic
film failed the
antistatic test.
Twenty samples of plastic film were removed
from roll ends and when measured against the
Teflon wheel, accepted charges ranging up to
10,000 volts. Analysis revealed that the
polyethylene overwrap negated the antistatic
properties of the outer layer of each roll.
32
MSC.70-02
STATIC CHARGE
ON STYROFOAM
Incompatibility
Styrofoam packing
material used to ship
ordnance stuck to
side of package.
The packing material was found to contain a
static charge of 4500 Vdc (neg).
33
JPL 9-29-04
CORROSIVE ACID
FORMATION
Incompatibility
The resistive element
in wire wound
resistors failed due to
COITOSiOn
PVC label material decomposed in the
presence of high temperature (above 200°C)
into various organic products, water, and
HCL. The corrosive acid (HCL) had
penetrated the outer epoxy coating of the
resistor and destroyed the resistive element.
3,*
G7-72-OI ,01A
ONE COMPONENT
RTV SILICONES
CAUSE
CORROSION
Incompatibility of
materials
Some one component
RTV silicones liberate
acetic acid during
cure resulting in
subsequent corrosion
of metallic surfaces.
Corrosion noted on fine copper wires,
aluminum connectors, steel containers, and
cadmium plated surfaces due to action ()f
acetic acid released from particular RTV
silicones during cure, usually because of lack
of proper ventilation. This type of material
can also cause fracture of stressed high
strength steel when applied under atmospheric
condition of high humidity°
35
MSFC-A-72-13
PI'I'rlNG
Incompatibility of
materials
A stored fuel
manifold line made of
series 300 corrosion
resistant steel was
found during
inspection for stress
corrosion to be
severly pitted
necessitating
scrapping.
Investigation revealed that polyurethane foam
used on the supports was in direct contact
with the line and had reverted to a powdery
and/or gummy substance. Analysis of reverted
foam indicated a high chloride content and a
pH of 3.0 to 3.5.
36
GSFC.72_2
SOLVENT
CONTAMINATION
Incompatibility of
materials
Solvent (Freon TF)
residue contained a
high percentage of
phthalate esters.
Analysis revealed the phthalate esters had been
leached from the polyvinyl chloride tubing
used to transfer the solvent.
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ALERT t
ITEM NOo/ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
37 ABS Acrylonitrile
M5C-72-04 DETERIORATION Butadiene Styrene
Unreliable creep (ABS) material failed
data under sustained loads
and leaked pottasium
hydroxide (KOH).
Tests showed that the published creep data on
ABS plastics is not reliable even for normal
air exposure. Tests also showed that the yield
strength of ABS plastic is reduced to less than
70 percent when exposed for one day to
organic acids, alcohols, boric acid. detergents.
and solvent fumes.
38 POOR ADHESION Silicone rubber
MSC-72-03 Improper curing adhesive exhibited
inadequate adhesion.
Problem occurred during room temperature
cure with manufacturer's recommended primers
in bonds of less than 0.060 inch thickness.
Manufacturer now recommends the use of a
different primer when curing at room
temperature.
39 PLATING DEFECTS Voids and defects
K9.A.72-10 Inadequate process occurred within the
plated.through holes
of printed wiring
boards.
The printed wiring boards were fabrica.'ed
from a flame retardant laminate. The voids
and defects were attributed to a passive
condition of the laminate due to excessive
amounts of flame retardant chemicals.
ALERTt
METALLIC MATERIAL
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM' AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
40 TITANIUM
MSFC.65-02 EXPLOSION
Pryophoric reaction
with LOX and
impact
Titanium alloys are
attractive for
construction of
LOX/LH 2 containers
for space vehicle
systems because of
their high
strength-to-weight
i
ratios at cryogenic
temperatures.
Titanium is highly sensitive to impact in
contact with LOX. The shock stimuli
produced by small detonator caps alone were
sufficient to initiate explosive reaction of
titanium in contact with oxygen. Do not use
titanium for this application
41 TITANIUM A titanium fuel tank
MSC 7-7-67 CRACKING failed when
Notch sensitivity to pressurized with
anhydrous methyl alcohol.
methanol
The alloy used (Ti-6AI-4V), under stress, is
incompatible with anhydrous methanol and the
result is failure because of a stress-corrosion
mechanism.
42 TITANIUM
MSFC-65-0,1 FRACTURE
Stress corrosion
due to contact with
N204
Propellant tanks
fabricated from
titanium alloy
('ri.6AI.4V) either
ruptured or leaked
after short term
exposure to N204 at
100°F and stress
levels at 90,000 psi.
The probable cause(s) are fabrication
processes, stress corrosion, galvanic couple
corrosion, or a basic incompatibility of
materials. Do not use titanium for this
application.
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ALERT I
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/
GIDEP NO, Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
43 MERCURY
MSC 2.15-67 CONTAMINATION
Mercury spillage
Mercury spillage was
discovered in and on
aerospace hardware.
Source of mercury
was not determined.
In addition Io its toxic hazard, mercury, in
either liquid or vapor form. can cause severe
corrosion and/or cracking of unprotected
nonferrous metals as well as act as an
electrical conductor. Restrict usage of
mercury and mercury containing equipment in
and around flight hardware.
44 MERCURY
MSC-N_-04 CONTAMINATION
Mercury spillage
Mercury was
discovered in interior
of valves used in an
oxygen supply
system°
The mercury could have been introduced
during original fabrication of the valves or
during subsequent disassembly and test. Limit
usage, of mercury and mercury containing
equipment in and around hardware.
45 STEEL EXPANSION
MSC 6.27.e_7 JOINT FRACTURE
Inadequate design
Steel expansion joint
failed during systems
test. A fire which
damaged several TV
cables and scorched a
LOX line was
attributed to this
failure.
Failure was due to embrittlement of the
bellows material (AIS! 304) at low
temperatures. Increase radius of bends to
decrease operational stress or choose different
material.
°
o
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major hazards associated with use of ordnance and propulsion, and to
suggest safety and handling procedures (developed from experience) for minimizing those hazards.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The ordnance/propulsion section is presented with the following organization:
I. Problem Area/Cause and Sulggested Action. This tabulation lists the problem area. problem cause, and suggested
action for ALERT reports issued against ordnance/propulsion.
°°
Ordnance Device Problems/Solutions - Non-ALERT.
other than ALERTs.
This listing reflects problems and solutions from sources
_. Hazards Associated with Ordnance and Propulsion. This listing reflects experience of hazards, causes, and effects.
4. Safety and Handlinlt Procedures for Ordnance. Specific safety precautions for handling explosives are provided.
5. Sources of Additional Information for Ordnance and Propulsion. A listing of relevant documents (with synopses).
associations, and agencies is provided.
6. ALERT Summaries. Individual ALERT reports issued against ordnance/propulsion are summarized.
i
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.
SUGGESTED ACTgON
INADVERTENT INITIATION
Electrostatic discharge
Arming and firing circuitry can be designed so
that a squib is not armed until just before it is
to be fired.
VALVE MECHANISM FAILED TO ACTUATE
Malfunction of squib
Part application data from the manufacturer
can prevent problems of this nature 'from
occurring.
DUDS (NO-FIRES)
Poor iEnition and propagation characteristics of the
primary mix
Store devices in a controlled environment and
conduct thorough age-testing.
PREMATURE IGNITION
Migration of lead azide
Explosive bolts should be qualified to different
levels of vibration testing since virtually all of
them will see some level of this type of
environment.
i
FRACTURED BOLT HEAD Basic good design practices for the fabrication
High stress and hydrogen embrittlement 5 of bolts should be followed.
OUT OF SPECIFICATION Proper lot acceptance testing will uncover
Short canister life 6 failures of this nature.
DAMAGED MILD DETONATING FUSE Use compatible epoxy compounds.
Acetic acid reaction 7
MATERIAL FAILURE Insure mountings are sufficient in flatness and
Cracks and deformations 8 strength to preclude the possibility of
fragmentation°
INADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION
Propellant blend changes° specification changes, etc;
leading to qualification test and lot acceptance test
failures
Lot certification identifying device by unique
lot number and serial number of acceptable
devices. Require active participation of both
Quality and Engineering in certification effort.
Documentation review prior to each new
procurement.
MOISTURE IN HARDWARE Require dry N 2 when cleaning and drying
Shop air condensation parts.
ALCOHOL CONTAMINATION Use of neutron-ray technique Allow no
Lack of manufacturing controls alcohol or solvents in loadint* rooms. Require
documentation approval prior to manufacturing.
CONDUCTIVE CONTAMINATION IN Use dry N 2 to clean part prior to installation.
ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
Conductive gasket in Farady cap shredding
MANUFACTURING LOSSES Use protective bags and desiccanl.
Rust and contamination
MANUFACTURING LOSSES Use of X and Neutron-radiographic techniques.
Under/overload of explosive material
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PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION
INSULATION RESISTANCE
Excessive testing at high voltage (500 Vdc)
Require minimal testing to insure proper
acceptance/rejection criteria.
Test only at lot acceptance and prior to
installation (2._0 Vdc).
SEPARATION SYSTEM FAILURE Eliminate free volume area with RTV.
Free volume excessive in frangible area
ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR INSTALLATION, Require inspection for material composition
EXCESSIVE TORQUE REQUIRED and hardness.
Improper identification of rubber O-rings
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ORDNANCE DEVICE PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS'NON-ALERT
SQUAB, PRESSURE : ....
+
Problem. Prior to vehicle installation of the p_'essure squib. a resistance check revealed an open circuit. After open_ng
and examining the squib, extensive corrosion and primer flaking were observed. A separation was found between a
bridgewire and a connector pin at one weld joint. This pin surface was found to be displaced 0.004 to 0.00.'; of an inch
below the plane which should be formed by the other three pin surfaces.
Solution. As a result of investigation three possible failure modes were revealed:
I. Extensive corrosion
". Primer flaking
3. Poor welds (revealed by Scanning Electron Microscope)• ! +
Corrosion and primer flaking were both found to be due to acid flux contamination. The flux contains chlorides and
has a pH value of approximately I..';. This flux releases HCL when heat is applied during the soldering process. The
acid attached the steel pins to the cellulose binder and the cellulose lacquer of she primer.
Eliminating extensive corrosion and primer flaking as possible failure modes would require° at the minimum, changing to.
resin flux and changing the poss material. The undesirable aspects of these changes are that problems may arise from
contaminants due so use of resin flux and that the resin flux had a past history of unsuccessful performance in this
application. Corrective action should include close surveillance of existing techniques, with special attention paid to
improving those techniques wherever possible.
COMMAND DESTRUCT UNIT AND SELF DESTRUCT INITIATOR
Problem. Diodes have been used in the command destruct unit and the self destruct initiator. Existing diodes have
been in house storage for several years and can no longer be purchased; nor is there any dimensional/functional substitute
presently available for these devices. One diode is used to suppress sparking across the commutator switch for EMi
control and another is used to prevent circuit damage from reverse polarity during testing. The latter diode proyides
single point failue mode which would prevent cycling of safe and arm rotor of each device.
Failure of selected diodes aroused suspicion as to the integrity of the two command destruct units and the fi,ve self
destruct initiators now in stock. Furthermore, existing parts cannot be reworked because this would destroy soldered
connections.
Solution. Special confidence tests are being done on existing diodes to arrive at a reliability figure for the Command
destruct units and the self destruct initiators currently available. A design change has removed the diode used for
reverse polarity protection. Hence. the single diode remaining will not prevent cycling of the rotor if it does fail in use.
This is the command destruct unit open circuit failure mode.
CUTTER, • 1/16 INCH DIAMETER CABLE
Problem. The shear pin maintaining the piston culling blade in position prior to actuation of the unit was ejecting from
the housing of the cable cutter after the squib was fired. This is undesirable since the small steel pin might jam a
mechanism or produce other harmful effects in flight.
Solution. A new configuration has been created to keep the shear pin intacJ. This configuration specifies that a roll
type pin shall be employed in place of the original type pin. and that this roll pin shall be retained in the housing by a
360" controlled peripheral staking of housing material at the shear pin hole.
•INITIATOR, ELECTRIC
Problem. During the application of 2x10 "_eros to determine electrostatic discharge sensitivity, a number of units initiated,
although calculations indicated a margin of safety. The initiator utilized a glass-to-metal sealed header assembly pressed
into a stainless steel case which contained ignition powder. An external spark gap discharge path was provided. An
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insulatingplasticchargecup was designed to contain the ignition powder, the glass-to-metal seal header was undercut to
obtain an interference fit into the charge cup. and the resultant subassembly was inserted into the stainless steel case.
Although this increased the effective breakdown path, processing problems such as cracking of the plastic charge cups
and smearing of ignition powder alone the sides of the header allowed for varying breakdown paths and a very small
percentage of failures. Investigation revealed that the powder cavity breakdown path was 2 I/-'2 times greater than the
spark gap breakdown path. This value, however, was still less than the applied voltage.
Solution. A potential solution involves coating the charge cup/header assembly mating surface with an insulating cement
which further increased the effective discharge path. This actually increased the voltage breakdown characteristics to
values greater than the applied voltage, thereby insuring complete protection.
CAST EXPLOSIVE
Problem. Cast explosive exuded from a device during temperature and humidity cycling tests. It was discovered that
an additive (less than i percent) was included in an explosive mixture to improve casting and prevent cracking during
handling. The additive caused formation of a low melting point eutectic.
Solution. The additive was removed from the mixture,
CARTRIDGE, PRESSURE
Problem. The pressure cartridge was not actuating properly with the application of Correct current level. It was
determined that the recommended installation torque was being exceeded. The configuration of the cartridge is such that
if proper torque is exceeded, the single bridgewire is stretched to the point of fracture in certain instances. In those
cases where the bridgewire did not fracture its elongated configuration increased the resistance so that predicted current
requirements no longer applied.
Solution. Caution documentation has been put into effect warning that the installation torque is critical and under no
circumstances is to exceed 30 in-lb.
EXPLOSIVE SEPARATION SYSTEM
Problem. A payload separation system experienced an incomplete separation during qualification testing in that the outer
frangible doubler joining the forward and aft rings did not completely separate upon actuation of the explosive system.
This particular qualification unit had been subjected toenvironmental tests, a separation test, and had been refurbished
with new frangible doublers before the second series of environmental and separation tests were performed. An analysis
was performed to determine a solution to the problem.
Solution. A series of design changes is currently being put into effect to correct the nonseparation problem. Analysis
has indicated that the major problem area is that the pyro tube which houses the dual detonating cord did not fit snugly
between the frangible doublers. This tight fit is necessary to insure maximum shock effect during detonation. Tube-
doubler clearance should be no more than 0,005 of an inch, and even very slight interference is often desirable. Current
design changes will reflect this condition, and qualification testing will be continued.
SEPARATION NUT
Problem. The separation nut base exhibited Cracks after functioning of the unit. The separation nut base material was
7075.T6 aluminum.
Solution. Base material was changed to 17-4H stainless steel and no further cracking was observed.
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HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH ORDNANCE
AND PROPULSION
The tabulation shown below will be useful in the preparation of an explosive device hazard analysis. The first column
is a listing of Hazards and includes specific characteristics such as acceleration in ft/sec2o etc. The second column
predicts the Source of the hazard. The third and fourth columns list several Causes and Effects of the hazards identified
in the first column.
The last three columns have a direct relationship to the Hazard column, however, they may or they may not have a
direct relationship among each other.
HAZARD SOURCE CAUSE EFFECTS
DiSASSOCI-
ATION,
CHEMICAL
Monopropellants.
fuels or oxidizers.
Explosives.
Organic materials.
Epoxy compounds.
Temperature of compound raised
to point reaction begins.
Presence of suitable catalyst.
Shock,
Explosion.
Nonexplosive exothermic reaction.
Material degradationo
Toxic gas production.
Corrosion fraction production.
Swelling of organic materials.
ELECTROMAG-
NETIC
Radar equipment.
Communication
equipment.'
Radar equipment operation.
Communications equipment
operation.
Initiation of ordnance devices.
Interference with operation of other
electronic equipment.
9.8
HAZARD SOURCE CAUSE EFFECTS
EXPLOSION Rupture of engines, motors or other
pressurized container.
Impact sensitivity,
psi; TNT
equivalency. Ib;
temperature, °F
Ordnance or
munitions systems.
High pressure
equipment.
Cryogenic liquid
system.
inadverten! activation of:
High explosives
Propellant explosives or
combustible gases in containers
or confined spaces.
Fine dust and powders.
Combustible gases or liquids:.
In high concentrations.
In presence of strong oxidizers.
At high temperatures.
Activation of cracked or otherwise
defective solid propellant motors.
Afterburning of confined
combustion products.
Delayed combustion in a firing
chamber.
Cold soaking of solid propellants.
Overpressurization of boilers,
accumulators or other pressure
vessels.
Warming closed cryogenic or
other system containing highly
volatile fluid.
Contact between water or
moisture with water.sensitive
materials such as molten sodium,
potassium, or lithium;
concentrated acids or alkalis; or
similar substances.
Blast:
Overpressures (impulse energy).
Collapse of nearby containers.
Damage to structures and
equipment.
Propagation of other explosions.
Fragmentation:
Holing of nearby containers and
vehicles.
Impact of pieces against personnel,
equipment and structures.
Dispersion of burning, hot,
combustible or corrosive materials.
Heat (see heat and high temperature).
Dispersion of toxic materials.
injury to personnel.
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HAZARD SOURCE CAUSE EFFECTS
HEAT AND
TEMPERATURE
Heat_ btu, btu/Ib,
btu/sq ft.
_emperature "F,
"C.
High Temperature
Any fuel
consuming
process°
Other exothermic
chemical process.
Electrical
equipment.
Solar energy.
Biological or
physiological
processes.
Moving equipment
or parts°
Fire or explosion.
Other exothermic reaction.
Heat engine operations.
Electrical energy losses.
Aerodynamic or other vehicular
friction.
Friction between moving parts or
vehicle and surrounding medium.
Gas compression
Inadequate heat dissipation.
Cooling system failure.
Welding, soldering, brazing, or
metal cutting.
Proximity to operations involving
large amounts of heat (radiation,
convection, conduction).
Immersion in hot fluid.
Lack of insulation.
Exposure to sun or artificial light.
Hot climates or weather.
Human or animal heat output.
Organic decay processes.
Ignition of combustibles.
Initiation of other reactions.
Melting of metals.
Charring of organic materials.
Increased reactivity.
Reduced material strength.
Reduced equipment life.
Distortion and warping of part.
Expansion of solids and liquids.
Increased evaporation rate of liquids.
Expansion may cause binding or
loosening of parts.
Increased gas diffusion.
Reduced relative humidity.
Increased absolute humidity.
Breakdown of chemical compounds.
Personnel burns.
Reduced personnel efficiency.
Heat cramps, strokes, and
exhaustion.
Peeling of finishes, blistering paint.
Evaporation or decreased viscosity of
lubricants.
Changes in electrical characteristics.
Softening of insulation and sealants.
Opening or closing of electrical
contacts due to expansion.
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HAZARD SOURCE CAUSE EFFECTS
INADVERTENT
ACTUATION
Static electricity discharge
Lightning strike.
Inadequate electrical insulation.
Electrostatic discharge.
Faulty connector or connection.
Corrosion.
Dirt or other contamination.
Moisture,
Excessive solder.
Cut wires.
Bent pins.
Improper wiring.
Improper mating.
Worn keyways.
Poor alignment devices.
Inadequate electrical protection.
Overloading electrical equipment.
Inadequate heat dissipation.
High resistance circuits.
Sparking and arcing.
Welding or build-up of contacts.
Lack of adequate grounding
Electrolytic action.
Misapplied test equipment power.
Photosensitive materials.
Firing of ordnance devices.
Untimely electrical equipment starts.
Endangering of personnel working on
circuits or equipment.
OXIDATION
Other than by air
Missile propellants.
Welding oxygen.
- Oxygen for
respiratory
protective
equipment.
Laboratory
chemicals.
Cleaning
compounds.
Process chemicals.
Chemical combination involving
oxidants such as:
Oxygen or ozone.
Halogens or halogen compounds.
Oxidizing acids and their salts,
Nitrates, chlorates, perchlorates,
hyperchlorates, chromates.
Higher valence' compounds of
mercury, lead, selenium, and
thallium.
Increased reactivity of combustibles,
Easier ignition.
Normally low flammable materials
may burn easily.
May cause violent or explosive
reactions.
Partner in hypergolic reactions.
Corrosion.
Forms explosive gels with some
fuels.
- Deterioration ofrubber, plastics, or
other organic materials.
Almost all volatile strong oxidizing
agents except oxygen are toxic.
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HAZARD SOURCE CAUSE EFFECTS
REPLACEMENT.
CHEMICAL
Fluorine and Replacement of a chemical radical Exothermic reactions.
water, by a more active one.
Explosions.
Sodium and water.
Violent spraying of corrosive
Nitric acid and material.
water°
SHOCK
Impact energy.
Ib/sq h; load. Ib,
G
Any part or piece
of equipment.
Impact.
Handling and transportation
damage.
Blast.
Pneudraulic actuated devices.
Acceleration.
Electroexplosive detonating
devices.
Water hammer.
Vibrations caused by heavy
equipment.
Breakage of cable, ropes, chains, pin.
Fracture of brittle materials.
Detonation of sensitive explosives.
Normally closed contacts may open.
Normally open controls° valves.
contacts may close.
Parts may be displaced.
Disruption of metering equipment.
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SAFETY AND HANDLING GUIDELINES FOR ORDNANCE
The storage, handling, transportation, and use of explosives and ordnance devices is potentially hazardous because of the
nature of the materials involved. Explosives can. however, be handled and used safely provided proper precautions and
procedures are followed. This section describes procedures for general safety and handling of explosives.
GEN ERAL
Only duly authorized and qualified personnel shall handle, transport, test. and install explosives and ordnance.
"'DANGER EXPLOSIVES, NO SMOKING. EYE PROTECTION REQUIRED" signs shall be posted whenever explosive
devices are being unpacked, installed into equipment, or otherwise handled. The sign shall be removed only after the
devices have been replaced into approved storage containers, or the installation is complete and devices can be operated
without danger to personnel.
No smoking shall be permitted within 50 feet whenever explosive devices are being unpacked, installed into equipment.
or otherwise handled.
Matches, lighters, etc. shall not be permitted in areas where explosives are being stored or handled.
Shielding caps shall be provided and shall be placed on electroexplosive devices during shipment, storage, handling, and
installation up to the point of electrical connection in the missile.
Only approved electrical devices and mechanical tools will be used (including personally owned items).
Radio. radar, television and other transmissions shall not be permitted near any operation involving electroexplosive
devices. The problem of radio frequency excitation of electroexpiosive devices involves power density, frequency, tuned
circuits, and shielding so that it is difficult to set exact safe distances. However. in the absence of other information.
the following tables should serve as a guide.
RADIO TRANSMITTERS
Transmitter Power
(watts)
0-25
2._-50
50-100
100-250
2._0-._00
500-I,000
1,000-2,._00
2,._00-5,000
5,000-10,000
10,000-25,000
2._,000-50,000
._0,000-I00,000
Minimum Distance
(feet)
I00
150
220
350
450
650
!,0o0
1.500
2,200
3,500
5,000
7,000
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FM MOBILE TRANSMITTERS
Transmitter Power
(watts)
; I-!0
10-30
3O-6O
6O-25O
25O-6OO
Minimum Distance
(feet)
5
I0
15
3O
45
RADAR TRANSMITTER
Transmitter Power "
(watts)
5-25
25 -50
50-100
100-250
250-500
500-1.000
I°000-2.500
2_500-5.0O0
5.0O0-I0,000
i0.0O0-25.O00
25.O00-50,O00
50.0O0- IO0.000
100,O00-250,0O0
250.000-500,000
Minimum Distance
(feet)
100
150
220
350
450
650
1,0o0
! .5O0
2,2O0
3°500
5.000
7.000
10,0O0
15.o00
Note: When the transmission is a pulsed or pulsed continuous wave type and its pulse width is less than ten
microseconds, the left-hand column indicates average power. For all other transmissions, including those with pulse
widths greater than 10 microseconds, the left-hand column indicates peak power.
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PERSON N EL
Only duly authorized and qualified personnel shall install, remove, or handle ordnance items.
"'Qualified" in connection with this procedure shall mean personnel trained in the safe methods and procedures of
handling, using, and installing explosives.
Ordnance work will not be performed unless a minimum of two authorized and qualified persons are present.
in any location where explosives are stored, used, or installed, personnel shall be restricted to only those necessary to
accomplish a specific operation.
Whenever explosive devices arc fired in tests, personnel shall be adequately protected from all possible flying particles.
EQUIPMENT (SAFETY)
All persons in the immediate vicinity of explosive devices shall wear safety glasses or other approved eye protection
whenever these devices are being unpacked, installed into equipment, or otherwise handled.
Cotton clothing will be worn to minimize static electrical charges.
HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION
Only duly authorized and qualified personnel shall handle and transport explosives and ordnance.
All electrical bridge circuits shall be received electrically shorted and capped.
Electroexplosive devices are to be picked up one at a time. A check shall be made to see that the shorting plug and
cap shielding are in place each time it is handled. The device shall be handled so that the live end does not point
towards the handler or other personnel.
Before any electroexplosive device it handled, steps shall be taken to eliminate any difference in potential because of
static electricity between the electroexplosive device, the person making the installation, and the item on which the device
is to be installed. " •
Shorting devices and shielding caps shall not he removed during storage except to lest continuity, and then only in
approved testing areas.
Ordnance items shall not be subjected to heat and, where possible, are to be kept out of the direct rays of the sun.
Except during continuity tests, shorting plugs and shielding caps or other safety devices must be kept in place at all
times until the final electrical connection is made. Shorting connections shall short all pins to each other as well as to
the body of.the device.
Explosives shall be carried only in approved transportation containers which act as RF shields, e.g.. metal outer containers.
The leads must be shorted and shielding caps in place at all times.
All, explosives shall be inspected for damage before their subsequent handling and use. Any damaged items shall be
segregated from flight items and cognizant personnel notified immediately.
Ordnance items will not be torqued beyond specifications nor cross-threaded. However. should this occur, the specific
individual items will be replaced and properly identified, to preclude their eventual flight use.
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STORAGE
Explosives shall be stored either in the original shipping containers or in approved storage containers.
Explosives shall be stored only in assigned magazines or magazettes which can provide the recruited storage environment.
i.e.. temperature and humidity.
Magazines shall be locked at all times except when occupied by authorized personnel.
Ordnance devices containing explosives, pyrotechnics, or propellants shall not be left unattended but shall be stored in a
proper and safe place when not in actual use/
Careful inventory records should be kept showing the location and ultimate disposition of all ordnance item received.
TESTING
Only duly authorized and qualified personnel shall test explosives and ordnance.
Testing, checkout, or preparation for installation are prohibited in storage magazines.
Disassembly or modification of explosive items shall be performed only on the written request of a qualified ordnance/
pyrotechnic engineer.
All testing of explosives, except at installation, shall be performed in approved check-out facilities.
I. .All tests shall be accomplished per an approved test procedure.
2. Since many explosive devices are electrically initiated, no electrical potential should be applied to any explosive
device where the electrical apparatus is capable of delivering more than 10 milliamps of current. Such testing
devices shall be used only if approved by cognizant personnel.
3. All personnel testing explosives shall wear safety glasses.
4. A minimum of two pyrotechnic technicians is required for tests.
5. Indirect methods of lest shail'be used with shielding adequate to protect all personnel from the effects of
premature initiation of any explosive device being tested.
6. Ordnance devices will be installed in approved test fixtures when being tested.
Circuit continuity tests on any electroexplosive device shall he made only with a standard silver chloride cell cap testing
device, such as the Alinco Igniter Circuit Tester or the DuPont Blasting Galvanometer. ,An ordinary voltohm meter must
never be used as there is sufficient current output from these meters to actuate most electrnexplosive devices.
INSTALLATION
Only duly authorized and qualified personnel shall install explosives and ordnance.
All explosives installations shall be made in accordance with applicable "installation" and/or "test" procedures.
All explosives installations shall be performed under the technical direction of an ordnance/pyrotechnic engineer.
Explosives shall be assembled, tested, and otherwise prepared for installation in approved work areas.
Only personnel necessary for the explosive installation shall he permitted in the vicinity of an explosive installation
operation. ,Any deviation must he necessary, and must have the prior approval of a safety engineer.
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Explosives to be installed shall be delivered to the installation site only as required. Any items not installed on the day
delivered must be returned to the storage area. Note: Those areas having pad ready explosive magazines (magazettes)
may store necessary explosives including spares in these magazettes.
Ensure that all safe/arm devices (e.g., Self Destruct Initiator, Command Destruct Unit, etc.) are in the "safe" condition.
with safety pins in place, before installation.
Prior to the handling or installation of explosives, the ordnance/pyrotechnic engineer shall verify that the RF (radio
frequency) radiation is either nonexistent or at a "safe" level (as specified for the particular facility involved). Ensure
that a °'no.switching" period is also in effect.
Whenever explosive devices are bein,_mechanically or electrically installed in a vehicle or test setup, all electrical power
to the vehicle or test setup shall he turned off. No electrical switches are to be thrown until the installation is compJete.
Power shall be kept off and the firing circuit shorted until it is safe to fire.
Immediately before electrical connections are made to any explosive device, the firing circuit to which it is to be
connected shall be checked for "'NO VOLTAGE" between connector pin sockets and between pin sockets and connector
body.
After the installation of explosives, an appropriate warning sign shall be posted to warn personnel of the presence of
loaded explosives.
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SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR ORDNANCE
AND PROPULSION
AIR FORCE DESIGN HANDBOOK
AFSC DH I-6 (System Safety). Contains safety theories, principles, practices, and experience data applicable to all
types of Air Force systems and equipments. It includes safety design data pertinent to aerospace vehicle design, ground
equipment design, and facilities design, as well as material on system safety engineering. Design Handbook I-6 was
originally scheduled to appear as AFSCM 80.9, Volume VI.
AFSC DH 2-3 (Propulsion and Power). Contains design data covering aircraft propulsion subsystems and secondary
power° ]t includes criteria on engine selection and installation, and detailed information on turbine and rocket engine
design; and on electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical secondary power subsystems. Design Handbook 2-3
supersedes Part D and selected portions of Part C of AFSCM 80-1.
AFSC DH 2-5 (Armament). Contains design data on aircraft weapons, electroexplosive subsystems, and ordnance devices.
]t includes installation criteria for guns, rockets, missiles, bombs, and fire control systems, and will eventually cover all
general design data for aircraft armament systems, including the design aspects of storage, handling, transportation,
assembly, and loading of nonnuclear munitions. Design Handbook 2-5 supersedes Chapter E.4 of AFSCM 80-1, Chapter
Co IO of AFSCM 80-6. Pare D of AFSCM 80-7, and selected portions of AFSCM 80-8. Volume I.
AIR FORCE MANUALS
AFM 71-4. "Packaginlt and Handlin 8 of Danjerous Materials for Transportation by Military Aircrafl."(This is a joint
publication and also is listed as TM 38-250, NAVWEPS 15-03.500, DSAM 4145.3, and MCO P4030.19.)lt provides
instructions for packaging, handling and marketing of explosives, ammunition, flammable liquids, solids and oxidizing
materials, corrosive liquids, compressed gases, poisons, and several other articles "not otherwise regulated."lt is primarily
concerned with transportation by military aircraft.
AFETRM 127-1,"Range Safety Manual." Contains range safety requirements common to all missile launch operations
supported by Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR). It explains these requirements, their preparation, and to whom
they must be submitted. The manual is directive in nature and applies to all range users at or supported by the AFETR.
all units using the service of, or providing service to the AFETR, and those national agencies launching vehicles which
impact the AFETR.
AFWTRM 127ol, "'Range Safety Manual."Contains the requirements covering all aspects of range safety for which the
AFWTR is responsible. It explains these requirements, their preparation, to whom they apply; and, where applicable,
to whom they must be submitted. This manual is directive in nature and applies to all range users and those agencies
performing services for the range.
AFM 127-100 "'Explosives Safety Manual." Contains safety criteria for operations involving explosives. Covers general
precautions, fire protection, storage, electrical hazards, transportation, site plans, construction (quantity-distance criteria),
chemical munitions and manufacturing. This manual supersedes AFM 32-6, I November 1961.
AFM 127-201, "Missile and Space Safety Handbook (FOUO)." Explains hazards, operation of missile systems, prevention
of mishaps, and preparation of safety survey checklists. Covers human factors, hazards of propellants, characteristics of
propellants, cleanliness and decontamination, initiating devices, detection and protective equipment, facilities, and "mis-
cellaneous" hazards (microwave, acoustical, welding, weather, stress concentrations, wind); manual is general and
educational. Covers the preparation of safety survey checklists for Operational missile and space systems.
AFM 160-39, "The Handlin S and Storage of Liquid Propellants."This manual is in the Medical Service series and is
adapted from a publication of the same title issued by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in January
1963o It lists twenty*two propellants or groups of propellants, gives their general properties, associated hazards, required
safety measures, and transfer, storage, and shipping information.
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AIR FORCE REGULATIONS
AFR 66-20, "'Designating. Redesignating. and Naming Military Rockets and Guided Missiles."
AFR 12"/-100. "Responsibilities for the Explosive Accident Prevention Program."
AFR 136-6. "'Ammunition and Explosive Materiel Quality Assurance."
AFR 136-8, "Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal."
AFR 136-10, "Air Force Explosive OrdnanCe Disposal Program."
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
Institute of Makers of Explosives. (420 Lexington Avenue, New York. New York 10017). Their interest is in the safe
transportation, handling, and use of explosives.
Association of American Railroads. Under the AAR is a group by the title "Bureau for the Safe Transportation of
Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles" located at 2 Pennsylvania Plaza. New York. New York 10001.
J
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US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). Department of Defense Directive No. 5154.4 of 23 October
1971 established the responsibilities of the DDESB. The board insures the establishment and revision of explosives safety
standards, and reviews and evaluates all site plans for construction and modification of explosive sites.
The Air Force Propellant Control Committee. OPR for the committee is the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory (RPL) at
Edwards AFB. The committee is established under the provisions of AFR 25-7 by Special Order. The members are
from a wide range of activities and include users, quality control, procurement, and control, transportation, safety.
contracting, testing, specifications and standards writers, and chemists who are experts in the field of propellants. The
committee is a working iproup set up to discuss and solve problems, disseminate information and is instrumental in the
revision of propellant manuals, regulations, and TOs. The SAMSO Staff Safety Office (SE) currently provides a
representative to the committee.
MILITARY SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS, AND TECHNICAL ORDERS
MIL-STD-172B, "Color Code for Containers of Liquid Propellants."Coniains directions for color coding portable containers
of liquid propellants. Applies also to exterior containers. Coding is by the use of colored stripes (3 max, 2 rain) to
indicate:
I o Primary hazard from a safety standpoint.
2. Secondary hazard°
3. If it has monopropeilant or pyrophoric properties.
A list of 44 liquid propellants is furnished with their color codes.
MIL.STD.709A "Ammunition Color Codin.8."The color coding for service and training ammunition items of issue,
including guided missiles. EXCEPT: ammunition of less than 20 MM caliber, blank ammunition, cartridge cases, propelling
charges for fixed, semi-fixed, separated and separate loading ammunition, commercial ammunition and explosives, display
models, test and experimental ammunitions, devices required to be inconspicuous (booby traps, etc.), atomic weapon
materials, fuses, cartridge or propellant actuated devices and components of aircrew escape systems or aircraft external
stores ejection systems, and biological warfare ammunition.
MIL-STD-746A, "Radiographic Testing Requirements for Cast Explosives."Covers the requirements for radiographic
inspection used in determining the presence of discontinuities in cast explosives.
MILoSTD-84|. "Marking of Aircraft and Missile Propulsion System Parts Fabricated from Critical High Temperature
AII_._."As the name implies this standard sets the marking requirements for critical high temperature alloys to prevent
damage to the parts from standard marking procedures. The alloys requiring special marking are listed.
MIL-STD-II67A, "Ammunition Data Card." Covers general requirements for a data card, tells who is responsible for
its preparation, and provides detailed instructions for filling it out. (Examples of completed data cards provided.)
Distribution of data cards is also specified.
MIL-STD-II68, "'Lot Numbering of Ammunition°" Covers the description and use of ammunition lot numbers, propellant
lot numbers, and the marking of lot numbers on _xplosive components, inert components, complete rounds and guided
missiles. Guided missile explosive components shall be lot numbered in accordance with MIL.L-9931.
MIL-STD-1314A (Navy), "Safety Precautions for Explosive.Loaded Items."Describes and establishes the fundamental
standardized safety precautions necessary for safely loading, assembling, and handling explosive-loaded items.
MILoSTD.1512. "Electroexplosive Subsystems, Electrically Initiated, Design Requirements and Test Methods."This stan-
dard establishes the general requirements and test methods for the design and development of electroexplosive subsystems
and associated items to preclude hazards from unitentional initiation. These requirementsapply to all subsystems utilizing
electrically initiated explosives or pyrotechnic components.
MIL-STD-1522 (USAF)w "Standard General Requirements for Safe Desisn and Operation of Pressurized Missile and Space
Systems."This standard established the basic system safety criteria for pressurized systems used on Missiles and Space
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System - Aerospace Vehicle Equipment (AVE) and its related Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). It is applicable to
all AVE and AGE which contain pressurized systems, subsystems or components.
MIL-L-9931A, "Lot Numbering r Dating, and Data Cards for Guided Missile Explosive Assemblies T Sub-Assemblies and
Part___s."The procedures covered by this specification are intended to provide minimum controls for identification of units
and groups of units procured by the Air Force. Provides permanent file of data required to maintain administrative and
physical control of items entering the Air Force inventory.
AFrO IIA-1-33_ "Ground Handlin 8 of Aircraft Containinll Ammo and Explosive Materials." Provides instructions for
ground handling of aircraft containing ammunition and other explosives° Distance requirements are given to show how
to minimize damage resulting from accidental discharge. Shows what can be handled in industrial areas.
AFrO IIA-1-47_ "Explosive Hazard Classifications Procedures." This TO contains the minimum test criteria for:
I. Bulk explosive compositions and solid propellant compositions.
2. Ammunition and explosives items including fuses, igniters, main explosive charge, gun type propellants, artillery
ammunition, pyrotechnics and motors, and rocket ammunition up to S-inch diameter.
3. Rocket motors or devices containing solid propellants.
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OTHER GOVERNMENT CODES, MANUALS, AND REGULATIONS
DOD Manual 4145-26-M, °'Contractor's Safety Manual for Ammunition_ Explosives, and Related Dangerous Material."
This manual covers construction, location, and maintenance of facilities, utilities, and equipment concerned with explosives,
ammunition, and liquid propellants. Also covered are quantity-distance siting standards, electrical safety standards,
industrial safety standards, intraplant movement, and destruction standards. Although "'and Related Dangerous Material*'
is mentioned in the title, this manual does not give guidance concerning "dangerous materials'" and "materials hazardous
to health" as defined in paragraphs (AXii) and (a)(iii), ASPR 7-104.79.
DOD Manual 4145.27M, "DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards.°'provides uniform safety standards and
policies for development, manufacturing, testing, transporting, handling, storing° maintaining, and demilitarization of
ammunition and explosives including construction and siting of ammunition and explosives facilities.
DOD Re_,ulations 4500.32.R, "Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures." This regulation provides the
guidance and general procedures for the movement of explosives and other dangerous articles for the military departments
and agencies. It outlines the responsibilities of personnel concerned with the movement and receipt of amino, explosives.
and other dangerous articles. It provides that the shipping activity prepare *'Special Handling Data Certification, DD
Form 1387-2" for military transport and civilian transport to military installation in addition to DOT labeling.
NASA SP-3071 °'ASRDI Oxygen TechnoloEy Survey Volume l: Thermophysical Properties.°_This document is composed
of the thermodynamic functions, transport properties° and physical properties of both liquid and gaseous oxygen° The
low temperature regime is emphasized. Because the data are detailed beyong that previously available, this handbook
should fill an existing need for both the scientific and technical communities.
NASA SP-3072. "ASRDI Oxygen Technology Survey Volume !!: Cleaning Requirements, Procedures. and Verification
Techniques."This document gives the different levels of hardware cleanliness requirements as functions of the particular
oxygen service application, the cleaning methods used to attain the required degree of cleanliness, and the verification
techniques presently practiced to establish that the cleanliness level required has been attained. No attempt is made to
select recommended cleaning procedures since a basis for such selection is not now available.
/
Department of Labor Title 29. Chapter XVll "Occupational Safety and Health Administration:. Part 1910, "Occupational
and Health Standards", Subpart H_ "Hazardous Materials."
Department of Transportation Title 49 T Parts 71-79 "Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles.'" and Part 297,"Transpo-
rtation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles by Motor Vehicles."
R. M. Graziano°s Tariff No. 25. "Hazardous Materials Regulation of the Department of Transportation Including
Specifications for Shipping Containers." Describes commercial surface transportation regulations for classification,
shipping, storage, marking, and labeling.
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued qainst Ordnance/Propulsion are shown below. They are listed according to type
of part.
ORDNANCE/PROPULStON
TYPE;.
ALERT'
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
SQUIB INADVERTENT An accidentoccurred
I INITIATION with a Deltasolid
KSC 5-20-64 Electrostatic propellant motor.
discharge
Cause of accident was inadvertent ini!iation
caused by a static electricity discharge through
the igniter squib from the case to bridsewire
lead pin. Tests using a naval propellant plant
motor case, with igniter suppressor paddle and
live squibs installed, resulted in firing the
squibs with an electrostatic charge of 1880
volts applied on the fiber body and aluminum
foil of the motor case.
SQUIB VALVE Valve mechanism
2 MECHANISM failed to actuate
K2.70-02, FAILED TO although the squibs
LaRC-70-02 ACTUATE "fired" (propellant
Malfunction of consumed).
squib
INITIATOR
3
LaRC-70-Oi
DUDS (NO-FIRES)
Poor ignition and
propagation
characteristics of
the primary mix
Time delay initiators
exhibited "no-fires"
during lab tests
Failure analysis revealed this squib type is
sensitive to the initial volume into which the
squib is fired. When the initial volume is 10
cc, application of 7 volts results in conduction
across the leadwires, whereas it takes more
than 100 volts when the initial volume is 10
cc. Once conduction across the leadwires
begins it causes the potting material to break
down, allowing the high pressure gases to
escape through the squib preventing valve
actuation.
Investigation revealed the no-fires were caused
by poor ignition and propagation characteristics
of the primary mix (lead-selenium,
silicon-silicon-dioxide). This primary mix has
good ignition and propagation properties when
first produced, but it does not age well.
EXPLOSIVE
BOLT
4
LaRC t2-22_66
PREMATURE
IGNITION
Migration of lead
azide
An explosive bolt
fired during random
vibration test.
X-rays taken after the failure showed that
some lead azide had migrated to a position
between the metal sleeve which contains the
lead azide and the outer metal sleeve of the
primer cup assembly. The migrated lead azide
initiated the detonation during vibration test.
EXPLOSIVE
BOLT
JPL-69-01
FRACTURED BOLT
HEAD
High stress and
hydrogen
embrittlement
Head of release bolt
fractured after 15
hours at 2500 lb
tension. The device
had a design
requirement of
indefinitely
withstanding sustained
tensile loads of up to
4000 lb.
The fracture initiated at the sharp radius
between the shank and the end face of the
bolt head. Cause of failure is attributed to
the high stress concentration of the radius, and
to the hydrogen embrittlement of the bolt
material.
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ORDNANCE/PROPULSION
TYPEs
ALERT!
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
CANISTER OUT OF
6 SPECIFICATION
KSC 8-23-66 Short canister life •
Rocket propellant
canister (used in gas
masks) generated
excessive heat and
burned out in 3
minutes.
Specification required
the canisters to
absorb UDMH for 5
minutes.
Failure analysis revealed traces of potassium in
the soda.lime layer of the canisters, and
differences in physical make-up between it and
other canisters of the same type.
MILD DAMAGED MILD Mild detonating fuse
DETONATING DETONATING (MDF) was found to
FUSE FUSE be of inferior quality
? Acetic acid during testing.
M5C-71-07 reaction
Analysis revealed that acetic acid° released
during curing of the sealant, reacted with the
lead sheath of the MDF to form lead acetate.
Further reaction with moisture and CO2
formed lead carbonate and lead hydroxide
causing deep etching, corrosion, and
embrittlement of the sheath.
SEPARATION MATERIAL Functional separation
NUT FAILURE tests revealed material
8 Cracks and failures in a
Bg-A-72-02 deformations separation nut such
as cracks and
deformations.
Investigation revealed that the aluminum base
of the separation nut was incapable of
selfcontaining the impacting piston during
actuation. Therefore, it became dependent
upon the structure to which it was mounted to
contain the pans at the pressures generated.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problems associated with the use of relays and to suggest approaches
(developed from experience) to deal with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The relay section is presented with the following organization:
General
I. Basic failure problems associated with relays are identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
2. Where applicable, a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished pans having a potential for failure.
Subtopics - Treatment of Specific Types
1.
"t
6.
Relay type background.
For those in the process of selecting pans and manufacturers, or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of selected types and describing the
manufacturing sequence necessary to produce the part. Particular emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing
deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal that problem.
Relay Types. Relays have been divided into subtopics according to their internal construction. Armature and reed type
relays have been discussed in .depth. Other subtopics dealing with contactors, time delay, choppers, etc., include only
summaries of ALERT reports.
RELAY FUNDAMENTALS
What a Relay Should Do. A relay is basically a remotely controlled, electrically operated switch which contains two or
more contacts arranged so as to control external circuits. This broad definition applies to all relays regardless of type
and internal construction.
Prac'ical Considerations. Most relay types, with the exception of simple thermal time delay and reed types, are complex
electromechanicai devices. Experience with these devices has indicated that, because of imperfections in materials and
workmanship, a relay cannot he satisfactorily specified by contact rating alone. Physical considerations force us to
recognize such compromising characteristics built into a relay as operate and release time, temperature effects on pickup
and dropout voltages, dielectric breakdown, contact resistance, and insulation resistance. These characteristics are not
simply design controlled, but are directly affected by the materials employed and the care with which the relay i,
assembled. The factors of design, materials, and workmanship are the ones usually associated with relay failure.
FAILURE MODES
Failure Categories. Part level failure problems associated with relays may he lum:_ed under four basic categories:
h Failure of contacts to make or break
2. Short
10-3
3. Electrical parameter deviation
4. Mechanical anomaly
These categories are used for both latching and nonlatching type relays.
ELIMINATING DEFECTIVES
Problem Solving Approach. The approach taken in this section will be to identify the user-encountered problem areas
associated with a particular type of relay, then provide suggestions for eliminating those relays prone to exhibiting these
problems at the finished relay, level, the design level, and at the manufacturing level.
Finished Relay Level. Recognizing that the typical consumer is faced with using finished devices that are on-hand,
information is provided for screening -- sorting the bad ones from the good. Suggestions are made for subjecting the
relays to environmental stresses (capable of identifying defective units, but well within the safe operating margins for
properly made units). This reliability technique has found use not only for sorting,"but for providing assurance that the
manufacturer has controlled his processes.
Design Level. While screening has proven to be an effective reliability tool it does not correct the fundamental problems
of design compromises and worse yet m design deficiencies. Certain design compromises are inevitable, however, reliable
equipment can be built if these compromises are recognized and proper precautions are taken in the equipment design
to minimize the effects of these compromises. Design deficiencies must be identified and eliminated at the manufacturer's
facility.
Manufacturin B Level. The most carefully conceived design can be brought to nought if it is manufactured in an
environment lacking necessary controls over critical materials and processes, and allowing substandard workmanship.
Again, defectives produced as a result of these conditions can he removed using a screening, but since no screen is 100
percent effective, a more desirable technique for removing these potential reliability degraders is to take action to correct
these manufacturing conditions by applying controls and providing inspection points.
FAILURE ANALYSIS
_e. A primary objective of failure analysis is to identify failure mechanisms at a level such that corrective action
is feasible. Knowing nothing more about a relay than that it is shorted does not allow effective corrective action. If
we learn that the short is caused by contamination, we now have identified a mechanism suitable for corrective action.
The cause of the shorting may be eJiminated by process changes, added controls, use of different materials, suitable
screens, or combinations of these alternatives.
Failed Part Rarity. A part in a failed condition must be considered by its owner as a jewel, a °'once-in-a-million"
occurrence, a phenomenon he may never again be privileged to witness. Only if one starts from that position may there
exist a reasonable chance of performing a successful failure analysis.
Failure Verification. After recording all identifying external markings, and performing a thorough external and radiographic
inspection, .the first requirement is to verify the failure. Too often the wrong part is removed from the circuit or an
equipment test error, rather than a part failure, results in a good part being delivered for failure analysis.
Analysis Direction. The process of analyzing a failure, performing those steps necessary on a suspect device which will
result in the identification of a specific correctable failure mechanism, requires the coordination of a series of specialized
skills by one having knowledge of failure mechafiisms, device design, and manufacturing techniques: and the experience
necessary to organize this combination of skills and knowledge into a practical plan of action.
When to Analyze. Many part failures occur for which no corrective action is planned to be taken. In many cases it
is most cost effective to simply scrap the defective part and replace it with one that performs properly. For those cases
where it is necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur, a portion of this sectiorl is devoted to
describing some of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis._
Reliability/Life. it is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the part level (screening, analysis of design
and manufacturing, and effective failure analysis) that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
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PROBLEM/SCREENING SUMMARY
_ope. This summation is an accumulation of knowledge and experience gained in dealing with relay failures and in
avoiding those failures. It addresses itself to the causes and effects of failures, and shows the suggested screens that
will allow identification of relays having latent or incipient defects.
This summary is aimed toward identifying relay problem areas and failure causes. Having identified problems, and
recoiPdzJng that the typical user is concerned with eliminating this problem from a group of relays on-hand, suggestions
are mmle for performing screening. These screening suggestions are based primarily upon industry experience. The
problem areas have been grouped under the basic categories of failure of contacts to make or break, short, parameter
deviation, and mechanical anomaly.
ALERT Item No. Where directly applicable, the "ALERT Item No." of the ALERT report describing a specific cause
for a failure is listed against that cause° Thereby, a cross reference is provided between a specific failure cause found
in the "ALERT Summaries" and the broader failure experience/avoidance knowledge shown in this presentation.
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
ARMATURE RELAYS
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
T_sts")-
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO MAKE
Contamination - between contacts or between pole
piece and armature
Contamination o moisture freezing on contacts
Deformed parts
Armature binding
Fractured actuator arm
Improper armature/pole alignment
Oversize/undersize parts
1,2,3.4,5.6.7,
8
9
IO
11ol2
High and Low Temperature, Run-In, Sinusoidal
Vibration, Particle Impact Noise Detection
(PIND), Contact Resistance. Pickup Voltage,
and Dropout Voltage -
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO MAKE
Open coil (broken leads)
Shorted coil (insulation breakdown)
8,13
High and Low Temperature Run-In
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO BREAK
Contamination _ solder flux on contact
Armature binding
Fractured actuator arm
Oversize/undersize parts
14,15
16,17
High and Low Temperature Run-In. Contact
Resistance, Pickup Voltage, and Dropout
Voltage
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO BREAK Contact Resistance. Pickup Voltage, and
Fused contacts Dropout Voltage
SHORT High and Low Temperature Run-in, Sinusoidal
Contamination - between contacts 18,19,20 Vibration. Particle Impact Noise Detection
(PIND), Contact Resistance, Coil Resistance,
Pickup Voltage, and Dropout Voltage
SHORT Contact Resistance, Pickup Voltage. and
Fused contacts Dropout Voltage
SHORT High and Low Temperature Run-In
Shorted coil (insulation breakdown)
SHORT High and Low Temperature Run-In, Sinusoidal
Shorted terminal (metal between terminal and case) 21,22 Vibration, Particle Impact Noise Detection
(PlND), Contact Resistance, Pickup Voltage.
and Dropout Voltage
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION -
DECREASED INSULATION RESISTANCE
Contamination
Defective insulation
Improper lead positioning
Inadequate contact gap
23
High and Low Temperature Run-In, Dielectric
Withstanding Voltage, and Insulation
Resistance
|0-6
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
ALERT
ITEM
NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION. SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
Tests")
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
OPERATING VOLTAGE
Friction on armature (stud assembly)
High and Low Temperature Run-in
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
CONTACT RESISTANCE
Contamination - on contact surface
Contact pressure
Organic outgassed products
Plated contact surface defects
24
High and Low Tempeature Run-ln. and
Contact Resistance
MECHANICAL ANOMALY o CONTACT
TRANSFER (during vibration or shock)
Excessive tolerances
Resonant point in enclosure
Resonant point in NO, NC, or common contacts
Sinusoidal Vibration
MECHANICAL ANOMALY - CONTACT
CHATTER (during vibration or shock)
Broken welds (frame core bracket, etc.)
Contact overtravel
Excessive tolerances
Improper mounting
Insufficient actuator bead gap
Resonant point in enclosure
Resonant point in NO, NC, or common contacts
Terminal (with attached contact) rotating in glass
seal
Sinusoidal Vibration, and Particle Impact Noise
Detection (PIND)
MECHANICAL ANOMALY
Cracks in terminal leads (hydrogen embrittlemant)
Cracks in header glass
Dents in case
Poor terminal plating
Visual Examination
REED RELAYS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION . SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspections and
Cause NO. Tests")
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO MAKE Vibration, Temperature Cycle and Run-In
Thermal stress or contamination (moisture) 26,27 (monitor contacts), and Seal.
Measure following parameters at room ambient
and temperature extremes: Contact
Resistance. Pickup Voltage (ampere turns),
Coil Resistance, Dropout Voltage (ampere
turns), Operate Time, and Release Time.
Final Visual
10-7
REED RELAYS
.ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO0
SUGGESTED ACTION o SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspections and
_:- . Tests") .
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - HIGH
CONTACT RESISTANCE
Loss of mercury 28
_,Precap Visual. Vibration, Temperature Cycle
and Run-ln (monitor contacts). X-ray. and
Seal. Measure following parameters at room
ambient and temperature extremes: Contact
Resistance, Pickup Voltage (ampere turns).
Coil Resistance, Dropout Voltage (ampere
turns), Operate Time. and Release Time.
Final Visual
MISCELLANEOUS RELAYS
TYPE
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Couse NO°
SUGGESTED ACTION o
SCREEN (see "Screening
Inspections and Tests")-
CHOPPER ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION . HIGH CONTACT
RESISTANCE
Unstable epoxy compound 29
High and Low Temperature Runoin, and
Contact Resistance
PHASE
SEQUENCE
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO
MAKE
Actuator arm fell off 3O
High and Low Temperature Run-in,
Sinusoidal Vibration, Particle Impact
Noise Detection (PIND). Contact
Resistance. Pickup Voltage. and Dropout
Voltage
THERMAL
TIME DELAY
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION - EXCESSIVE TIME
DELAY
Low heater coil resistance 31
High and Low Temperature Run-ln
TIME DELAY ELECTRICAL PARAMETER
DEVIATION ° INADEQUATE TIME
DELAY
Contamination - aluminum particles 32
X-ray. and High and Low Temperature
Run-In (monitor each timing cycle)
TIME DELAY OPEN AND SHORTED COILS
Contamination - corrosion by
bromide
33
High and Low Temperature Run-In
10-8
ARMATURE RELAYS
CHARACTERISTICS
Why Armature Relay. The relay style used in high reliability applications (and considered here) is the balanced armature
type because of its demonstrated ability to withstand mechanical shock and vibration, in these relays the armature is
pivoted at its center of mass so as to place it in equilibrium with the static and dynamic forces which act upon it during
operation. The moving contacts are either mounted on the armature or activated directly by movement of the armature.
Temperature Effects. Almost all armature type relays use copper magnet wire in the coil windings, in such copper
windings the coil resistance is directly proportional to the temperature of the windings. The ampere-turns required for
the coil to actuate the armature is, therefore, proportional to temperature since the coil resistance, R, varies with coil
temperature. To maintain the required ampere.turns, the pickup and dropout voltages will vary over the application
temperature rangn.
Contact Considerations. The most crucial and troublesome area in relay reliability is that associated with the contacts.
Much of the problem area results from the user's lack of understanding of the parameters which affect contact
performance. As a consequence, contacts are operated under a wide spectrum of load conditions and a multiplicity of
performance criteria which, when reviewed singularly or in combination, are inconsistent with the design parameters of
the contacts.
There is a great fund of information available on contact theory and the various materials used in obtaining specific
contact characteristics. The user of relays in high reliability applications should be thoroughly familiar with this information
since reliability is frequently achieved through carefully limiting certain service applications.
Specification Parameters. The above discussion has served to define a few of the characteristics associated with armature
relays. These, and other limitations, can be described as specification limits for manufacturers and using designers.
Deviations from limitations can lead to equipment failure. The next subsection will describe problems and failure
mechanisms found in armature relays caused by design deficiency, lack of process control, and inadequate quality control.
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ARMATURE RELAYS
SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
Basic Screeninl;. The screening inspections and tests suggested for armature relays included in the Problem/Screening
Summary are as follows:
!, Vibration, Sinusoidal
2. High and Low Temperature Run-In
3. Panicle Impact Noise Detection (PIND)
4. Electrical Measurements
5. Visual Examination
Objective . The purpose of the screening is to allow detection of parts that: (i) have been improperly processed by
the manufacturer, (2) contain misaligned, oversize, or undersize pans. (3) have poor solder or weld connections_ (4)
contain particulate contaminants. (.';) have not been properly adjusted, or (6) have any other anomalies that could result
i. a failure under normal operating conditions.
Additional ScreeninB. in cases where specific characteristics are critical in the function of using equipment, such as
pickup or dropout speed over a wide temperature range, such characteristics should be added to the requirements of
these screening tests.
Case Removal/lnspectlon. The basic approach taken here is to subject each of the devices to a test procedure in order
to make a one.by.one acceptance determination. The disadvantage of this approach is the underlying assumption that the
internal construction materials, processes, etc. from pan.to-part are homogeneous so that the devices can be treated as
a uniform lot. If the devices are not produced under similar design criteria and manufacturing controls which permit a
heterogeneous lot to exist, a sin_e screening procedure may not he the optimum for all units. For this reason, it is
frequently desirable to examine the internal design and construction. This is accomplished, first, by a nondestructive
radiographic inspection; and second, by performing a destructive envelope removal or dissection on a limited sample of
devices. This procedure is more meaningful if a design/construction baseline has been established as a comparison
criterion.
I. VIBRATION, SINUSOIDAL _ MIL-STD-202, METHOD 204 (ref 2)
The purpose of this test is to determine if there is any degradation of mechanical integrity of the assembled
device which may result from loosening of components, or which may result from relative motion between
components which are not to tolerance or which are improperly assembled. Where these conditions exist, vibration
can produce degraded operating characteristics, wear, physical distortion, and often fatigue and failure. The
following conditions are suggested:
a. .One sweep, traversed in 20 minutes at rated level
b. Sweep in critical axis
c. Contact chatter I0/_sec max
d. No contact transfer
e, Energize nonlatch relays during first half of test time and de-energize during the remaining half.
f. Latching relays should be latched in one position for half the test and latched in the opposite position for
the other half {coils de-energized),
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2. HIGH AND LOW TEMPERATURE RUN-IN
This test is a combination of miss testing and temperature cycling. It is highly effective in elimination of relays
having parts which are not properly aligned, are out of adjustment, contain materials whose coefficients of
expansion are improperly matched, or which respond adversely to low or high temperatures.
The suggested test during temperature cycling is as follows:
Time (Minutes)
Ambient 1st Thru 4th
Ste__._pp Temperature Cycle Sth Cycle
I + 125"C 30 Min 60 Min
2 +2Y'C I0 Max 10 Max
3 -65°C 30 Min 60 Min
4 +_"C I0 Max Stabilize
During steps I and 3 (fifth cycle), relay should be operated I to 3 Hz for total of 5000 operations without misses (2._00
operations per step), coils energized with nominal voltage. Contacts should be monitored for contact resistance.
At completion of each 2500 operations and at extreme temperatures, the following measurements should be taken:
Pickup and Dropout Voltage per MIL-R-39016 (ref 29)
Insulation Resistance (Step I only) per MIL-STD-202, Method 302, Cond A (ref 2)
3. PARTICLE IMPACT NOISE DETECTION (PIND)
The PIND test is a nondestructive test and is used as a means for assuring internal cleanliness control.
Construction and operation of the PIND system is not complex. Mechanical stimulus (2 to ._g at 27 Hz is
obtained from two small shakers and transmitted to a combination tL;ansducer-mountingfixture through a coupling
having low transmissibility characteristics in the ultrasonic frequency range. The relay under test is attached to
the transducer (barium titanate ceramic) by means of a spring-loaded holding mechanism. The transducer electrical
output is band-passed from 36 kHz to 44 kHz, amplified, and translated to the audible spectrum through use of
an ultrasonic translator. This audible output is available either through a head set or loudspeaker. To perform
the PIND test, the operator attaches the relay under test to the transducer and listens for the presence of
contamination, as evidenced by nonperioclic noise bursts. Data analyzed indicate that PIND is approximately 83
percent effective in locating relays containing particles, and 97 percent effective in not rejecting good devices.
Panicle masses of 10 micrograms have been detected.
PIND system operation consists essentially of three sub-systems:
a. The driving electronics and exciters for providing input to the test relay.
b. The holding fixture/transducer for detecting the Ultrasonic energy generated by particle-to-can impact.
c. The translator for translating the detected energy to the audible spectrum for aural or electrical display.
4. SEAL -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD 112, CONDITION C, PROCEDURE Illb OR IV (ref 2)
a. I x 10"sarm cc/sec max
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ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS
a. .Coil Resistance -- MIL-STD-202o Method 303 (ref 2) ..
b: Pickup and Dropout Voltage -- MIL-R-39016 (ref 29)
¢. Static Contact Resistance -- MIL-STD-202, Method 307 (ref 2)
d. Insuiatlon Resistance -- MILoSTD-202, Method 302, Condition A
e. Dielectric Withstanding Voltase -- MIL-STD-202, Method 30I
(1) Atmospheric pressure
(2) _ to I0 seconds
fo Operate and Release Time -- MIL-R-39016 (ref 29)
VISUAL EXAMINATION
a. Identification
bo Defects
c. Damage
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ARMATURE RELAYS
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Failures Related to Process. A typical armature relay (Fignre I0-I) and a typical assembly flow (Figure I0.2) are presented
together with the suggested controls required to assure a reliable product. The "Critical Process" is defined for each of
the manufacturing steps. Relationship is established between failure causes and the manufacturing process. Having
experienced a specific problem, one could identify those manufacturing steps with potential for contributing to the failure.
Assembly Flow. The manufacturing flow of an armature relay is essentially the same for all manufacturers, differing
principally in the degree of process controls and number of production tests. The assembly flow as described is typical
of what may be expected for relays of the type produced to meet MIL.R.39016 (ref 29) specifications. Significant
variables are listed on the typical flow diagram with those operations that are considered critical for the design of a
reliable relay. In-process inspection and testing may vary from one manufacturer to another depending on the exact
construction of the relay type.|
TYPICAL ARMATURE RELAY DESIGN (Figure 10-1)
ITEM ITEM NAME ITEM ITEM NAME
! Bobbin 12 Insulating Film
2 Magnet Wire 13 Insulating Thread
3 Core 14 Reinforcing Lead
4 Insulating Wrap 15 Back Stop
5 Pole Piece 16 Return Spring
6 Pusher 17 Armature
7 Frame 18 Pivot
8 Movable Contacts 19 Stationary Contacts
9 Insulation Pad 20 Header
I0 Plug
II Case
t_ 10.13
i !
!
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Figure 10-1. Typical Armature Relay (I/2 Crystal Can)
ASSEMBLY FLOW
General. A typical assembly flow (Figure 10-2) is presented together with the suggested controls required to assure a
clean, reliable product. It will be noted that the controls predominantly address themselves to the detection of
contamination. The assembly operations are performed under semiclean room conditions where such constraints as
lint-free garments, filtered air conditioning, prohibition of smoking or eating in assembly areas, and the wearing of special
shoe covers awe established requirements. Where particular attention must be paid to the control of contamination,
laminar flow benches we employed to prevent the introduction of ambient airborne contaminants. The suuested controls
have been noted on the assembly flow chart and are considered critical to the fabrication of reliable relays.
Sources of Contamination. Cleanliness is relative and so therefore is contamination. Contamination is a major concern
in high reliability relays because it is the prime contributor to relay failures and because it is predominantly introduced
during the assembly of the relay. A partial list of contamination sources is provided below:
I o Oxide scale from forging° welding, or heating operations
2. Plastic, glass, ceramic, and elastomer debris from washers, insulation, or spacers
3. Metallic debris generated during machining, iprinding, or polishing operations; from interference between moving
parts, from improper plating; or soldering or welding operations
4. Fibers from cleaning materials used to wipe surfaces
5. Human hair and dandruff scales
6. Manufacturing and handling dirt
7. Corrosive chemicals from soldering operations
8. Abrasive particles from ip'inding or polishing operations. Such particles not only constitule harmful contaminants
in themselves by causing excessive wear or binding, but produce secondary contamination in the form of metallic
particles
Construction Materials. The contamination level in relays is also reduced by the careful selection of materials which are
used for the fabrication of the end product. The user should pay particular attention to the malerials used for spacers.
washers, insulators, and coil insulation as well as plating requirements, before specifying a particular manufacturer's relay
for his application. These control_ are not indicated on the assembly flow diagram, but are also considered critical to
reduction and control of contamination.
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FLOW DIAGRAM
MATERIAL
I MANUFACTURING "OPERATIO
I Bobbin "
i IeaulatingFilm
Magnet Wire
{_orolng
Insulating
Thread
I COIL ASSEMBLY
I
i
[ _) - i Insulating film under-
I -- [ start lead
I® _-].led I.coil on bobbinJ
I
-- I Solder or weld winding to
Ji (_ -- [ rei_oretug lead
I
Wied ieaulat_ug thread
___w I m
rap insulating fil
on coil
I
I Ultruonic clean
I
Vacuum bake
[
I
1
CRITICAL PROCESS
+
Burred edges and
particle contamination
RELATED PROBLEM CODES 1
(see foldout in the Appendix)
FAIL PAR MECH
MAKE/ SHORT DEV ANOM
BREAK III m _/
A,C A A
Damnge to wire . C
Improper solder or weld
connection, wire damage, A, C A A9 F
contamination (flux)
I
I
I Particle contam/tmtion, A F
residue
Core
Pole Piece
Pusher
Frame
Back Stop
Return Spring
Armature
Pivot
I Coll Assembly
I MOTOR ASSEMBLY I
I ++
_ Ultrason/e clean L
all_r_, i
I
I_ Ispe,weldre=. +rlng
[_ ',toba°++ I I
I_ I_'weldpole_l_eto
I_ l Spot weld backstop I
I'_' [ to pole piece " I
I
I
a_mature
I
_.-------t Assemble coil to pole
piece [
I
I_°=°'euu I
Figure 10-2.
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+
Burred edges, rough
surfaces, plating,
particle contamination
A,B A,B,C A
Misalignment, improper
weld, weld spatter,
particle contamination,
plating
Armature Relay - Typical Assembly Flow wlfh Related Problem Codes
MATERIAL
FLOW DIAGRAM
I MANUFACTURINGOPERATION
T
+ I HEADER ASSEMBLY
I
_.4_ Ultrasonic clean all
Movable Contacts J(8_ I parts
Ststiouary Contacts [+ I' !Insulation Pad Install insula on pad
Header J_ I Spot weld contacts to
I header pins
I
I Ultrasonic clean
I
Vaonum.bake
I
b
CRITICAL PROCESS
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foidont in the Appendix)
SHORT PAR MECH
DEV ANOM
H IH IV
Burred surfaces, A A A, F, G B, D
rough surfaces,
particle contamination
Improper welds, weld A A A B
spatter, misaligument
Particle contamination, A A A, F
residue
Case
( ultrasonically
cleaned)
Plug
[ (ultrnson/e_dly)
-[ cleaned)
FINAL ASSEMBLY [
I
Spot weld motor assembly
to header
I
[ Demaguetlze
+
Improper welds, weld A, E A A
spatter, misaligument,
particle contamination,
plating
(Laminar flow work
station)
r L
I Magnetize for polarized _ (Laminar flow work
_el__ r" .... J s_ion)
I Ultrasonic clean _. Particle contamieation A A A
[ ![
[ Adjust parameters I "(Laminar flOW Vmrk
[ station)
Ultrasonic clean and __ Contamination, corrosion,Cobehn spray weld spatter A A A
I
l Mechanical and electrical _ MiealLgament, binding.check ha1_-_ (laminar How A, B, G A A, C, E
work station) Gi |
_--I_" l Weld header to case _'- Weld spatter A, B A, C A
I
I + I Repeat mechanical and I
[ electrical check [
I1
l Vacuum bake and __ Sufficiently dry; inert A A A, F, H
I bacldill / gas
,Plug and seal l
B
I ' I-test I Hermeflclty
I
I Paint and identify l
, I
[ Screening tests p Mechanical damage
I
I Package and ship _- Mechan/cal damage
E,H
Figure 10.2. Armature Relay - Typical Assembly Flow wlfh Related Problem Codes
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ARMATURE RELAYS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
General. Failure analysis is a corrective action-related procodureo Only after knowing why a part failed can action be
taken to minimize future failures° Failure analysis findings can show the need for redesign (improvement in materials,
processes_ and controls) or proper part application.
Predominant Failures. Failures of armature relays most frequently result from problems associated with contamination
affecting contact performance or hampering operation of the mechanical moving parts.
I'IICAUTJO'_III
EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID INTRODUCING CONTAMINATION INTO
THE RELAY.
Openin B Techniques° A cut is made around the periphery of the enclosure approximately 3/32 inch above the base of
the header° The depth of the cut should not exceed 90 percent of the thickness of the enclosure wall and should be
made using a cutting wheel (aluminum-oxide) mounted in table saw fashion.
After completion of the peripheral cut° the entire surface of the relay should be thoroughly vacuum cleaned in a cleanroom
environment.
Use a sharp, knife-edged tool to carefully cut through the remainder of enclosure wail.
Failure Analysis Flow. The failure analysis flow (Figure il)-_) which follows) provides for maximum nondestructive
evaluation of the failed part,prior to the dissecting or deporting operation.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 10-3) is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their causes by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus° one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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TEST/EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
WHEN
FAILURE
FOR
NONDESTRUCTIVE IMECHANICAL
I
External Visual
Examination
I
Rndingraphio
Inspection
PROBLEM AREA
VERIFICATION
I
NONDESTRUCTIVE
I Functional Testing
!
t SealTeat
INDUCING FAILURES
Note all identifying markings and external
ICpecial I
oeditioning
I
Radingrapblc
Inspection
I
Functional
Testing
PROBLEM CAUSE [VERIFICATION
I
I c.e Removal
l- '
I unction Operationand Testing
I
I_'_cle IsolaUon
and Identiflnation
I
I Progressive
Disassembly and
Inspection
If fixed focus X-ray used, photograph in three
planes mutually perpendicular to vertical axis.
(Use for crystal can and larger relays). If
Vidicon (imaging) used (1/2 crystal can, TO-5
and other small relays), examine and photo-
_raph anomalies as observed.
All specified electrical parameters. Record
dntn
Helium mass spectrometer for relays having
helium tracer. Those having nitrogen must
be tested by Radlflow
Baking, temperature cycling, vibration, and
shock as required to confirm problem area
Fixed focus or Vidicon as appropriate
All specified parameters. Record data
Gas chromatograph. Do only if high contact
resistance is encountered
See paragraph '*Opening Techniques". Inspect
for contamination, corrosion, weld spatter,
misali_nment, binding, broken or fused parts,
eta. Use normal andblack light.
Remeasure electrical parameters. Observe
contacts and mechan*-sm for signs of binding,
sticking, or hang-up while relay is operating
Clean with Freon TF tn a chemically clean
container. Evaporate and identify particles.
(Infrared spectrophotometry, electron beam
microprobe, emission spectroecop_ etc._
Carefully disassemble mechanism inspecting
each portion for wear, corrosion, galling,
platin_ defects, contaminants, etc.
Figure 10.3. Armature Relays - Typical Failure Analysis
Codes
RELATED PROBLL .1 CODE
(see foidout in the A0pendtx)
FAIL PAR MECH
MAKE/ SHORT DEV AIq)M
BREAK H III IV
!
A,I,J A A,I,J &,B,C,D
A,B.I, A,B,C A
J
C,D B,C,D B
A A A
A,B,I, A,B,C A
J
C,D,I B, CtD B
A A A,H
Flow with Related Problem
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REED RELAYS
CHARACTERISTICS
Classification° Reed relays are made from one or more reed capsule switches placed inside a common actuating coil.
in those cases where the reed capsule switch is used in conjunction with a coil, it is generally classified as a relay; and
in those cases where the reed capsule switch is used in conjunction with permanent magnet actuation, it is classified as
a magnetic switch.
O_rafion. A basic magnetic reed switch consists of a pair of low reluctance ferromagnetic, slender flattened reeds,
hermetically sealed into a glass tube with a controlled atmosphere, _ranged in cantilever fashion so that the ends align
and overlap with a small air gap in between° The overlapping ends assure opposite polarity when brought into Ihe
influence of a magnetic field. When the magnetic flux density is sufficient, the attraction forces of the opposing magnetic
poles overcomes the reed stiffness causing them to flex toward each other and make contact. The restoring force
provided by the elasticity of the reeds returns the reeds to their original posit'ion when the magnetic field is removed.
Reed capsule switches when used within their rated limits generally have contact life ratings in the one to one hundred
million cycle range depending on contact voltage and current loads used.
Application Considerations. The reed switch is inherently a low currenl, low voltage device. Its contact areas are small
and contact pressures are low because the reeds become magnetically saturated° therefore, additional contacl force cannot
be developed by increasing the applied magnetic flux. These factors limit the continuous current rating of the switch.
The interrupting rating of the switch is limited by the gap between fully open contacts and by the restoring force provided
by the elasticity of the reeds. Low contact pressures and small contact gap between fully open contacts limit the reed
capsule switch use in severe vibration and shock environments.
Unpredictable random occurrence of contact sticking inherent in these switches is caused by tiny magnetic wear fragments
accumulated at, and sometimes bridging, the contact gap. Arcing caused by dc loads between the contacts causes metal
transfer resulting in spike and crater formation which sometimes results in contact slicking due to friction between the
spike and coated surfaces. For these reasons application should be limited to those uses where an occasional contact
miss is not considered a catastrophic event and those uses where voltage and current loading of the switch contacts
minimizes spike and crater formulation. Careful handling of the switch is a mandatory requirement. The switch contact
members extend beyond each end of the glass capsule and are used as switch terminals° Bending, culling, or applying
excessive heat to the switch leads during soldering and installation changes the switch operating sensitivity. Operating
one reed switch adjacent to another or in a stray magnetic field can also change" its sensitivity. Magnetic shielding
around reed relays is relatively ineffective in reducing the effects of uniform stray magnetic fields. Reed relays are
inherently more sensitive to stray magnetic fields by one or two orders of magnitude than any other type of sealed relay
in common use today. The sensitivity is only an order of magnitude greater than earth's magnetic field which results
from relative poor magnetic efficiency of a reed relay compared .with other types of relays. Stray magnetic fields in the
order of 5 to l0 gauss can cause most reed relays to malfunction.
in those special applications where usage of reed switch capsules occur, the above factors should be carefully reviewed
and considered with respect to each application prior to usage.
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REED RELAYS
SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
The following inspections and tests have been found to be effective in detecting and eliminating potential failures.
Variation as to levels or durations of tests should be considered to suit those particular applications or performance
requirements that apply.
I. VIBRATION, SINUSOIDAL -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD 204, TEST CONDITION D (ref 2)
One sweep 20 minutes; low to high frequency in I0 rain,high to low frequency in I0 rain
Sweep to be applied in direction of contact motion
o Contact chatter I0 #.see max
No contact transfer
Energize nonlatch relays during I/2 test time -- de-energize during other half
Latch relays latched in one position for I/2 test time and latched in other position for the other half (coils
de-energized)
2. TEMPERATURE CYCLING AND RUN-IN -- MIL-ffro-202, METHOD 102. TEST CONDITION C (ref 2)
While at the high temperature extreme on the final cycle, measure Insulation Resistance per MIL.STD-202, Method
302, Test Condition A. On completion of Temperature Cycling each relay should be cycled for a minimum of
10,000 cycles; 5000 cycles should be run at the specified low operating temperature extreme and 5000 cycles
should be run at the specified high operating temperature extreme. The cycling rate should be from 15 to 60
Hz. The contacts should be monitored for misses and there should be no misses during the 10,000 cycles of
operation.
On completion of the 5000 cycles of operation, and while stabilized at each temperature extreme, Contact
Resistance, Pickup Voltage (Operate Ampere Turns), Operate Time, Dropout Voltage (Release Ampere Turns). and
Release Time measurements should be made.
3. Seal -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD !!2, TEST CONDITION C, PROCEDURE Ilia or b (ref 2)
4. ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Coil Resistance MIL-STD-202. Method 303 (ref 2)
Pickup and Dropout Voltage (Operate and Release Ampere Turns) MIL.R-5757 (ref 30)
Static Contact Resistance MIL-STD-202 Method 307 (ref 2)
Insulation Resistance MIL-STD-202, Method 302. Test Condition A
Dielectric Withstanding Voltage MIL.STD-202, Method 301. Sea Level 5 to 10 seconds
Operate and Release Time MIL.R-57._7 (ref 30)
5. PRECAP VISUAL
Precap visual is suggested in those cases where problems occur due to manufacturing processes or handling. In
this case it should include careful 10 to 30 power magnification microscope visual examination of the individual
reed switch capsules before they are encapsulated and prior to sealing tbe-outer enclosure of the relay.
10-21
REED RELAYS
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Contamination. Control of manufacturing processes and cleanliness during the manufacturing of reed relays is required
to assure a clean reliable product° Assembly operations, particularly prior to hermetically sealing of the reeds in glass
capsules, must be performed under semiclean room conditions° with use of lint-free garments, filtered air conditioning.
special shoe covers, laminar flow benches, and with smoking and eating prohibited in these clean assembly areas.
Contamination is the primary concern since it is the major contributor to relay failures. Careful control and minimizing
of the contamination sources (some of which are listed below) is mandatory.
Hair. lanolin, dandruff, moisture
Metallic particles
Corrosive chemicals from plating, soldering, and cleaning
Nonconductive particles, airborne fibers. "plastics, and ceramics
Film deposits from heat treating, plating, cleaning, handling
Hermetic Seal. |f contamination sources are carefully controlled up to the point where the reed switch capsule is
hermetically sealed, then the integrity of the hermetic seal prevents contact contamination at the contact interfaces. To
assure seal integrity, fine and gross leak testing is performed, followed by I0 to 30 power microscopic visual of each
reed switch capsule just prior to and just after installation in the relay assembly is required. Each reed switch capsule
must be handled with care to prevent application of any stress to the leads prior to or during installation into the relay
assembly.
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REED RELAYS
FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Predominant Failures. Failures of reed relays most frequently result from problems associated with contamination
affecting contact performance or hamPering movement of reeds.
[¢AUTIbN_i
EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID INTRODUCING CONTAMINATION INTO
THE RELAY.
Opening Techniques. X-ray photograph one view of each of three perpendicular axes and examine each photograph
carefully for familiarization of internal reed orientation. Cut metal housing around periphery approximately 1/16 inch
above header to a depth approximately 90 Percent of the metal housing thickness using an aluminum oxide cutting wheel
mounted in table saw fashion.
After completion of cut, vacuum clean entire relay surface thoroughly in cleanroom environment.
Use a sharp, knife-edged tool to carefully cut through the housing material remaining from the previous cut.
Remove metal housing carefully, then remove potting as required to expose the defective reed relay leads and capsule at
each end. Examine visually in detail, using a 10 to 30 power microscope, all exposed lead and capsule areas. Photograph.
as required, any anomalies detected. If defect is not readily apparent, carefully remove defective reed switch capsule
taking extreme care that stress is not applied to the switch glass enclosure through the leads during removal.
Failure Analysis Flow. The failure analysis flow (Figure 10-4) provides for maximum nondestructive evaluation of the
failed part prior to the opening operation.
Relationship to Failures. Where it is relevant, each step of the failure analysis procedure (Figure 10-4] is related to one
of the four major problem areas and their cause by a coding system which is defined on the foldout in the Appendix.
Thus. one experiencing a specific type of failure can identify those steps in the failure analysis most likely to reveal the
problem.
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TEST/EXAmNATXON
T_ WHEN RELATED PROBLEM CODE
PROCEDURE [ _AIL_RE (see foldout in the Appendix)
FAIL
MAKE/ SHORT PAR MECH
_'.. BREAK II _ DEV. ANOM
I HI Iv
NONDESTRUCTIVE [MECHANICAL
I
External Visual
Exam/nation
I
Radiographic
Inspection
PROBLEM AREA
VERIFICATION
I
NONDESTRUCTIVE
ELECTRICAL
i
[ Func_onalTesting
I
l S_d Test. "
h_
I
Note aU identifying markings and external J "
damage I A,I,J A
A,I,J
l_flxed focus X-ray is used. photograph in
three planes mutually perpendicular to vertical
ax/s. Examine and photograph anomslies an
observed. _
All specified electrlcal parameters. Record
dam.
INDUCING FAILURES
I l] S.,m,._.1 [ I Baking, temperature cycling, vibrat on, and
_._ Tl_e:_ _ HAI| specified parameters. Record data
PROBLEM CAUSE J
VERIFICATION
Gas A ysls _ Gas chromatograph. Do only If high contact
l" I resistance is encountered
• ISee paragraph "Opening Techuiques"o Inspect
_.___ for contamination, corrosion, weld spatter,
Case ] I m/salignment, binding, broken or fused parts,Removal
[etc. Use normal and black light_
h iSe.am ,pectrometor el.sha ng ihelium tracer, Those having nitrogen must be
[ tested by Radlflow
FuncUon Operationand Testing
Solvent Rinse,
Particle Isolation
and Identification
I
Progressive
Disassembly and
Inspection
___ Remeasure electrical parameters, Observe
contacts and mechanism for signs of binding,
sticking, or hang-up while relay is operating
H Clean with Freen TF In a chemically clean
container. Evaporate and identify particles.
(Infrared speetrophotometry, electron beam
m/croprobe_ emission spectroscopy, etc.)
H Carefully disassemble mechanism, inspecting
each portion for wear, corrosion, galling,
platin_ defects_ contem/nants, etc.
A A
A,I,J
A A A
A A A,H
Figure 10.4. Reed Relays - Typical Failure A.alysis Flow with Related Problem Codes
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ALERT SUMMARIEs
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Armature. Reed, and Miscellaneous Relays are shown below. They are
listed according to the Problem Area - most frequent to least frequent occurrences, except Miscellaneous are listed by
lype, The "ALERT ITEM NO." (first column) references each summary back to the "Problem Area/Cause, and
Suggested Action'" table.
ARMATURE RELAYS
ALERT t .
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. AREA/ DESCRIPTION
Cause
•PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I FAILURE OF Relay failed to
MSFC-68-25 CONTACTS TO transfer when
MAKE energized during
Contamination - vehicle checkout.
between pole piece
and armature
Failure analysis revealed numerous small pure
iron particles on the armature. Particles
between the pole piece and armature prevented
full armature travel. Contamination came from
an external source.
E9-70-01
FAILURE OF Two relays would not
CONTACTS TO transfer or the
MAKE contacts would not
Contamination - make during
between pole piece black-box electrical
and armature test.
Failure analysis verified the failure was caused
by particulate contamination identified as
magnetic weld splatter found lodged between
armature and pole piece.
3
GSFC 7.28-67
FAILURE OF Relay failed to
CONTACTS TO transfer when
MAKE energized.
Contamination -
between pole piece
and armature
Metallic slivers in the magnetic gap prevented
closure of armature. Slivers were caused by
interference fit between header and can which
sheared slivers from the header during
assembly.
4
LeRC 2-14-66
FAILURE OF Relay exhibited
CONTACTS TO intermittent operation.
MAKE
Contamination -
between contacts
Failure analysis revealed that relay failed to
close because of particles which had dislodged
from a cracked ceramic getter. Further
examination of numerous relays selected at
random from manufacturer's stock confirmed
the problem of cracked getters.
5
GSFC-70-07
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
MAKE
Contamination -
between contacts
Three relays exhibited
open circuit contacts.
Failure analysis revealed contamination in the
form of solder flux, nonconductive fibers, and
organic particles. An all welded construction
replacement lot was inspected and rejected
because of flaked copper plating on the
actuator arms° A second replacement lot was
fabricated, inspected, accepted, and sealed.
This lot was screened by the manufacturer and
failed vibration test because of low armature
return spring force.
6
MS FC-76-03
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
MAKE
Contamination -
between contacts
Normally closed
contacts showed no
continuity.
Investigation revealed that the failures occurred
because of Teflon pieces contaminating the
relay contacts causing a break in the circuit.
Teflon spacers are used to insure insulation
resistance.
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ARMATURE RELAYS
ALERT t .
ITEM NO,/
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM
AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
14
K9_9_1
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
BREAK
Contamination
solder flux on
contacts
During vibration
testing a rotary
armature hang-up
(failure to release)
occurred when relay
was de-energized.
it was determined that the armature was
binding on the core, causing the failure.
'Investigations revealed that the hang-up was
caused by misdrilling of the core bearing hole.
The concentricity of the armature shaft and
recess was out of tolerance and was
contributing to the hang-up.
15
GSFC-68-07
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
BREAK
Contamination -
solder flux on
contacts
Sticking and open
contacts experienced
randomly over the
past six months.
Four relays were observed to have solder flux
within them. These relays passed acceptance
tests and operated in system bench tests. The
Solder flux eventually caused the relays to fail
because of sticking and/or high resistance
contacts.
R6-71-01
16 FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
BREAK
Armature binding
Relays failed in card
test after an average
of 200 cycles.
Failure Analysis revealed an intermetallic
galling between the armature and return spring.
Galling was the result of low moisture content
within the relay caused by a malfunctioning
gas dryer. Moisture acts as natural lubricant
between metal surfaces.
17
MSFC-68-13, 13A.
13B
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
BREAK
Armature binding
Relay failed to
transfer to normal
state when
de-energized during
functional tests.
X-rays revealed that the contact actuator arm
was touching the relay case. Only when a
slight pressure was applied to the end of the
relay case, did the relay hang up in the
energized position.
18
MSFC.67-OI Add
i. 2
SHORT
Contamination -
between contacts
19
MSFC-68.18
SHORT
Contamination -
between contacts
During reliability
testing, simulation of
an engine shut down
condition induced
closure of open
contacts in several
relays.
Internal examination revealed metallic particles
and slivers, solder splash and balls, weld
_plash and balls, nylon/teflon particles and
strings, bristle or hair, and an unidentified
white powder. Investigation at manufacturer's
plant indicated that all relays were
contaminated with metallic and nonmetallic
particles.
Three relays from
three separate lots
containing a total of
112 relays failed
random vibration
acceptance testing.
Failure analysis revealed solder balls in each
relay. Verified source of contamination was
the remelting of solder.
2O
MSFC-67-06
SHORT
Contamination -
between contacts
Loose solder plugs in
relay cans.
The production process requires a solder plug
to be placed in the purge port to facilitate
soldering. Accumulated tolerances made it
possible for some plugs to fall through the
port. Internal clearances of the relay will
allow tee plug to travel and cause shorts or
blocking of operation.
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ALERT t .
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
REED RELAYS
PROBLEM
AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
CONTACT
RESISTANCE
Loss of mercury
Low meter readings
were obtained during
functional test. The
trouble was traced to
increased contact
resistance. X-ray
examination showed
evidence of mercury
spillage.
Failure analysis revealed epoxy potting material
adhering to the capsule. As the epoxy _t.
stress caused the glass to crack and mercury
to spill. Without mercury to wet the contacts,
the contact resistance increased.
MISCELLANEOUS RELAYS
TYPE;
ALERT I .
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM
AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
CHOPPER
29
KSC-69-16
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION - HIGH
CONTACT
RESISTANCE
Unstable epoxy
compound.
Five failures occurred
in fifteen recorders.
Problem was caused by a particular batch of
unstable epoxy compound which allowed
parameter shift after about six months.
PHASE
SEQUENCE
30
KSC 3-2-66
FAILURE OF
CONTACTS TO
MAKE
Actuator arm fell
off
During system
check-out, the relay
used to indicate
correct phasing of an
inverter failed to
have an output even
though the motor was
running.
Failure analysis revealed that the contact
actuating arm had fallen off because of the
loosening of the motor-torque-arm set screw.
No locking provision exists for the screw, nor
is there a seating flat on the shaft. In a
"base-down" condition, the unsecured arm can
fall on the energized headers in the relay and
short the power supply
THERMAL TIME
DELAY
31'
MSFC-65-06
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION.
EXCESSIVE TIME
DELAY
Low heater coil
resistance
Thermal time delay
relay exhibited
excessive time delay
for actuation
Investigation revealed that the relay
malfunctioned because of change in resistance
of the heater element. The heater element
was removed and microscopic examination of
the heater coil indicated poor insulation of the
wire used in the coil.
TIME DELAY
32
C6.68-01
ELECTRICAL
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
; INADEQUATE
TIME DELAY
Contamination -
aluminum particles
Two relays timed out
too quickly.
I
Contamination of aluminum particles between
the nylon timing disk and the mating relay
surface provided air leakage paths from the
timing bellows other than. the normal timing
path. Source of the contamination was
concluded to be from the aluminum body
under the timing disk.
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SECTION 11
RESISTORS
(GIDEP CODE 651, 661)
11-I
' i
INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of resistors and to suggest
approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with these problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The resistor section is presented with the following organization:
General
I. Basic failure problems associated with resistors are identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
2. Where applicable, a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished parts having a potential for failure.
Subtopics Treatment of Specific Types
I. Resistor type background.
2. For those in the process of selecting pans and manufacturers, or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of selected types and describing the
manufacturing sequence necessary to produce the part. Particular emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing
deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
3. Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
steps in the failure analysis process likely to reveal that problem.
Resistor Types. Resistors have been divided into subtopics according to their internal construction. Metal and carbon
film, variable, wirewound, and carbon composition resistors have been discussed in depth. Other types of resistors
include only summaries of ALERT reports.
RESISTOR FUNDAMENTALS
What a Resistor Should Do. Resistance is a basic electrical circuit parameter having properties which result in the
dissipation of electrical energy (R - P/I'). Resistors are devices constructed to provide known amounts of resistance to
circuits in order to fulfill electrical design requirements. In its fundamental form, a resistor is a device made of a
material havi.ng atomic properties such that practical design variations can produce a useful resistance range (e.g., t to
1,000.000 ohms). Its resistance is directly proportional to the specific resistance and length of the material, and inversely
proportional to the cross sectional area of the material. The specific resistivity of a material is determined empirically
by relating it to that constant associated with silver.
Practical Considerations. Analysis indicates,, that because of physical imperfections in materials and laws that govern
their properties, a resistor cannot be defined by its resistance value alone. Physical considerations force us to recognize
such compromising characteristics built into a resistor as voltage and current limitation, frequency effects, and temperature
coefficient of resistance. It is only by recognizing and controlling all of these factors that stable reliable resistors can
be developed and manufactured. All of these characteristics are inherent limitations associated with the materials and
processes used in the fabrication of the resistors and are normally dealt with as design limitations.
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PROBLEM/SCREENING SUMMARY
Scope. This summation is an accumulation of knowledge and experience gained in dealing with resistor failures and in
avoiding those failures. It addresses itself to the causes and effects of failures, and shows the suggested screens that
will allow identification of resistors having latent or incipient defects.
This summary is aimed toward identifying resistor problem areas and failure causes. Having identified problems, and
recognizing that the typical user is concerned with eliminating this problem from a group of resistors on hand, suggestions
are made for performing screening. These screening suggestions are based primarily upon industry experience. The
problem areas have been grouped under the basic categories of open, short, parameter deviation, and mechanical anomaly.
ALERT Item No. Where directly applicable, the "ALERT Item No." of the ALERT report describing a specific cause
for a failure is listed against that cause. Thereby, a cross reference is provided between a specific failure cause found
in the "'ALERT Summaries" and the broader failure experience/avoidance knowledge shown in this presentation.
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VARIABLE RESISTORS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspections and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN DC Resistance, Burn.ln. Temperature Cycling,
Contamination 13,14 DC Resistance, Peak Noise, and Continuity
OPEN DC Resistance. Temperature Cycling. DC
Inadequate contact 15,16,17. 18 Resistance. Peak Noise, and Continuity
OPEN DC Resistance (total). Temperature Cycling.
Inadequate solder connection 19 DC Resistance, and Peak Noise
OPEN DC Resistance (total). Temperature Cycling,
Broken contact spring 20 DC Resistance (total), Peak Noise, and
Lead separation 14,21 Continuity
SHORT DC Resistance. Temperature Cycling, DC
Contamination 22 Resistance, Peak Noise, and Continuity
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION . OUT DC Resistance, Burn-in, Temperature Cycling,
OF TOLERANCE DC Resistance. Peak Noise, and Continuity
Contamination 23
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION - OUT Invoke limited life requirements on components
OF TOLERANCE which rely on electrical continuity through a
Excessive electrical noise 24 lubricant on sliding contacts
MECHANICAL ANOMALY - BROKEN Visual Examination at 10X
SCREWHEADS
Poor epoxy bond 25
MECHANICAL ANOMALY - LOSS OF WIPING DC Resistance. Temperature Cycling. DC
ACTION Resistance, Peak Noise, Continuity. and Visual
Canted shaft 26 Examination
MECHANICAL ANOMALY - LOSS OF WIPING DC Resistance, Peak Noise. and Continuity
ACTION
Faulty drive gear 27,28,29
Contamination 30
WIREWOUND RESISTORS
ALERT SUGGESTED ACTION - SCREEN
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM (see "Screening Inspections and
Cause NO. Tests")
OPEN DC Resistance, Short-Time Overload,
Broken resistor element wire 31.32.33 Temperature Cycling. and DC Resistance
OPEN Terminal Twist Test. MIL.R-39005. fief 31)
Broken resistor element wire 34
OPEN None. Manufacturer has implemented
Broken resistive element wire 35 inspection tests to prevent acceptance of wire
with cracks in the insulation
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SCREENING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
Basic Screening. The screening inspections and tests suggested for resistors included in the Problem screening Summary
are as follows:
I. Temperature Cycling
2. Burn-ln; sometimes called "voltage conditioning." "voltage aging," or "voJtage stabilization"
3. Seal Test (for hermetic devices)
4. Electrical Measurements
5. Visual Examination
6. Radiographic Inspection (for devices with opaque cases)
7. Short-Time Overload
8. Tap Test (metal film resistors only)
9. Peak Noise and Continuity (variable resistors only)
_e. The purpose of the screening is to allow detection of parts that: (I) have been improperly processed by the
manufacturer, (2) contain flaws or weak spots in the resistance element, (3) have poor solder or weld connections, or (4)
have any other anomalies that could result in a failure under normal conditions.
Additional Sereenin 6. In cases where specific characteristics are critical in the function of the using equipment, e.g.,
temperature coefficient, such critical parameters should be added to the requirements of these screening tests.
Envelope Removal/Dissection. The basic approach taken here is to subject each of the devices to a test procedure in
order to make a one-by-one acceptance determination. The disadvantage of this approach is the underlying assumption
that the internal construction materials, processes, etc. from part.to.part are homogeneous so that the devices can be
treated as a uniform lot. If the devices are not produced under similar design criteria and manufacturing controls which
permit a heterogeneous lot to exist, a sin_e screening procedure may not be the optimum for all units. For this reason,
it is frequently desirable to examlne the internal design and construction. This is accomplished, first, by a nondestructive
radiographic inspection; and second, by performing a destructive envelope removal or dissection on a limited sample of
devices. This procedure is more meaningful if a design/construction baseline has been established as a comparison
criterion.
I. TEMPERATURE CYCLING -- MIL STD 202, METHOD 102 (_ cycles) (ref 2)
General. This environmental exposure will assist in detecting a variety of design and manufacturing deficiencies
resulting from materials with incompatible temperature coefficients of expansion, inadequately bonded materials,
and materials with improper chemical composition.
Complementary Tests. Seal test and electrical measurements will detect degradation and catastrophic failure
resulting from the temperature cycling exposure. Resistance (or DC Leakage) is the suggested electrical measure-
ment to be performed after Temperature Cycling and Seal Test; test condition selected must he compatible with
the part characteristic.
2. BURN-IN
Burn-ln typically consists of the application of rated power (not to exceed maximum rated voltage) at the maximum
rated wattage-temperature for a period of time associated with the resistor type and resistance material. The
purpose is to stress the resistor electrically and thermally to the maximum of its designed operating capability.
Experience has indicated that this type of stress is extremely effective in detecting incipient failures. The number
of hours that a part is burned in has evolved as a result of experience. This time is based on minimizing the
infant mortality rate of a specific part type. A typical burn-in time is 100 hours.
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is varied by uniform rotation of the lead screw. The deviations from a linear increase decrease are observed on
an oscilloscope and recorded as noise and/or open. it should he remembered that open conditions detected in
this manner may he caused by contamination on the surface of the resistance element as well as actual
discontinuities in the resistance element.
10. ENVELOPE REMOVAL/DiSSECTION
A sample from each lot (e.g., lot-date.code) has its envelope removed and/or is dissected in order to detect
internal anomalies such as part damase, poor workmanship,-improper materials, etc. It is suggested that a sample
base line dissected part he used as a standard for comparison.
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DESIGN AND PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
General. Typical metal or carbon film,, variable, wirewound, and carbon composition resistors (Figures I1-1, 1l-2. !1-3
and 11-4) and typical assembly flows (Figures I I-5, 1I-6, I 1-7, and 1i-8) are presented together with the suggestedcontrols
required to assure a reliable product.
Assembly Flow. The manufacturing flow of a resistor is essentially the same for all manufacturers, differing principally
in the degree of process controls,, number of production tests, and extent of automation. The assembly flow as described
is typical of what may be expected for resistors of the type illustrated. Significant variables are listed on the typical
flow diagram with those operations that are considered critical for the design of a reliable resistor. In-process inspection
and testing may vary from one manufacturer to another depending on the sizes of the lots produced and the degree of
automation.
TYPICAL METAL OR CARBON FILM RESISTOR DESIGN (Figure 11-1)
ITEM ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
I Lead Gold platod nickel
2 End Fillet
3 End Cap
4 Core
Copper-silver alloy
Nickel-iron alloy such as Kovar, Rodar, etc.
Ceramic or glass
.'; Metal Film or
5 Carbon Film
Nickel-chromium resistance alloy or
Carbon
6 Envelope Ceramic or glass
7 End Disk Nickel-iron alloy
8 Spiral Cut through metal film that exposes core
Envelope Gas (not
shown)
Dry gus/air mixture
10 Varnish (not shown) Hi-temperature varnish over'resistor body (optional)
o
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ITEM
i
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
io
ii
12
13
14
15
TYPICAL VARIABLE RESISTOR DESIGN (Figure 11-2)
ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Cover Moldable plastic such as dialyll phthalate
Contact Sprinj Pt-Pd-Au alloy
Worm Stainless steel
Case Moldable plastic such as dialyll phthalate j
O-Ring Silicone rubber
Retaining Pin Nylon
Collector Ring Beryllium copper
Gear Nylon
Mandrel ML magnet wire
Element Resistance Nickel-chromium alloy
Wire
Varnish Hi-temp varnish
Pin Gold plated nickel
Tab Silver plated copper
Spot Weld
Element Preform Adhesive film
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ITE.__MM
I
2
3,8
4
5
6
7
9
IO
TYPICAL WIREWOUND RESISTOR DESIGN (Figure 11-3)
ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Lead Gold plated nickel
Weld Tab Gold plated nickel
Bobbin Rigid plastic such as dialyll phthalate
Cushion Coat Silicon rubber
Wire Nickel-chromium resistance wire
Shell Risid plastic such as dialyll phthalate
Cap Gold plated nickel
End Cap Moldable plastic
Insulating Tape (not Teflon
shown)
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TYPICAL CARBON
ITEM
I
2
3
COMPOSITION RESISTOR DESIGN (Figure 11-4)
ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Lead ETP copper with tinned coating
Shell PhenoPformaldehyde system resin filled with microcrystalline silica
Core Phenol/formaldehyde system resin filled with microcrystalline silica and
carbon. (Hole: Carbon is either calcined carbon black or graphite)
Lead header Phenolic based conductive painl
Impregnant Halol_nated aromatic compounds
Item 5 is not shown on drawin$ -- will he found on outer surface and within shell (2) and/or
core (3).
Note:
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ASSEMBLY FLOW
General. A review of the following assembly flow diagrams (Figures I I.._. 11.6, 11-7 and !1-8) for the four significant
types of resistors will reveal that no truly proprietary processes are used. The only significant variation thai will be
found, based on industry experience, is the process variations found in depositing the film used in film resistors such as
the variation in the substrate material used and the composition of the films. An examination of the implementation of
the process inspection requirements and process control documents gives an indication of quality being built into the parts
but not necessarily an indication of good quality.
Problem Areas for Film Resistors. The areas in processing of film resistors that are of significant concern are those
processes that can induce fracture of the core and control of envelope gas content. Fracture of the core is an insidious
failure mechanism as it can result in intermittent opens or parameter deviations. Inclusion of excessive hydrogen and/or
moisture in the envelope gas can lead to a time-dependent parameter drift that may or may not be radically changed by
heating, either by baking or application of short-time overload.
Problem Areas for Variable Resistors. The predominant cause of variable resistor failures becaiJse of processing faults
is inclusion of contaminants. The contaminants vary from extrusion of improperly cured setting-bed varnish to assorted
debris, all of which generally result in erratic open conditions.
Problem Areas for Wirewound Resistors. The significant processing problem area for wirewound resistors is faulty
connections, such as inadequate weld of the resistance element wire to termination tab and damaged insulation that has
been abraded during the winding process. The faulty connections are more commonly observed as opens at either high
• or low temperatures. The loss of resistance element wire insulation results in parameter ch.'.nges and/or shorts.
Problem Areas for Carbon Composition Resistors. The problem areas associated with carbon composition resistors are
more theoretical than actual. Catastrophic failures, open or short, are almost nonexistent. However. as with any
assembly thai requires several steps, problems can appear as listed in the flow diagram. Since people usually crea'e
problems associated with part problems, the automation/mechanization in making composition resistors is the highest of
any resistor in this section,
Insuring Reliability. It is because of the above considerations thai special part requirements become necessary where
these devices are used in long-life and critical applications. They include: (I) lot rejection because of excessive screening
fallout. (,_) failure analysis by the manufacturer of catastrophic screening failures, and (3) user receiving inspection and
envelope removal.
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MATERIAL
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_-_-- I Ba_Tc_etaban t° element _
I
_._ _weld collectorto case assembly /
®
I
,@
_m _ Attaching process A
ent -parameters
[Weld process
Spotweld tab to V parameters A@ pins
I
Lubricate element; !
add gear, spring and Contaminant
cover; and seal --introduction
®
®
Braze time,
-temperature, and
atmosphere
Gear
[ Contaminant
O-Ring [ @ Install O-ring and V lntr°ducfl°nWorm [ (_) worm
[
Drill plug hole
[Plug I and inject
I
I I
I
I Lub_p_c__ _p I
Weld process H
"parameters
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see _ldout in t_Appendix)
PAR _ MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV ANOM
I II HI IV
A,D C ]33
A A B3
H A
C,D C A2
C, D C
C, D
NOTE: For items O through @ see Figure 11-2.
Figure 11-6. Variable Resistor - Typical Assembly Flow with Related Problem Codes
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I MATERIAL [
FLOW DIAGRAM
MANUFACTURING
I CRITICAL PROCESSOPERATION
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV ANOMI II Ill IV
I Shell
Lead
Core
Impregnate
NOTE:
' _--_ Mix shell material F
. .i
I
___ Mix core material
and insert
I
-_ Add other lead
I
Compress
- Material control C C C
Pressure, time,
"and temperature
- Material control
- Alignment
_ Prevention ofbody fracture
I ___ Pressure, time,Cure , and temperature
--_ Vacuum impreguat_ Coverage
[ Degrease J
Acceptance test [
i
For items Q through Q see Figure 11-4.
E C
C C AI
E C AI D
A
i
i
i
i
I
A4 D
Figure 11.8. Carbon Composition Resistor - Typical Assembly Flow with Related Problem
Codes
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TEST/EXAMINATION
NOENDESTRU CTIVE
CHANICAL i
I
External Visualxamination
I
Radin_mphicInspectton
PROBLEM AREA
VERIFICATION I
I
NONDESTRUCTIVE
ELECTRICAL
i
Resistance
Confirmation
I
I Continuity• Evaluation
Ceramic FractureEvaluation
Hermet/cityEvalua ion
I
IConfirmation
J
INDUCING FAILURES
I
I ConditioninE .
I
I ParameterVerification
PROCEDURE
Record all identifying markings
and external damage (photographs
preferred)
-4b
If fixed focus X-ray is used, pho-
togrsph in two mutually orthogo-
nat planes as required to record
any interior anomalies. If Vidicou
(imaging) is used, examine and
record anomalies as observed
--p
. Measure and record resistance at
_ applicable temperatures (roomambient and s cification limits
for high and low)
H Measure and record peak noise
and continuity
Tap test and record maximum re-
sistance deviation (Note: This is
a comparative evaluation and re-
suits should be compared with re-
suits obtained from known good
devices tested under identical
conditions)
Perform leak test per
MIL-STD-202, Method 112,
Condition ".%" and "C," and
record observations
Repeat resistance measurement
at applicable temperatures and
record any changes in values
Baking, vibration, thermal
:cycling, and short-time overload
only if required to confirm
problem area
_ Repeat resistance measurement,
peak noise, and continuity as
applicable and record any
nhmpw_red o.h Rn_eM
_ELATED PROBLEM CODES APPLICABLE
(see foldout in the Appendix) RESISTORTYPE
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV. ANOM ;MF CF VAR
I II HI IV
iA, c,
E, H,
I
A X X X
A2 thru
E
A A3 X X X X
CC
X X
-_ all all all X X X X X
A1; X
_._ A,C,D A,C B3
I
X X
--p B
A2; X X
.._ F, G B BI
all all all X X X X X
X X X X X
XlX X X X
Figure 11.9. Resistor - Typical Failure Analysis Flow wlfh Related Problem Codes
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ALERT SUMMARIES
Summaries of ALERT reports issued against Metal Film, Carbon Film. Wirewound, Variable, and Miscellaneous Resistors
are shown below. They are listed according to the Problem Area-most frequent to least frequent occurrences, except the
Miscellaneous are listed by type. The "ALERT ITEM NO." (first column) references each summary back to the
"'Problem Area/Cause. and Suggested Action" table.
METAL FILM RESISTORS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO, Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
I OPEN Two resistors
GSFC-?O-09 Broken resistive purchased in an
element unfinished form and
ELECTRICAL then trimmed and
PARAMETER encapsulated, failed.
DEVIATION - OUT
OF TOLERANCE
Incorrectmaterial
Failure analysis by the manufacturer revealed
that a substitute isolation coat material caused
resistance instability in one resistor. The main
element of the other resistor had been cut
(accidentally) during the trimming operation.
2 OPEN Resistor failed open
GSFC 7-18-67 Fractured substrate during bench tests,
after thermal cycling
and removal from
storage.
Glass substrates fractured without cracking the
epoxy encapsulant. Broken substrates may
remain in position and maintain normal
electrical continuity until mechanically or
thermally exercised.
3 OPEN (Intermittent) j Resistors failed
MSFC-6._-O? Fractured ceramic open/intermittent open
core during temperature
cycling.
Failure analysis revealed that the ceramic
cores were cracked beneath the end cap.
Investigation by the manufacturer indicated
that because the capping operation was out of
control, excessive stress was created in the
core beneath the end cap.
4 OPEN Resistors failed open
K9.72-11 Dissolved film following humidity
test.
Microscopic examination, after removal of
conformal coating, revealed missing metal film,
Failure is typical of that occurring in this
resistor type when moisture penetrates the
protective coating and reacts with contaminants
and the metal film, resulting in electrolysis
which in effect etches away or dissolves the
metal film.
SHORT Three resistors
GSFC 3-18-66 Silver migration exhibited a sudden
decrease in
resistance.
Investigation revealed silver substance in the
inner cavity of the failed units. In a
controlled series of tests, attempting to
simulate the failure, five resistors failed after
temperature humidity cycling. Two of these
were confirmed to have developed an internal
path because of silver migration.
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4CARBON FILM RESISTORS
ALERTI
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
II
M3-70.02
OPEN
Broken ribbon lead
Resistor trailed open
during temperature
cyclins.
Failure analysis revealed that solder had
flowed up the ribbon lead from the PC Board
to the chip (the lead is soldered to the PC
Board on which the chips are mounted). The
resulting lack of stress relief on the lead
caused the ribbon to break.
12
G SF C.68.0 2
OPEN
Corona discharge
Corona discharge in
the hollow core
ceramic tube between
ends of the terminal
connections after
being in vacuum for
24 to 36 hours.
Corona discharge caused by gas trapped during
assembly of the resistor. Gas gradually leaked
out until discharge pressure was reached.
VARIABLE RESISTORS
ALERT t
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
13
M3-70-01
OPEN
Contamination
Devices failed
intermittently open
during system level
tests.
Contamination on the coil caused intermittent
opens as the rotor passed over the winding.
14
K9-71-12
OPEN
Contamination
Lead separation
Of 20 units tested, 18
had open end
terminals and i had
erratic operation.
Investigation revealed a gap between the end
terminals and the silver epoxy. The erratic
operating unit had a plastic material on the
resistive element.
L9_9_1
15 OPEN
Inadequate contact
Mechanical
adjustment of
potentiometer caused
intermittent operation.
Failure analysis revealed intermittent electrical
contact of the center shaft to the end shaft
terminating joint.
16
B I-A.?2-0J
OPEN
Inadequate contact
Resistors
demonstrated
intermittent opens.
Investigation showed that the intermittent
condition was due to a loose center terminal
(collector) that caused the wiper to have an
unpredictable travel. The epoxy bond between
terminal and housing was inadequate.
17
LeRC-69-02
OPEN
Inadequate contact
A potentiometer slider
opened during
temperature cycling
of signal conditioner.
Failure analysis revealed a broken flat contact
spring on the slider.
18
MSC-71-05, 05A
OPEN
Inadequate contact
Five potentlometers
failed during
evaluation test.
Failure analysis attributed the failures to a
minor wear problem. Investigation by the
n'tanufacturer revealed the primary cause of
the failure was.the improper shape of the
wiper contacts which severed the resistance
film.
Precedingpageblank ,,.3,
I
VARIABLE RESISTORS
ALERTI
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
27
MSFC I 1-13-67
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE - LOSS
OF WIPING
ACTION
Faultydrivegear
Loss of wiper
adjustment.
Not specified. ALERT number KSC-67-69
specifies the same problem.
28
KSC.67.68
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE - LOSS
OF WIPING
ACTION
Faulty drive gear
Loss of wiper
adjustment capability
is possible,
Eccentricity in the plastic main drive gear
causes the wiper to hang-up in the stop.
Cause of the problem was traced to a
defective 8-cavity mold used for casting the
gear.
29
KSC-67-69
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE - LOSS
OF WIPING
ACTION
Faulty drive gear
Loss of wiper
adjustment
Loss of wiper adjustment because of
eccentricity between drive gear and resistor
interior.
30
F3-A-72-06
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY - LOSS
OF WIPING
ACTION
Contamination
Resistance was found
to be nonadjustable
after potting.
Failure analysis disclosed potting compound
inside the resistor case. Entrance of the
compound was traced to a void (hole) in the
molded resistor case.
WIREWOUND RESISTORS
ALERT:
ITEM NO./
OIDEP. NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
• • .Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
31
MSC 1.25-66
OPEN
Broken resistor
element wire
During test of an
earth landing system,
a power supply
experienced failure of
resistors.
The method of potting used by the
manufacturer was inadequate. Resistor
element wire which is unsupported by potting
because of voids, especially at attachment to
the lead wire, is susceptible to failure from
vibration and/or movement of the lead wires.
32
GSFC 9-20-67
OPEN
Broken resistor
element wire
Unsatisfactory circuit
design test results
were traced to open
resistors,
Failure analysis revealed breaks in the
resistance wires at their connection to the
resistor lead. Breaks were caused by
improperly centered bobbin within the tubular
epoxy case. This resulted in inadequate
isolation of resistance wires from externally
applied stresses and leads were bent too close
to resistor body during assembly into circuit.
33
SH-71-OI, OIA
OPEN
Broken resistor
element wire
Resistors overheated
and blew the
resistance element
from the aluminum
housing during
equipment test.
Failure analysis revealed aluminum particles
had shorted the resistor to the chassis. The
aluminum had been scraped off (from an
,improperly bored chassis extrusion) when the
resistor element was inserted into the housing.
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MISCELLANEOUS RESISTORS
Tv De;
A[_RT 1
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
SENSISTOR OPEN Devices exhibited
41 Poor lead welds, intermittent opens
MSFC-67-09 cracked tabs, during temperature
cracked resistive cycling
elements
Investigation revealed weakness in three areas:
!) poor lead to transfer tab weld
2) cracked or torn transfer labs
3) cracked silicon resistive element
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and data are shown.
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SECTION 12
SWITCHES
(GIDEP CODE 791)
12-1

INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to identify the major problem areas associated with the use of switches and to suggest
approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with those problems.
SECTION ORGANIZATION
The switch section is presented with the following organization:
General
I. Basic failure problems associated with switches ate identified based upon ALERT and industry experience.
2. Where applicable, a screening technique is suggested for detecting finished parts having a potential for failure.
Subtopics Treatment of Specific Types
I. Switch type background.
For those in the process of selecting parts and manufacturers, or attempting to eliminate part problems at the
manufacturer levels, a portion is devoted to describing the inner construction of selected types and describing the
manufacturing sequence necessary to produce the pan. Particular emphasis is given to the design or manufacturing
deficiencies associated with the identified failure mechanisms.
Basic approaches are provided to assist in developing a competent failure analysis plan where corrective action at
the part level is desired. The material is arranged so that one experiencing a specific problem can identify those
steps in the failure analysis process likely tO reveal that problem.
Switch Types . Switches have been divided into subtopics according to their internal construction. This section of the
publication includes a detailed discussion of the subminiature snap-action switch, and the thermostatic snap-action switch.
The snap-action switch, becaus_ of the stability of its operating characteristics provided by the snap-action, is most
frequently used in aerospace applications. Other subtopics such as pressure switches, transfer switches, and squib
switches are included as summaries of ALERT reports.
SWITCH FUNDAMENTALS
What a Switch Should Do. A switch is a device which can be used to open or close an electrical circuit. Ideally.
when open there is no current through the switch and when closed there is no voltage across it. Practically. the open
circuit current is so small that the voltage across the switch is essentially the same as if the switch were not there and
the closed circuit resistance is so small that the voltage drop across the switch is small compared to the open circuit
voltage. This section is concerned with switches whose operation depends on the motion of electrical conductors into
or out of contact in response to motion ex!ernal to the device. (When the entire motion is internal to the device, the
device is usually a thermostatic switch, a relay, or similar internally actuated type device.) Circuit closure may result
from bridging between fixed contacts or from motion of a contact on a flexible, conducting member. The primary rating
characteristics for switches is the current carrying capacity and maximum voltage which is dependent on the size of the
contact surface area, contact spacing, and the materials of construction of the contacting members.
Practical Considerations. Analysis indicates that because of the physical imperfections in materials and laws that govern
their properties, a switch cannot be simply defined by its current carrying capacity. Physical considerations force us to
recognize such compromising characteristics built into _ switch as limitations on operating forces required, mechanical
stability (sensitivity to vibration caused malfunction), insulation resistance, dielectric withstanding voltage, thermal stability.
and maximums for actuator (plunger) travel distances (pretravel and overtravel), and voltage maximums established by
contact spacing. Mechanical stability, actuator (plunger) travel distances, current maximumS, and voltage maximums are
primarily a function of mechanical desiipl of the device, insulation resistance, dielectric withstanding voltage and thermal
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where it is necessary to have assurance that future failures will not occur, a portion of this section is devoted to
describing some of the considerations involved in performing effective failure analysis.
Reliability/Life. It is anticipated that as a result of this series of actions at the part level (screening, analysis of design
and manufacturing, and effective failure analysis} that significant improvement in reliability and life will be realized.
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PROBLEM AREA/CAUSE AND SUGGESTED ACTION
SWITCHES
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO.
SUGGESTED ACTION SCREEN
(see "Screening Inspedlons and
Tests")
OPEN (including increased resistance)
Contaminated contacts
Insufficient contact pressure
i.2.3.4.
5
Electrical and Mechanical Characteristics Test
OPEN (including increased resistance)
Contact corrosion
None. Application problem in that the switch
should have been sealed
SHORT (including intermittents)
Conductive contamination
All screening tests listed, with emphasis on
Visual Examination and Radiographic
Inspection.
SHORT (including intermittents)
Improperly routed leads
Loose contact
Loose or broken conductive part
8
9
10
Sinusoidal Vibration, Temperature Cycling with
Run-In Test. and Electrical and Mechanical
Characteristics Test
PARAMETER DEVIATION - OPERATION AND
RELEASE FORCE ANOMALIES
Loose or defective parts II. 12
Contamination 13
Sticking 14
Temperature Cycling with Run-In Test, and
Electrical and Mechanical Characteristics Test
PARAMETER DEVIATION - OPERATING None. Application problem in that proper
DISPLACEMENT care was not used when cleaning flux from
Loose or defective parts 15 the terminals
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY Visual Examination
Cracked or damaged case 16. 17
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY Electrical and Mechanical Characteristics Test,
Defective seal ,_ 18 Seal Test, and Visual Examination
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permitting the flow of large leakage currents, can disturb the operation of circuits intended to be isolated by
forming feedback loops. This test is especially helpful in determining the e,xtent to which insulating properties
are affected by deteriorative forces, such as heat, moisture, oxidation, etc. it is normally preformed while the
switch is stabilized at high temperature during final cycle of thermal cycling.
4. DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE -- MIL-STD-202, METHOD 301 (ref 2)
The dielectric withstanding voltage test consists of application of a voltage higher than the rated voltage for a
specified time between mutually insulated portions of the switch or between insulated portions and ground. This
is used to prove that the switch can operate at its rated voltage and withstand momentary overpotentials caused
by switching surges and other similar phenomena. It serves to determine whether insulating materials and spacings
within the switch are adequate. After application of the specified overvoltage, the switch is examined for evidence
of arcing, flashover, and insulation breakdown.
5. SEAL TEST (HERMETIC DEVICES ONLY)-- MIL.STD-202. METHOD 112 (ref 2)
General. The purpose of this test is to verify the integrity of the hermetic seal. Typical failure areas occur
where materials are fused, brazed, or soldered to make the final seal. The seal test will detect manufacturing
defects, damage resulting from handling, seal failures resulting from mismatched temperature coefficient of
expansion of materials, etc., which can result in the intrusion of contaminating atmospheres that result in corrosion
and/or contamination.
6. ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL, OR TEMPERATURE CHARACTERISTIC MEASUREMENTS
These tests are designed to verify that the following switch characteristics are within specification requirements:
I. For subminiature snap-action switches: operating force, release force, pretravel, overtravel, differential
travel, operating point, and contact resistance.
2. For thermostatic snap-action switches: contact opening temperature, contact closing temperature, differential,
repeatability, and contact resistance.
Because of the variety of designs found in various kinds of subminiature snap-action and thermostatic snap-action
switches, exact methodology for all testing will not be defined.
For testing thermostatic snap-action switches, an agitated, calibrated, uniform temperature controlled liquid type bat_
should be used which, in conjunction with precision quartz type instruments, will provide a -," 0.1°F temperature tolerance
for over-all system accuracy. Each switch during each individual operating parameter test should be temperature cycled
in the liquid bath at a constant rate of temperature change not exceeding I°F every three minutes. The upper and lower
temperature of each liquid bath temperature cycle should be a minimum of ._°F above and below the operate temperature
of the thermostatic switch being tested. During each cycle the contact opening, closing, and differential temperatures
should be recorded. Contact resistance should be recorded at the time of. or immediately after, each contact closure.
The test employed for measurement of contact resistance is M1L-STD-202, Method 307 (ref 2). Normally, contact
resistance is specified as 0,050 ohms maximum, Except in those cases where the switch is to be used for low level
applications, the switch contact loading for resistance measurements is 6 "*- 0.1 Vdc open circuit voltage and 0.100 ±
0.00._ ampere closed circuit current. It is recommended that for those switches that are to be used in low level
applications, the contact loading for all screening and testing including resistance measurements not exceed 0.030 Vdc
open circuit voltage and 0.010 closed circuit current. Low level is defined in MIL-STD-202, Method 311. and in
MIL-S-880._ (ref 32) as 30 millivolts maximum and I0 milliamperes maximum.
In thermostatic snap-action switches contact chatter or bounce during opening and closing of the contacts, or
contact creepage, which is slight opening of the contacts as the operate temperature is approached just prior to
contact transfer, are inherent in the design. The contact movements are a result of the movable contact being
moved by the metallic element actuator (bimetal disk) which exhibits small displacement (motional instability) on
either side of (above or below) the operate temperature just prior to disk snap. (Disk snap is defined as the
maximum disk displacement at the operate temperature.)Tests have been devised to screen out those thermostatic
switches that exhibit excessive contact creepage, chatter, and bounce during contact opening or closing. One test
method is performed by applying a dc voltage of sufficient amplitude to generate a sustaining arc for a given
contact gap. Current is limited to the microampere level through the I:ontacts during this test to minimize contact
surface burn at the point where the contacts meet. A time limit is set for the arc duration during opening or
closing of the contacts, and those switches failing to meet the time limit are rejected and removed from the lot.
=
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SUBMINIATURE SNAP-ACTION SWITCHES
CHARACTERISTICS
General Considerations. As was discussed previously, switches are electromechanical devices that interrupt/restore the
flow of current in a circuit in response to external mechanical stimuli. The interruption restoration function is accomplished
by mechanically moving a conductive member to bridge between two or more contacts. Degradation of the surfaces of
the contacts and/or application of excessive transient mechanical forces can degrade or cause false operation of the
installed switch. Not to be overlooked in any discussion of operational limits for switches are the insidious atmospheric
effects such as explosions caused by ambient gases, arcing because of low atmospheric pressure, etc., generally associated
with nonhermetic switches•
Atmospheric Effects. The nonbenign effects of atmospheric environment on nonhermetic switches can be divided into
two broad categories, altitude or vacuum effects, and atmosphere composition effects. At altitudes above 2._.000 feet,
the reduction of dielectric strength of air is appreciable and reaches its minimum at some point between 70,000 and
130,000 feet° In the latter range, switches thai are dielectrically stable at sea level are prone to arc and produce a
failure• At altitudes approaching ._00,000 feet, contacting surfaces of nonhermetically sealed switches tend to become
superclean because of the dissolution of surface films and oxides and molecularly bond "cold weld" together. Furthermore.
the reduction of atmospheric pressure associated with increasing altitude promotes the outgassing of solvents and other
volatiles that are entrained in the plastic components and other materials. These released volatiles may be reactive
(corrosive) in nature or may accumulate as films on contact surfaces. Not to be overlooked is the possible synergistic
combination of arc-created elemental gases with outpssing solvents resulting in degrading gaseous compounds. Effects
on nonhermetic sealed switches resulting from atmospheric composition include increase in corrosion and/or film deposit
on contact surfaces caused by the presence of moisture or other reactive substances in a gaseous form and explosion
because of the presence of flammable compounds.
Transient Force Effects. The majority of switches used in aerospace applications are of the snap-action type. This
design employs a spring to aid in the movement of the movable member and then secure it in its conducting/nonconducting
position. Application of transient mechanical forces (shock and/or vibration) in excess of the design limit can overcome
the inherent resistance to motion of the spring. The systems designer must not only be apprised of these design limits,
but must also be cautioned against mounting the switch in such a manner as to magnify any transient forces that may
be encountered in service. An example of the mechanical mounting that should be proscribed is cantilever mounting.
Current Application Effects. The current applied to a switch during all testing prior to end item use should be limited
to the range that will be encountered in actual usage. Higher current levels cause increased heating, and can degrade
the surface of the contact by creating carbon deposits and other films that the subsequent lower operational current
levels of actual application cannot overcome.
Displacement and Frequency Limits. A review of the mechanical considerations used in design of switches will reveal
that acceptable operation of the switch is dependent on two parameters of the operating force, plunger (or actuator
displacement) and operational frequency. Loss of geometrical congruency between displacement requirements and
movement generated by the applied force can result in malfunction and/or irreversible damage to the switch. Displacement
beyond the inherent limits of the switch can result in bent or fractured contacts and/or other switch components. On
the other hand, insufficient displacement can cause an apparent switch failure by failing to fully actuate the switch.
Common causes of this type of problem is mismounting and thermal expansion mismatches.
The inertia of the moving components of the switch causes every switch to have a minimum operating time. Application
of repetitive forces at higher frequencies than are defined by this operating time will result in apparent intermittent
operation in that the switch will not respond to every force command.
Specification Parameters. The foregoing discussion has served to delineate application limitations of switches because of
physical characteristics associated with their design and materials of construction. These limitations can be described as
specification limits for use by manufacturers and using designers. Deviations from these limits can lead to failures.
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TYPICAL SUBMINIATURE SNAP-ACTION SWITCH DESIGN (FIGURE 12-1)
ITEM ITEM NAME MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
19 Normally Open Fine silver
Stationary Contact
20 Normally Open Brass, I/2 hard
Stationary Contact
Terminal
21 Snap-Action Movable Beryllium copper
Contact Spring
22 Stationary Anchor Brass, 1/4 hard
23 Common Terminal Brass. il2 hard
24 Plain Washer Brass, i/4 hard
25 Actuator Bushing Corrosion resistant steel
26 Ring Seal Teflon
27 Plain Washer Corrosion resistant steel
28 Lock Washer Corrosion resistant steel
29 Ring Seal Silicone rubber
30 Special Washer Corrosion resistant steel
31 Actuator Spring Chrome silicon steel
32 Switch Actuation Corrosion resistant steel
Lever
33 Switch Case Molded glass filled phenolic plastic
34 Oval Head Rivet Brass
35 Inert Gas Arc Weld
36 Glass Seal Glass
3; Header Tubes For Glass seal alloy tubing with 60140 solder
Terminal Solder Joint
38 Leadwire Embedment Moldable thermoplastic
39 Electrical Insulation Extruded 'vinyl tubing •
40 Contact and Ground Copper wire
Wires
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FLOW DIAGRAM
T MANUFACTURZNO
MATERIAL _ OPERATION
9witch Case Base With _ i Clams and bake
Termimds
_o,,..e_.'-_,W.', _j I
_.,,. G® "._toea,_me,,_l.
Anchoa'I to hue
StaUonary Contacts [
AdJUSt and clean
l_utle INmqier _ Cleen added iarts, assemble,
Case Cover _ and cheek forces
I
i Cobeha clean and reuecmblm
ISsUing EpcuY _i---_ SCUl and cure
Mark and cure
Rthgs I (271(291 •
tinier Washer _ Lubricate bushllnS and assemble
_.,rd _ Pree,intou,embly
_ctcutor _ Add to usemb _ and checkP[uaser | I movement
Weber Assemble and stake
J Seal Ret_eer
I Spring Seat sprluK
I
_i I LubricutO I
ISpring Assemble t
'I * Weld 1351 bn.cket to beshin ifirAcket assembly
I
ActuaUcu Lever _ Assemble and rivet In two
tsp_. m,,et, I _@- I _s,c ,,e.tc_.
I
fiouslu S With Header _ Adjust switch, unstable to
I firszed On [ (_6_ _ 4 bmm, .... ,t wold
_ Add Iced wires, solder, an4
]Lead Wires ___ _7 add tubin_
Lsolder;'reform,, I "_ '_'"
I Flush, fill w/th dry rdtrogen,
pinch, and weld fill tube
ILend Wire _-4_ Solder to flll tube stub -l
I
I 3andblut terminal area
and clcun
t
I I add _rd
I
IL_td _ Muk, pot (3 applicuttoms)oWire Embndmeet and cure
[Washers
I CRITICAL PROCESS
'-- Reme_l of eoatamlnm_to
...--Torm/n t and poeifioa/t_g
of Ito
Removal of cummd_nto
from cuntuets
• ---Coutrt2 of six)x7 Ioc_Uon
- -Amount of lubricant
F .Seettn_ of Euard
-Fit of plunser
-Det_cu of stoke
-LocuUOn of sprin_
-Amount of lubricunt
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in tl_ Appendix)
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV ANOM
I II m IV
C,D A A2,;
BI
D C A1,3
AI
D
A
A2;
D HI
n
A1
A1
A1,3;
B4
A1;
-Weld IIroI_tcrs A1,3
•--..Seourlty of rivet A 1, 3
_Weldl_ ptt rametcro C,D A,D AI,2,3;B3
-iSolderiq time and temperature C A A3;
B4
A4;
--Moisture content of nttrogen A, E B4
•..._lderins time and temperature C A
--E_iTflJe&tion Of resldull sand
-'--Completeness of fill
I
I (_ _CII, sandblast, paint,
I _ - Iand add nameplate"
® '
_-_t Add nuts and washers to assembly I
, s,_ I
IPl+ i.po0,toe I
I
l_.c_anda.ip I
NOTE:Per tt_, (_) th_,+,_ _) ,re _iz. "-x
Fig ure 12-2. Subminiature Snap.Actlon Switch - Typical Assembly Flow with Related
Problem Codes
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TEST/EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
LOOK
FOR
l NONDESTRUCTIVE 1MECHANICAL
[
External Visual __xamination
!
Inspection
Note all identifying markings and damage
If fixed focus X-ray is used, photograph in
two or more orthogonal planes as required
to record any anomalies within the device.
If Vidicon (imaging) is used, examine and
photograph anomalies as observed.
RELATED PROBLEM CODES
(see foldout in the Appendix)
PAR MECH
OPEN SHORT DEV ANOM
I H Ill IV
C, D all
A,B,C B,C,D A1,3;
B3
PROBLEM AREA IVERIFIC ATION
I
NONDESTRUCTIVE Measure and.record static and dynamic
ELECTRICAL AND -- electrical and mechanical characteristics
MECHANICAL as appropriate, such as Contact Resistance
' Operate and Release Force, Operating
Displacement, Dielectric Withstanding
Voltage, etc.
Seal Test
(hermetics Fine and Gross Leak Test
only)
I
INDUCING FAILURES
[
SpecialConditioning
I
Electrical and
Mechanical
Measurements
PROBLEM CAUSE
VERIFICATION
I
Delldding
I
Material Analysis
Spectrographic
Microprobe
Baking, Temperature Cycling, andVibratio_only if required to confirm problem area
_ Repeat appropriate static and dynamic
mechanical and electrical characteristics
testing and record changes
i Remove case (carefully). Observe and
record any anomalous conditions such as
_ corrosion, particulate and film contam-ination, evidence of abnormal wear, or
bent and broken parts
Analyze all foreign materials not
otherwise identifiable
Figure 12-3.
1.--_ all all all
I -;4P D A2,4; G,HB1,4
--_ all all all
i
Subminiature
1
5.ap.Actlo. Switches - Typical Failure Analysis Flow wlth
Related Problem Codes
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The metallic element actu•tor type most commonly used in the thermost•tic sn•p-action switch is the bimetal snap-action
disk which consists of two metals of different temperature coefficients laminated to form a sin_e disk. The disk is
formed in a curved shape and through carefully controlled processes is designed to instantaneously (by snap-action) change
its curv•ture (concave to convex or convex to concave) •t • discrete temperature. The switch contacts are opened and
closed by the disk displacement. The switch contacts m•y he electrically isolated from the disk or the movable contact
may he physically attached to the disk. The former electrically isolated design is preferred since it isolates 12R heat
generated by contact current flow from the disk providinlg closer temperature tolerance in the design.
Precedingpageblank ,2.,,

TYPICAL THERMOSTATIC SNAP-ACTION SWITCH DESIGN (FIGURE 12-4)
ITE._MM ITEM NAME
19 Stationary Contact
20 Movable Contact
21 Insulator Bead
22 Spring
23 Mounting Bracket
MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
Fine silver
GP alloy on nickel
Steatite (AISiMag #35)
BeryUium-copper, spring temper
Cold roiled steel, ASTM A365-57T, nickel plated
NOTE: Not shown at mating point for Items 3 and 8
Adhesive: Locktite
81-31
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FLC_' DIAGR_%|
RELATED PROBLE.M CODES
(eee foldom in the .l.plpendL, O
[ PAR .MECII
OPEN SHORT
MANUFACTURING CRITICAL PROCE_! DEV A hie .M
MATERIAL, OPERATION I !1 nl FV
Moval2e C_mct _)_ Assemble sod weld J--- Weld AI,3
_'_ I_ I
=M,.,,= I_ I
s,umry _cle,, co,,_ _ n A.C
_(s';" " "_-tAsN_le ud weld _ Weld C, A. D" _Asxml_e 8nd'rtvet coata_t_ Rivet A,B,C,D A,C,D AI,3
A2;
I Clemn 0dt_LJo.e) J D A BI
w
I
kdJustl_ Sere _kuemble J
I
_...._Secure csUbrsU_ _ Cootrol of adhesive/appllcaUee D ,3,
J
cup and imlten Iron lumembly_ i_erlml colmaemrs BI
I
Cover I
I Tem_persture check j
[ * "" °Terminal Stud (dry box) _ Weld D A BI
Exteuicms J
IL. check (off, I D
I
!_"*"'_ _'-°' I
I
I AI.2,3;
I_.l._,i_Teet J ,.D .1.3
] AI,2.3;
I
[clm _ .. dip"r-,'-", ' I1 Pl-".s _-,,, _tr_
I
I
[FiMI ,lu_ec'tlou I
(100re scr_m testlnlD I
I
m
I"_ -0 '_'_ I
A,B,C A,C,D
Figure 12-5.
E, F,G,H
E,F,G,H
Thermostotlc Snap.Action 'Swltc/_ _ Typical Assembly Flow with Rela_tecl
Problem Codes
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TEST/EXAMINATION
_/ONDESTRUCTIVE
_IECHANICAL
t
External Visual
I
Rndiographlc
Inspection
PROBLEM AREA
VERIFICATION
!
NONDESTRUCTIVE
ELECTRICAL
AND ,MECHANICAL
I
Seal Test
(hermetles
only)
I
INDUCING FAILURES
Jl
J
Special
Conditioning
[
Electr/eal and
Mechanical
Measurements
PROCEDURE
WHEN RELATED PROBLEM CODES
URE (see foldout in the Appendix)PAR
FL_OoRK _OPEN, SHORTII DEVIII
I
L______JNote all ldeetifytnZ markinse and ex-
[ternal damage
If fixed focus X-ray is used, photo-
graph in two or more orthogonel
planes as required to record any
anomalies within the device. If Vidi-
con (imaging) is used, exam/he and
photograph anomalles as observed
Measure and record static and
-- dynamic electrical and tempera-
itore character/sUes as appro-
prime, such as ContaCt Resistance,
[Opening and Closing Temperatures,
[Temperature Differential, Dielec-
tric withstanding Voltage, etc. " !
Fine and Gross Leak Test
[Baking, Temperature Cycling,
-._---- Jasd Vibration only ff required to
leonfirm problem area
I PROBLEM CAUSE ' 'IVERIFICATION
I
Material AnalysisSpectrographic
Microprobe
; Repeat appropr/ate static and dynamic
mechanical and electrical character-
IsUee testing and record changes
Remove ease (carefully). Observe
and record any anomalous conditions
such as corrosion, particulate andfilm eootm_inatl , evidence of ab-
normal wear, or bent and broken
parts
_ Analyze all foreign mater/ale not
otherwise Identifiable
i
C,D
A,B,C B,C,D AI,3
811 all all
----s_ D A2,4
all all all
A A2,3
MECH
ANOM
IV
all
G,H
Figure 12-6. Thermostatic Snap.Action Switch . Typical Failure Analysis Flow with
Related Problem Codes
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SWITCHES
ALERTt
ITEM NO./
GIDEP NO.
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
8
M S FC .70-05
SHORT (including
intermittents)
Improperly routed
leads
During system test of
spacecraft, five fuses
in Bound support
system burned out
because of shorts
within power transfer
switch.
Investigation revealed that internal lead wires
had been routed in such a manner that
insulation was abraded from the lead to the
switch motor brake. This resulted in a short
between lead and motor housing.
9
MSFC_-02
SHORT (including
intermittents)
Loose contact
During check-out of a
rocket engine, a valve
switch introduced
erratic traces on an
oscillograph recording.
Investigation revealed that the faulty switch
contact was improperly swaged at its mounting
point.
I0
MSFC-08-21, 21A
SHORT (including
intermittents)
Loose or broken
conductive part
During vehicle
check-out, a 23 amp
short was observed in
the LOX vent and
relief valve switch
circuitry.
Analysis indicated the cause to be a failed
weld joint of the internal switch actuating pin.
Ii
M SFC-_9-04
PARAMETER
DEVIATION.
OPERATION AND
RELEASE FORCE
ANOMALIES
Loose or defective
parts
During functional test
of a rocket engine,
pressure switch
actuated 125 psi
below specified
minimum.
Analysis revealed that the steel "U" frame in
the switch was cracked. This crack was
attributed to stress corrosion since 17-7 PH
material is susceptible to stress corrosion.
12
M SFC-71-09, 09A
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
OPERATING AND
RELEASE FORCE
ANOMALIES
Defective parts
During cycling tests
of ten toggle
switches, one toggie
lever failed to I:eturn
to the maintain
position.
Failure analysis performed on nine of the ten
switches revealed that eight switches had
broken contact pressure springs. Breakage
was attributed to improper stress-relief
annealing.
13
K9-71-07
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
OPERATING AND
RELEASE FORCE
ANOMALIES
Contamination
The switch's toggle
arm would not move.
Examination showed the movable plastic slider
was solidified to one side and the plastic had
overflowed onto the metal indent, thus,
preventing travel.
14
CK-A-72-OI
PARAMETER
DEVIATION -
OPERATING AND
RELEASE FORCE
ANOMALIES
Sticking
The lens assembly
(pushbutton). was
sticking.
Examination showed that worst tolerances
made the mounting clips press too hard on the
housing causing it to bow inward resulting in
the lens assembly sticking.
Precedingpageblank
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SECTION 13
VALVES
(GIDEP CODE 927)
13-1

INTRODUCTION
_e. The objective of this section is to identify the major problems associated with the use of fluid valves and
to provide approaches (developed from experience) for dealing with these problems.
_General. Valves are used to control the flow of fluids, either liquids or gases, with respect to amount and direction.
Industry employs many varieties of valves, such as gate, globe, poppet, plug, and needle valves, plus specialized varieties
like check, metering, and relief valves. A common feature of all these valves is that they contain a solid movable
member (gate, disk, poppet face, needle, or plug) that impinges on, or into an orifice in such a manner as to create a
fluid-tight separation between the entry and outflow sections of the valve. The contacting surface of this orifice, i.e..
valve seat, is normally of an elastomeric material. Where this is not true, the contacting surface of the movable member
is deformable or elastomeric in nature or the seat is of a deformable material and the movable member is hard.
Problem Descriptions. The problems are first defined by use of specific examples cited in ALERT reports, and then by
using a broader base from other government and industry investigations.
Problem Prevention. Problem prevention is dealt with by providing relevant information with respect to operational
techniques, design limits, and inspc_ction criteria.
Precedingpageblank
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VALVES
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/ ITEM
Cause NO. SUGGESTED ACTION
VALVE ELECTRICAL FAILURE Design review
Inadequate design 17
VALVE FAILED TO OPEN Use O-rings made of material capable of
Interference from O.ring 18 withstanding the environment to which they
are exposed.
Select valves so designed that there are no
19 residual stresses introduced into the case
during assembly; in-line construction is
preferable.
VALVE BREAKAGE
Inadequate design
SOLENOID FAILURE
Inadequate design 20
Redesign the coils to eliminate the stress
concentration point between the coil and
armature hinge.
Precedingpageblank 13.-5

DESIGN CRITERIA
General. Deterioration of the contacting surfaces, whether due to wear. damage during installation, chemical attack.
misalignment, etc.. will result in imperfect sealing resulting in internal leakage. All valves, with the exception of relief
and check valves, are actuated by external mechanical force that is transferred to the movable member of a stem or
riser. This actuating mechanism is subject to failure by seizure as the result of corrosion or contamination, or fracture.
The required opening into the valve body for entry.of the operating stem is an additional source of leakage, due to
inadequate design and/or packing. As the valve body is generally formed from a casting, valves are subject to all of the
hydrostatic problems associated with castings such as porosity and fracture from mechanical damage, or pressure stress
fracture due to inadequate section thickness.
Valve Desinn Criteria. Primary consideration in the selections of valves includes knowledge of the physical property of
materials from which the valve is manufactured in order to assure compatibility with: (1) applicable fluids, (2) operating
temperatures and (3) pressure limits. The function the valve must perform and its dimesnional limitations are also
important considerations. Life and wear factors must be taken into account as well as maintainability. The valve should
be designed to facilitate replacement of gaskets, seals, and seat. The applicable limits that are the result of design
consideration should be delineated at the design review that is conducted at time of first approval and should be confirmed
by proof testing. Furthermore, these limits should be reflected in resulting specification and design handbooks as
application notes in order that the system designer does not inadvertently contribute to premature failure of the finished
system.
Maior Problem Areas. A review of the "Problem Area/Cause and Suggested Action" summary will reveal that a majority
of the problems can be controlled by design review procedures. Investigation of the ALERT report and the problem
backgrounds, establish that the real problem is that the using designer has not. in many cases, been apprised of significant
valve limitations. One of the fundamental aspects of initial design review of any part is to determine inherent usage
limitations. Another significant problem area can readily be attributed to poor processing and control. A necessary part
of initial review of a part that may be used in a critical application, is establishing a thorough knowledge of the
manufacturer's processing and quality control methods.
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VALVES
ALERT 1
ITEM NO./ PROBLEM AREA/ PROBLEM
GIDEP NO. Cause DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
8 EXCESSIVE VALVE After repeated
KSC-67-67, 67A LEAKAGE subjection to sonic
Material flow across valve
incompatibility seat, excessive
leakage almost sdways
OCCURS.
The high velocity (sonic) flow of gas across
the valve seat erodes or blows out the valve
seat which is a relatively soft plastic.
9 EXCESSIVE VALVE Gross leakage out of
KSC-68.07 LEAKAGE pilot plug valve.
Inadequate design
Leakage caused by inadequate sealing of the
poppet guide O-ring; believed to be design
problem in the dimensioning of the poppet
guide gland area that prevents application of
sufficient sealing force on the O-ring.
10 VALVE INTERNAL Internal leakage was
ARC-69-O3 LEAKAGE observed when valve
Damaged O.ring was closed during
system test.
Analysis revealed that the leakage was due to
severe compressive set and nick in peripheral
O-ring installed in valve stem. The
compressive set was due to nonuniform
loading and stretching in the groove'. The nick
was caused by the ring passing over an abrupt
edge of the inlet port.
I I VALVE LEAKAGE
KSC 10-2._-65 Stress corrosion
Two valve fittings
manufactured from
2024T351 aluminum
were cracked and
allowed hydraulic
leakage into the
system.
The cracks originated as a result of stress
corrosion which was accelerated by the system
operating pressure of I._00 psi.
F 1-70-02
12 SOLENOID
FAILURE
Inadequate system
design (mounting)
Armature of solenoid
coil guide ring seized
during vibration.
Seizure was caused by fretting and metal
transfer that resulted from armature impacting
against guide ring. The basic failure cause
was amplification of system vibration due to
inadequate mounting design and installation by
the valve user. When securely mounted in the
same system, the valve operated properly.
13
KC5.67.71
SOLENOID
FAILURE
Inadequate sealing
Solenoid valves fail
during functional test
prior to vehicle
launch.
Analysis revealed evidence of moisture
intrusion and rust deposits in solenoid
enclosure and around solenoid actuator which
inhibited valve action. Moisture intrusion
points were identifed as improper O-ring seal
on solenoid cover, poor seal around electrical
connector/spacer-to-valve body, and solenoid
mounting screws.
D7_9.2
14 SOLENOID
FAILURE
Contamination
During system
acceptance test, valve
failed to close.
Investigation uncovered a small particle lodged
between the solenoid bore and movable
armature. Source of particle was from a void
in weld at bobbin/nonmagnetic end plate
junction. -Incomplete fusion of parent metal
ana weld filler form a cavity which traps
metal chips that are subsequently dislodged
during valve operation.
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to present summaries of wire related problems that have been documented on ALERT
reports.
ORGANIZATION
The ALERT reports have been categorized into two major classifications: electrical wire and steel wire. Each summary
shows:
I.
2.
.t.
4.
Type of wire and the ALERT number as assigned by GIDEP.
The problem thai was experienced, along with the cause of that problem.
A description of the manifestation of the problem.
An analysis of the events and circumstances which caused the problem.
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ELECTRICAL WIRE
TYPE;
ALERT NO. 1
(GIDEP)
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
SILVER-PLATED
COPPER
MSC 7-7.67
IGNITION AND
BURNING OF
COPPER WIRES
Conductive
compounds across
adjacent wires.
When Slycol/water
solution comes in
contact with silver
plated copper wires,
under an applied
voltage, conductive
compounds form
across adjacent wires
causing localized
incandescence and
subsequent ignition
and burning of
copper wires.
At atmospheric conditions, silver plated copper
wires subjected to dc electrical potential react
chemically with glycol/water solutions. The
reaction sequence is evidenced by: (I)
bubbling (electrolysis), (2) discoloration. (3)
sparking and incandescence. In 100 percent
oxygen at I._ psia, the glowing and sparking
will ignite the metal conductors and the
electrical insulation.
SILVERCOATED
COPPER,
FLUORO-
CARBON/
POLYIMIDE
INSULATED
K4.69-03
DIELECTRIC
LEAKAGE
Conductivity of the
black outer
dispersion coating.
Fluorocarbon/poly-
mide insulated bla_k
wire was rejected
because of
insufficient surface
insulation resistance.
If coating is in contact with center conductor
and the outer insulation touches the structure
or an adjacent wire (with the same condition)
which is functionally grounded, there exists a
high resistance path to ground (depending on
conditions).
SILVER/SILVER
COATED
MSC-68.10
IGNITION OF
WIRES WHEN DC
CURRENT APPLIED
Incompatibility of
materials.
Silver or silver-coated
wires impressed with
a direct-current
potential reacted
chemically with
glycol/water solutions
to produce ignition
when silver is the
positive terminal. At
a minimum potential
of 1.55 volts dc in
air and in 100 percent
oxygen, silver
circuitry in
glycol/water solutions
produced smoke and
fire.
When a dc'current is applied to silver or
silver-coated wires, where silver is the positive
terminal and glycol/water solutions are present,
silver hydroxide may form. Presence of a
silver chelating agent, benzotriazole (BZT),
inhibits the formation of silver hydroxide.
Pure copper, nickel covered copper, or
tin.plated wires do not have the same reaction
with glycol/water and do not create a
flammability hazard under these conditions.
THERMORAD,
POLYOLEFIN
INSULATED
MSC 4-13.65
DENTED AND
SEVERED
BRAIDED-SHIELD
Damage during
rework.
The shield on the 20
gauge "Thermorad"
(TRT) polyolefin
insulated wire was
found to be damaged
the full length of the
shield. The damage
ran parallel to the
conductor and varied
from a slight
indentation to a cut
completely through
the shield.
Manufacturer's failure analysis indicated that
the wire had been reworked prior to shipment.
In process of rework, the shield was damaged
prior to fabrication of the outer polyolefin
jacket. Subsequent inspection failed to detect
the damage because the outer polyolefin jacket
obscured the damaged shield.
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STEEL WIRE
TYPE;
ALERT NO, t
(GIDEP)
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION
i
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
7/8 INCH, 18
STRAND
KSC-70-OI
BROKEN CABLE
Corrosion
Hoisting cable (high
carbon type AISI
1085 steel] designed
for minimum
proof.load of 26,800
pounds broke at less
than 10,000 pounds
while being
proof-tested to 1._.600
pounds. Cable had
passed proof test at
26,800 pounds about
a year previously.
Examination showed that the cable had rusted
along its length and the fractured ends were
badly corroded. The effective area of most
wires had been substantially reduced and the
sound metal had been reduced 7._ percent.
Many wires were completely corroded to a
point at the tip, indicating they were separated
by corrosion prior to the proof test. Cable
exposed to corrosive environments should be
periodically inspected and lubricated.
NOTE:
I. Where no ALERT number (GIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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SECTION 15
MISCELLANEOUS
15-1

INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this section is to present summaries of problems on miscellaneous devices that have been documented
on ALERT reports.
ORGANIZATION
The ALERT reports have been categorized into the major GIDEP classifications for parts, components, and materials.
Each summary shows:
I. Major classification, GIDEP code, and ALERT number as assigned by GIDEP.
2. The problem thai was experienced, along with the cause of that problem.
3. A description of the manifestation of the problem.
4. An analysis of the events and circumstances which caused the problem.
Precedingpageblank ,5.3

MISCELLANEOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
ALERT .
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
BOARDS,
PRINTED
WIRING
142
KR 5-8-67
LOW RESISTANCE
PATHS
Graphite marking
pencils
Defective solder
connections on
printed circuit boards
being marked with
graphite pencils.
Low resistance paths formed between
conductive patterns and remained after rework
and cleaning.
COILS,
INDUCTANCE
181
GSFC-70-02
OPEN
Defective weld
connection
Three inductors were
found to be
open-circuited during
module fabrication,
and four were found
to be intermittently
open-circuited during
incoming inspection.
Failure analysis revealed that all seven
inductors failed because of defective weld
connections between the inductance (coil) wires
and the external lead wires.
COILS.
INDUCTANCE
181
GSFC 9-1-67
OPEN
Broken wire
A filter network
malfunctioned at
temperatures below
+40"C and operated
normally above
+40"C.
Examination revealed the inductor was
open-circuited because of taut terminal leads
pulling against sharp internal bends. This
reduced the ability of the wire to withstand
dimensional stresses occurring during thermal
cycling.
COILS.
INDUCTANCE
181
DT.A.72-01
OUT OF
SPECIFICATION
Inadequate
processes and
quality control
Leads improperly
supported by
encapsulant which
could lead to
separation of intenal
toroid lead due to
fatigue.
Investigation revealed fault due to improperly
applying compound after attachment of leads
preventing adherence of encapsulant to leads.
COMPUTER AND
RECORDING
ELEMENTS
191
GSFC-70-O!
DESTRUCTION OF
TAPE REEL
Breakage of tape
seal
Tape reels are
destroyed when they
fall to the floor
because the tape
seals (by which the
reels are hung) break.
Hanging of the tape reels for extended periods
of time leads to breakage of the tape seal at
the square cutout in which the hangar clasp
fits.
COMPUTER AND
RECORDING
ELEMENTS
191
KSC-69-08
POOR DURABILITY
OF MAGNETIC
TAPE
Tape slows down
and becomes sticky
after many passes
through transport
Tape exhibited poor
durability when
operated many times
on the transport.
There was a visible
slowing down of the
tape and it became
very sticky.
A test was developed which exercised a small
portion of tape on the transport.
Three-quarters of these tapes tested failed
prior to 1000 passes, whereas, comparable
tapes exceeded 10,000 passes.
CRYSTALS
241
K9.71.13
NO OSCILLATION
Short.
Module failures
traced to crystals that
had stopped
oscillating.
Investigation revealed crystals were cocked and
shorted_ to can. Manufacturer had not used
internal Teflon shield to prevent shorting to
the can. Cocking attributed to poor
workmanship.
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MISC ELLAN EOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
COoO ALERT . PROBLEM AREA/Cause PROBLEMDESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
FILTERS,
ELECTRICAL
321
•G SFC.7O- 14
OPEN
Broken connection
Attenuation of the
input signal at
resonant frequency
did not differ
significantly from
attenuation at
frequencies above or
below resonance on.
filters.
Failure was attributed to fractured spring wire.
or separation of the wire from the resonator.
FILTERS.
ELECTRICAL
321
El-71-01
OPEN
Broken connection
Internal lead wire of
filter coil broke from
stud assembly after
box post.vibration
test.
Compound to hold coil in place was soft. had
cracks, and of insufficient amount, which
apparently allowed coil to move during
vibration which cold worked coil lead. Also,
internal design had been changed from a
retaining bead to a non[etaining straight post
terminal.
FILTERS.
ELECTRICAL
321
GSFC.72-01
SHORT
Solder reflow
Filter was found
shorted to IFound
after installation in
inertial guidance
system equipment.
Investigation revealed that a mass of solder
had shorted the internal feed-through to the
case. apparently resulting from reflow into the
case from the eyelet solder seal during
installation soldering of filter.
FILTERS, NON-
ELECTRICAL
325
MSC.A-72-02
LEAKAGE
Corrosion
Oil filter leaked oil. Investigation revealed a small hole near the
base of the filter. Removal of the filter
housing disclosed internal corrosion whetPe the
•steel filter element spring rests against the
aluminum base. Cau'se of the failure was
galvanic action between dissimilar metals.
FINISHES AND
SURFACE
TREATMENTS
331
MS FC-70.04
OPEN
Debonded diode
solder connection
A printed wiring
board module
exhibited an
intermittent failure:
Failure was caused by an electrical separation
between the solder and copper pad at a diode
solder connection, The module board had
been gold plated and displayed high heat
concentration (up to 1950F) in the area of the
failed solder jo nt. Tests showed °Udyhte
Bright Acid Copper (UBAC), used in copper
plating, was responsible for the debonding.
FINISHES AND
SURFACE
TREATMENTS
331
K9-A.72-09
POOR ADHESION
OF
ELECTROPLATING"
Inadequate
processes and
quality control
o
0
The use of cold
(below 600F) rinse
waters subsequent to
electroless copper
deposition can cause
poor adhesion of
subsequent copper
electroplating
deposited from high
acid copper content
solutions because of
residual alkali.
No problem is evidenced if alkaline copper
electroplating solutions are used. Manufacturer
recommends that rinse waters be above 60°F
or that electro cleaning be used to prepare
surface for the electroless deposit.
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MISC ELLAN EOUS
MAJOR
CLASS-
GIDEP COD_/
ALERT NO.--
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
GENERAL
TECHNICAL
DATA
347
ARC-69-01
FORMATION OF
TOXIC GASES
Incompatibility of
materials
Testing of biosatellite
capsule was
interrupted when the
small monkey
(payload) became ill.
Cause of illness was the presence of
dichloroacetylene gas in the capsule. The gas
source was traced to the presence of
halogenated hydrocarbons, one of which was
trichloroethylene. The toxic gas is generated
when trichloroethylene is in combination with
usual capsule atmospheres: lithium hydroxide
(used to reduce carbon dioxide), heat_ and
metabolic products of water vapor and carbon
dioxide.
GENERAL
TECHNICAL
DATA
347
MSFC-70-07, 07A
FORMATION OF
HYDROCARBONS
Incompatibility of
materials
Surfaces treated with
Freon showed
presence of
hydrocarbons.
Development of a system for testing hydrogen
in metals disclosed one source to be Freon
113 which was stored in polyethylene bottles.
Investigation revealed that Freon 113 leaches
hydrocarbons from polyethylene containers.
GENERAL
TECHNICAL
DATA
347
T6-A-72-02
WATER SAMPLER
FAILED
Shorted switch
Water sampler failed
to operate when
received.
Investigation revealed water in the stepping
switch housing had shorted out the switch.
GYROS
358
LeRC-68-OI
WRONG AXIS
INSTALLATION
Location pins not
securely fitted in
gyro flange
A number of gyros
have been installed in
the wrong axis
because of pins
slipping during
installation.
Gyro locating pins are press fitted into the
gyro flange and can be pushed back during
installation without being detected, if the pins
are pushed back prior to installation, the
locating reference is lost and the gyro can be
installed in the wrong axis.
GYROS
358
MSFC-69-05
FAILURE TO
START
Lubricant
breakdown
Of nine rate gyros
taken from an eleven
month storage period,
one wheel failed to
start.
Investigation revealed spin bearing lubricant
destruction from heat and contamination. The
cause was found to be improper heat sinking
at the time the gimbal was originally sealed
(welded).
HARDWARE
361
KSC.70-03
LINEAR CRACKS
IN CLAMPS USED
ON LOX SYSTEM
Material
incompatibility
Galvanic corrosion set
in due to the
potential difference
between graphite and
stainless steel (>1.5
volts).
Tests disclosed that stress corrosion occurred
primarily due to galvanic action of graphite on
19-9DL stainless steel, after a 30 day
exposure.
HARDWARE
361
KSC 5.4.66,
MSFC-66-03
BROKEN SPRING
Marginal design
Bailatch handle
assembly latching
swings broke in
several assemblies
after only a few
operations.
Tests proved the spring was a marginal design
with a mean operating life of 140 cycles at
maximum deflection, with a range from 1 to
306 cycles.
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MISCELLANEOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
GIDEP CO_.J_/ALERT .
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
HARDWARE
361
Msc-71-03. 03A
DEFECTIVE
ACTUATION
SHAFT
Inadequate
crimping or
swaging
End cap swaged on
the end of ;he
activation shaft of
quick release pin
pulled off during a
training
demonstration.
Investigation revealed cause of failure due to
inadequate crimping or swaging of the end
cap.
HOSE
4O4
MSFC-67-11
CRACKED LINES
Overaged material
A fuel pump balance
cavity return line
(conductive Teflon
covered with wire
braid) leaked during a
gas pressure test.
The line had
undergone one 30 psi
test, three 80 psi
tests, and failed at 10
psi on the fifth test.
Failure is attributed to overaged material
caused by high oven temperature control limit
'and inconsistent flow through the oven.
HOSE
404
MSFC-68-14
FLEX HOSE
FAILURE
Resonant
flow-induced
vibrations
Analysis of flight
data indicated a
failure of a flex hose
assembly carrying
liquid hydrogen.
Flow testing at sea level of these hoses
carrying cryogens may be inadequate for hoses
which are to be operated in a vacuum.
Flow-induced vibrations at sea level are
dampened by the formation of liquid air
around the hose bellows. Results to date
indicate that, under vacuum conditions,
resonant flow-induced vibrations are of an
amplitude sufficient to cause a line failure.
HOSE
404
MSC-71-06
HOSE FAILURE
Improper hardness
and dimensions
Oxygen umbilical
hose on astronaut life
support assembly
failed.
Mechanism of failure determined to be soft
tubing and an oversized hole in attaching nut,
the combination permitting extrusion of tubing
flare through nut creating a galledcondition.
IDENTIFICA-
TION DEVICES
AND METHODS
411
KSC.69-01
CRACKED STAMP
CAPS
Improper O.D.
dimensions: of
holder
Cracked stamp caps,
which contain the ink
pads, impaired the
use of inspection
stamps.
Problem was caused by the holders which had
not been tumbled to meet proper O.D.
dimensions.
INSTRUMENTS
AND CONTROLS
428
KSC 4-25-66
LEAK
Lack of seal
Bourdon tube tip
leaked after one year
service.
Failure analysis revealed: (I) Steel ball
which serves as seal and heat sink for braze
at tip of Bourdon tube was missing; (2) Highly
porous braze seal.
INSTRUMENTS
AND CONTROLS
428
C6-70.01
OPEN
Broken coil lead
Alpha/numeric
magnetic indicator
failure.
Failure was caused by breakage of the
common coil lead at the solder connection to
the terminal. The lead had insufficient stress
relief.
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MISCELLANEOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
ALERT
PROBLEM AREA/
Caule
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
LIGHT
SOURCES,
ELECTRICAL
461.
FH-71.01o 01A
INTERMI'FrENT
OPERATION
Improper swaging
Terminal produces
loose.tooth effect
resulting in
"intermittent operation.
Investigation revealed intermittent operation
resulted from improper swaging.
LIGHT
SOURCES.
ELECTRICAL
461
FH-72-01. 01A
OUT OF
SPECIFICATION
Inadequate
processes and
quality control.
Manufacturing
discrepancies
precluded use of
lamps.
Failure analysis revealed: (I) Varying amount
of solder on contact bases, (2) Lamps too
short to make proper contact in all light
assemblies, and (3) MS2._237 does not
specifically control minimum dimensions for
over-all length of bulb.
LIGHT
SOURCES,
ELECTRICAL
461
FH-A-72-02
MECHANICAL
ANOMALY
Incorrect terminal
identification
Terminals incorrectly
identified; i.e., No. I
"Line" terminal
shouM be No. 2
"Ground".
Terminal No. I is grounded to frame (hood),
presenting an arcing possibility which could
create a personnel as well as a fire and
explosion hazard.
LUBRICANTS
484
MSC II-1-66
EXPLOSION
HAZARD
Incompatibility of
materials
Aluminum parts have
been lubricated with
halogenated
hydrocarbon oils and
_eases.
Chlorfluorocarbon oils and greases, and other
halogenated hydrocarbon lubricants can ignite
explosively under conditions of hi-shear
involving aluminum. Fluorosilicone based
lubricants can .be used with aluminum without
any known hazards.
LUBRICANTS
484
MSFC-68-11
SENSITIVITY
VARIATION
Incompatibility of
materials
Lubricant exhibited
variation in its
sensitivity to contact
with LOX.
Problem was caused by a change in the
formdlation (Teflon base to fluorinated
silicone).
LUBRICANTS
484
MSFC-71.18
BEARING FAILURE
Incompatibility of
materials
A bearing failed due
to galling.
After manufacture, bearing was lubricated with
a dry lubricant and silicone oil applied over
the dry lubricant for general corrosion
protection. The oil is not compatible with dry
film lubricants.
MECHANISMS,
POWER
TRANSMITTAL
511
KSC.70.12
FAILURE OF
CABLE
Improper swaging
Hoist cable (carrying
valid inspection
stickers) came loose
from drum, allowing
load to fall.
Investigation indicated ball end (MS20664) had
never been swaged to the cable end to retain
the cable to the drum. Cable was evidently
held in place in the cable boss by a set-screw
until failure occurred.
MOTORS AND
MOTOR
GENERATORS
532
LeRC_7-33
NOISY OPERATION
Improper assembly
Motor in Centaur
timer package
exhibited noisy
operation.
Failure analysis disclosed improperly installed
output shaft thrust bearing assemblies (parts
interchanged). Many units did not meet the
required 0.001 inch minimum clearance
between-thrust plate and shaft.
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MISCELLANEOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
GIDEP CODi_/
ALERT NO."
PROBLEM AREA/
Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
POWER .
SUPPLIES
562
Bg-A-72-OI
LOW OUTPUT
VOLTAGE
Incorrect internal
wiring
Output voltage was
low at rated load.
Investigation revealed one capacitor was not
wired, and two capacitors were interchanged.
POWER
SUPPLIES
562
MSFC-A-72-10
POLARITY
REVERSAL
Source voltage
interruption
Power supply output
reversed polarity
causing failure of
other components.
Investigation revealed that the inherent design
of the power supply caused output polarity
reversal whenever the source voltage was
interrupted.
POWER
SUPPLIES
562
GSFC-A-?2-OI.
GSFC.A-72-03
PADDLE FAILURE
Insufficient solder
at tab.cell joint
Solar array paddle
showed 200 lifted
tabs after two-cycle
thermal acceptance
test.
Cause was tentatively identified as having less
than 50 percent solder fillet visible on 60 to 70
percent of the tabs on each paddle.
POWER
SUPPLIES
562
GSFC.72-05
POWER SUPPLY
FAILED
Malfunction of
overvoitage
protection circuit
Power supplies failed
as a result of a
malfunctioning
overvoltage- protection
circuit.
Three failures were characterized by
intermittent loss of output voltage which later
restored itself. Four of the failures caused
the output voltage to pulsate with some
periodicity.
PUMPS AND
H YDRAULIC
MOTORS
575
KSC.70-02, 02A
BEARINGS FAILED
Insufficient
lubrication
A LOX pump failed
during vehicle
countdown
demonstration test.
Failure of the pump thrust and radial bearings
was caused by insufficient lubrication. The oil
level was maintained too low because of an
improperly placed "full" mark.
REGULATORS,
FLUID
597
MSFC-70-O8
OUT OF
SPECIFICATION
Undersize weld
joints
Welds joining inlet
and outlet
connections to
regulator body were
undersize.
Measurement of the welds did not meet
minimum requirements established by the
manufacturer and do not provide the required
4 to I burst protection.
REGULATORS,
FLUID
597
KSC-69-02. 02A
EXCESSIVE
LEAKAGE
Hard and brittle
O-rings
Leakage was detected
when the regulator
was pressurized to
3000 psig.
Examination revealed that the adapter O-ring
was grossly extruded and had lost all of its
resiliency. Amber colored rings (a polyester
type polyurethane) take on a hard set, become
brittle, and chip. Black colored rings (a
Buna-N formulation) lose their elasticity° turn
putty-like, and often disintegrate.
REGULATORS,
FLUID
597
KSC-69-14,
14A, 14B. 14C
FLASH FIRE
Incompatibility of
materials
Flash fire occurred in
the high pressure side
of an oxygen type
resuscitator.
Cause was attributed to oxygen incompatible
materials such as 6/6 nylon, Buna-N O-rings,
neoprene seats, and cotton thread.
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MISCELLAN EOUS
MAJOR
CLASS;
OIDEP COD_/ PROBLEM AREA/
ALERT NO." Cause
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION PROBLEM ANALYSIS
TUBING. METAL DAMAGE Extensive metal
CASINGS. AND Intergranular damage occurred on
SLEEVING corrosion the OD of aluminum
921 tubing.
MSC-68-08
Damage was due to intergranular corrosion and
bare spots in the blue anodic coating. Bare
spots were caused by improper manufacturing
process, lntergranuiar corrosion was due to
packaging procedures.
TUBING, INSUFFICIENT
CASINGS AND HARDNESS
SLEEVING Improper
921 processing
MSFC-71-08
A286 stainless steel
sleeves did not meet
Rockwell range of
C36-C45 hardness.
The cause of this deficiency was attributed to
improperly processed raw material.
TUBING, IMPROPER Stains and pits up to
CASINGS AND PROCESSING 0.007 inches found on
SLEEVING Stains and pitting inside surface of
921 stainless steel tubing.
MSFC-71-20, 20A
Investigation revealed that this condition was
caused by inadequate control of pickling,
rinsing, and/or drying procedures during
manufacture.
WAVEGUIDE HIGH Coaxial line
AND ATTENUATION attenuators with BNC
MICROWAVE AND VSWR connector showed
COMPONENTS .Intermittent contact greater attenuation
941 than marked and high
E9.69-09, 09A VSWR.
Investigation disclosed intermittent contact
between the body of the assembly and the
connector. Expoxy, used to hold the
connector in contact with the shell of the
coaxial return cylinder, insulates parts from
each other.
NOTE:
i. Where no ALERT number iGIDEP) exists, the originator and date are shown.
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APPENDIX A
A-]

PROBLEM CODE,
AREA CAUSE
I
A
B
C
D
E
n
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
III
A
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
B
1
2
3
4
5
6
C
1
2
3
4
D
1
IV
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
PROBLEM CODES AND DEFI_.'ITIONS
DE FINITION
OPEN (low capacitance and in-spec dc leakage)
Lead Separation
. Discontinuous Plates.
Termination Metallization Separation
No Contact With Plates
Inadequate Cathode Connection
SHORT (extremely high dc leakage/low insulation resistance)
Conductive Material Bridging Dielectric (internal)
Conductive Material, External (e.g., silver)
Deformed Plates (nonuniform thickness)
Breakdown of Dielectric
Nonuniform Structure of Anode Slug
Loss of Hermettctty
Internal Conductive Bridging Under Vibration
Inadequate Capability for Thermal Expansion of Electrolyte
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION (high or low)
Capacitance
Lead termination problems
Dielectric materi. -_ rocessing, uncontrolled
Dielectric thickness variation
Low plate area
Cracked plates
Deformed plates
Nonuniform plate st_king
Nonuniform structure of anode slug
DC Leakage/Insulation Resistance
Cracked plates
Conductive material bridging dielectric (internal)
Conductive material (external)
Deformed plates
Breakdown of dielectric
Nonuniform plate stacking
Dissipation Factor/Equivalent Series Resistance
Lead termination problems
Internal metal bonding poor
Metal plate discontinuities
Nonuniform structure of anode slug
Temperature Coefficient of Capacitance
Dielectric materials/processing uncontrolled
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY
Poor lead plating
Case dimensions
Lead spacing
Encapsulant on leads
Damaged leads
Cracked case
Salt on outer seal surface
Defective hermetic seal
Improper marking
E]E
Figure 3.12. Problem Codes and Definitions
This foldout table is requires for use with Figures 3-2 (p 3-16), 3-3 (p 3-18),
3-6 (Io3-26), .3-7 (p 3-27), 3-8 (Io3-29), 3-i0 (p 3-34), and 3-Ii (Io3-36).
. -
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This foldout table is required for use with Figure 4-2 (p 4-11).
PROBLEM CODES AND DEFINITIONS
PROBLEM CODE
AREA
II
III
IV
CAUSE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
A
1
B
I
2
C
1
D
1
E
1
F
1
A
B
.C
D
E
F
G
H
DEFINITIONS
OPEN (including increased resistance)
Defective-Component
Incorrect Part Used
Contamination
Installation Procedure
Missing Part
Inadequate Design
Incorrect Part Dimensions
Process Out of Control
SHORT
Contamination (including moisture)
Broken Part
ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION
Loss of Hermeticity
Bond failure
Low Retention Force
Defective component
Manufacturer testing
Excessive Mating Force
Process out of control
Polarity Reversal
Specification error
Connector Comes Apart
Inadequate design
Excessive RF Leakage
Inadequate design
MECHANICAL DAMAGE
Corrosion
Incorrect Part Dimension
Chemical Attack
Inadequate Design
Process Out of Control -
Cracked, Bent, or Broken Components
Installation Methods
Broken Leads
Z
Z
Figure 4-3. Problem Codes and Definitions
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This foldout table is required for use with Figures 6-2 (to 6-12, 6-13) and
6-3 (p 6-15) ..... _ _ .
PROBLEM CODES AND DEFINITIONS
PROBLEM CODE
AREA
II
.HI
IV
CAUSE
A
B
C
D
E
F
O
H
A
B
C
D
E
F
A
1
2
5
6
B
1
2
3
4
C
DEFINITION
OPEN including increased resistance)
Deformed. Contacts
Loose or Broken Contacts, or Bre,'fl< in Element
Termination Separation
Contamination (film or particulate)
Contact, Element or Terminal Corrosion
Cracked Substrate
Improper Positioning of Parts
Latching Difficulty
SHORT (includinginterrnittents)
Conductive Contamination
Misrouted Internal Leads
Deformed Contacts
Loose or Broken Conductive Parts
External or InternalConductive Bridging
Design Deficiency
PARAMETER DEVIATION
Operating and Release Force Anomalies- Electrical
Operation
Mechanical misalignment
Contamination (filmor particulate)
Loose or defective component parts
Excessive contact wear, contact, element or
terminal corrosion
Inabilityto latch
Undesirable tripping
Operating Displacement (plunger or activating
mechanism travel)
Contamination {film or particulate)
Inadequate heat treatment
Loose or defective parts
Excessive contact corrosion
Cracked Substrate
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Poor Terminal Plating
Case Dimensions
Termination Spacing .....
Encapsulant on Terminals
Damaged or Loose Terminals
Cracked or Damaged Case
Defective IIermetic Seal
Cracked Terminal Beads (on hermetic devices)
Contamination
t.a..i
L.--
Figure 6-4. Problem Codes and Definitions
- A-7
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This foldout table is required for use with Figures 10-2 (p 10-16, 10-17),
10-3 (p 10-19), and 10-4 (p 10-24!.
PROBLEM coDEs AND DEFINITIONS
PROBLEM CODE
AREA
II
HI
IV
CAUSE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
DE FINITION
FAILURE OF CONTACTS TO MAKE OR BREAK
Contamination
Armature Binding
Open Coil Winding
Shorted Coil Winding
Deformed Parts
Fractured Actuator Arm
Improper Armature/Pole Alignment
Oversize/Undersize Parts
Fused Contacts
Thermal Stress
SHORT
Contamination
Fused Contacts
Shorted Terminals
Shorted Coil
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION
Contamination
Defective Insulation
Incorrect Contact Gap
Improper Lead Positioning
Contact Pressure
Organic Cutgassed Products
Plated Contact Surface Defects
Improper Backfill (too dry, or contaminated)
Friction on Armature
Loss of Mercury
MECHANICAL ANOMALY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Cracked Terminal Leads
Cracked Glass Beads in Header or Body
Dents in Case
Poor Terminal Plating
Improper Tolerances
Resonant Points (enclosure, contacts)
Contact Overtravel
Insufficient Actuator Bead Gap
Improper Mounting
L,-m
Figure 10-5. Problem Codes and Definifions
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This foldout table is required for use with Figures 11-5 (p 11-22), 11-6 (p 11-23),
11-7 (p11-24), 11-8 (p11-25), and 11-9 (p 11-27, 11-28).
J
PROBLEM CODE
AREA CAUSE
I
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
II
A
B
C
III
A
1
2
3
4
5
B
1
2
3
IV
A
B
C
D
E
PROBLEM CODES AND DEFINITIONS
DEFINITION
OPEN
Broken Resistive Element
Fractured Ceramic Substrate
Contamination
Inadequate Wiper Contact (for variable resistors)
Lead Separation
Galvanic Corrosion
Corona Discharge
Metal Termination Separation
Cracked or Broken Tabs
SHORT
Bridging of Element Turns
Corona Discharge
Contamination
ELECTRICAL PARAMETER DEVIATION
Out of Tolerance (Increase)
Contamination
Loss of hermetlcity
Inadequate fitof metal cap
Loss of element cross section
Excessive electricalnoise
Out of Tolerance (decrease)
Reduction of element oxides
Electrostatic charge
Faulty wire insulation
MECHANICAL ANOMALY
Poor Epoxy Bonds
Poor Lead Plating
Case Dimensions
Damaged Leads
Cracked Case
m
W
Figure 11.10. Problem Codes and Definlflons
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This foldout table is required for use with Figures 12-2 (I0 12-15), 12-3 (p 12-17),
12-5 (p 12-23), and 12-6 (p 12-25).
PROBLEM CODES AND DEFINITIONS
PROBLEM CODE
AREA
H
m
IV
CAUSE
A
B
C
D
E
F
A
B
C
D
A
1
2
3
4
5
B
1
2
3
4:
DEFINITION
OPEN (including increased resistance)
Deformed Contacts
Loose or Broken Contacts
Termination Separation
Contamination (film or particulate)
Contact Corrosion
Insufficient Contact Pressure
SHORT (including intermlttents)
Conductive Contamination
Misrouted Internal Leads
Deformed Contacts
Loose or Broken Conductive Parts
PARAMETER DEVIATION
Operating and Release Force Anomalies
Mechanical misalignment
Cont_on
Loose or defectivecomponent parts
Excessive contact corrosion or wear
SUcking
Operating Displacement (plunger or activating
mechanism travel)
Contamination
Inadequate heat treatment
Loose or defective parts
Excessive contact corrosion or wear
EXTERNAL MECHANICAL ANOMALY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Poor Terminal Plating
Case Dlmenslons
Termlnatlon Spacing
Encapsulant on Terminals
Damaged or Loose Terminals
Cracked or Damaged Case
Defective Hermetic Seal
Cracked Terminal Beads (on liermetic devices)
G_
m
Figure 12-7. Problem Codes and Deflnlfions
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KEYWORD INDEX
I.I

Attachment of leads: cap 3-15
Avalanche condition: cap 3-19
Balanced armature: rly 10-9
Ball bonding: App B-2, B-11
Ball bonding equipment: App B-11
Ball formation: ' App B-8
Base-emltter voltage: xstr 18-14
Bathtub curve: IC 17-13
Battery heater malfunctfon: btry 2-11
Batteries: 2-1 thru 2-1]
Beam lead bonding: App B-13, B-14
Beam lead devices: App B-2
Bearing failure; LOX pump: misc 15-15
Bearings: mlsc 15-4
Bellows: gskt 7-6
Bent and cracked component: conn 4-18
Beta: xstr 18-14
Beta alloys: matl 8-14
Binding: gskt 7-11, 7-12
Bipolar: xstr 18'3, 18-10, 18-12, 18-14 thru
18-21
Bleed-out, silicon: App B-2
Blowers and fans: misc 15-4
Board, printed wiring: misc 15-4, 15-5
Bolthead failure: fstnr 5-4, 5-9, 5-10
Bond formation: App B-8
Bond reliability: App B-2
Bond size: App. B-12
Bond strength: App B-12
Bonder operation: App B-13
Bonding: App B-2 thru B-17
Bonding epoxies: App B-6
Bonding pressure: App B-10, B-12
Bracketry: valves 13-6
Brazing: attach 1-3 "
Break, spring: misc 15-9
Breakdown of dielectric: cap 3-6, 3-7, 3-9,
3-38 thru 3-40, 3-44
Brittle O-rings: misc 15-15
Broken: wire 14-7
Broken coil lead: misc 15-11
Broken component: corm 4-14
Broken connection: misc (filter) 15-7
Broken filaments: misc (lt sce) 15-12
Broken wire: attach 1-5. 1-8, 1-10; misc
(coil) 15-5
Bulk short: IC 17-7
Bulk wafer: diodes 16-8; xstr 18-9
Burn-in: cap 3-6 thru 3-9, 3-11; diodes 16-6
thru 16-9; IC 17-7, 17-8, 17-12, 17-17. 17-18.
17-25; res 11-5 thru 11-9; xstr 18-7, 18-9,
18-11, 18-12
Burrs: gskt 7-13
Bushings: gskt 7-6
Caromed out recess: fstnr 5-5, 5-6
Canister: ord 9-4. 9-24 "
Cap nuts drop off: misc (audio devices) 15-4
Capacitance: cap 3-6 thru 3-9, 3-12, 3-40,
3-43, 3-44, 3-47
Capacitance drift: cap 3-11
Capacitor fundamentals: cap 3-3
Capacitor types: cap 3-3
Capacitors: 3-1 thru 3-47
Carbon composition resistors: 11-3, 11-12,
11-19, 11-20, 11-25, 11-27, 11-28
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Compressive forces: gskt 7-5
Computer and recording elements: misc 15-5
Conductive bridging: cap 3-28
Conductive film: App B-2
Conductive material: IC 17-8, 17-41, 17-42;
wire 14-5, 14-6
Conductive particles: diodes 16-10
Conductive plates: cap 3-12, 3-13
Conductivity: xstr 18-22
Configuration analysis: conn 4-5
Conformal coating/potting: matl 8-4, 8-5,
8-9 thru 8-13, 8-19, 8-20
Connection: misc (term block) 15-10;
(xdcr) 15-16; (xfmr) 15-16
Connector types: 4-3
Connectors: 4-1 thru 4-18
Construction: cap 3-14, 3-15, 3-22 thru 3-25,
3-32, 3-33; corm 4-7 thru 4-9; diodes 16-12
thru 16-15, 16-25 thru 16-27; fuses 6-10, 6-11;
IC 17-18, 17-19; rly 10-14, 10-15; res 11-13
thru 11-20; sw 12-13 thru 12-15, 12-21 thru
12-23; xstr 18-15 thru 18-17, 18-24, 18-25,
18-33, 18-34
Construction techniques: xstr 18-14 thru 18-16
Contact: res 11-6, 11-7, 11-31, 11-32;
sw 12-3, 12-6, 12-7, 12-18, 12-19, 12-26,
12-27
Contact chatter: rly 10-7
Contact considerations: rly 10-9
Contact contamination: misc (slip ring assy)
15-10
Contact defects: rly 10-6 thru 10-8
Contact desiccants: matl 8-8
Contact gap: fly 10-6
Contact life: fly 10-20
• L.
Contact noise: misc (slip ring assy) 15-10
Contact overtravel: fly 10-7
Contact performance: rly 10-9
Contact pressure: rly 10-7
Contact resistance: rly 10-7, 10-8, 10-28
Contact transfer: rly 10-7
Contaminant transportation media: matl 8-8
Contamination: attach 1-3; btry 2-10; cap 3=5,
3-6, 3-38, 3-40, 3-42, 3-45; conn 4-13 thru
4-17; diodes 16-6, 16-7, 16-9, 16-16, 16-34
thru 16-36; fuses 6-6, 6-17; gskt 7-4, 7-6,
7-11, 7-12; IC 17-14, 17-15, 17-17; misc
(contact) 15"10, (It sce) 15-12, (tubing) 15-16;
fly 10-5 thru 10-8, 10-15, 10-22, 10-25 thru
10-30; res 11-6, 11-7, 11-10, 11-21, 11-26,
11-31 thru 11-33; sw 12-6, 12-7, 12-10,
12-16, 12-24, 12-26, 12-27; xstr 18-7 thru
18-9, 18-13, 18-15, 18-23, 18-32, 18-43,
18-44, 18-46; valves 13-4, 13-9, App B-8
Control equipment: valves 13-6
Controls: IC 17-31
Controller and switch failure: misc (env
sim equip) 15-6
Copper: wi re 14-4, 14-5
Core deterioration: attach 1-5, 1.9
Cordwood construction: attach 1-7
Corona discharge: res 11-6, 11-30, 11-31
Corotron voltage regulator: misc (power
supply) 15-14
Corrosion: btry 2-10; cap 3-28; fstnr 5-4,
5-9; gskt 7-11 thru 7-13; IC 17-5, 17-6,
17-13, 17-40; matl 8-4, 8-6, 8-14, 8-18,
8-22, 8-24; rly 10-8, 10-30; misc (tubing)
15-16; res 11-7, 11-34; sw 12-6, 12-7, 12-8,
12-26; xstr 18-8, 18-19, 18-22, 18-28,
18-67, 18-42, 18-47; valves 13-4, 13-9;
wire 14-7
Corrosive acid formation: •matl 8-6, 8-22
Corrosive monomers: matl 8-8
Cotton clothing: IC 17-37; ord 9-15
Precedingpageblank ,.5

Design compromises: btry 2-4; cap 3-4; corm
4-3; diodes 16-4; fuses 6-4; rly 10-4; res 11-4;
sw 12-4; xstr 18-4
Design considerations: cap 3-13 thru 3-16, 3-19,
3-21 thru 3-27, 3-30 thru 3-34; corm 4-7 thru
4-9; diodes 16-25 thru 16-29; fuses 6-10 thru
6-13; IC 17-8 thru 17-34; rly 10-13 thru 10-17,
10-22; res 11-13 thru 11-25; sw 12-12 thru
12-16, 12-20 thru 12-23; xstr 18-15 thru 18-18,
16-23 thru 18-27, 18-32 thru 18-36
Design criteria: attach meth 1-7
Design inadequate: corm 4-13, 4-15, 4-16;
gskt 7-11, 7-13; IC 17-9, 17-44, 17-47; matl
8-7, 8-24
Design level: cap 3-4; corm 4-3; diodes 16-4;
fuses 6-4; rly 10-4; res 11-4, sw 12-4; xstr
18-4
Destruction: raise (eomp and rec elem) 15-5;
(part test tech) 16-14
Dewpoint: xstr 18-7, 18-45
Die: .IC 17-5, 17-8, 17-40, 17-41; xstr 18-3,
18-7, 18-46
-Die bond shrinkage: diodes 16-6, 16-35
Die bonding: App B-2 thru B-7
Die collet: App B-2
Dielectric: cap 3-3
Dielectric breakdown voltage: cap 3-3
Dielectric constant: cap 3-12
Dielectric cracking/crazing: wire 14-6
Dielectric film: cap 3-19, 3-21, 3-23
Dielectric imperfection: cap 3.19
Dielectric leakage: wire 14-5
Dielectric withstanding voltage: fuses 6-7, 6-8;
sw 12-8, 12-9
Differential expansion/contraction: attach 1-6
Differential pressure: gskt 7-6
Diffraction grating: misc (optical devs) 15-14
Diffusion: IC 17-7, 17-13, 17-14, 17-23,
17-43
Diffusion temperature: xstr 18-3
Diffusion time: xstr 18-3
Dimensions; stamp holder: misc (ID dev and
meth) 15-11
Diode fundamentals: 16-3
Diode sheared: raise (It sce) 15-12
Diode-transistor-logic: IC 17-2, 17-18
thru 17.22, 17-39, 17-45
Diode types: 16-3
Diodes: 16-1 thru 16-36
Disassociation chemical: ord 9-8
Disengaged mounting nut: misc (amp) 15-4
Displacement: sw 12-11
Dissection: cap 3-10, 3-11, 3-17, 3-35;
diodes 16-10, 16-21, 16-30; fuses 6-7;
fly 10-18; res 11-9, 11-11; sw 12-8, 12-16,
12-24; xstr 18-9, 18-19, 18-28, 18-37
Dissipation factor:, cap 3-3, 3-6 thru 3-9,
3-11, 3-40
Distortion: gskt 7-6
Doping: xstr 18-3
Drift: cap 3-19; res 11-12, 11-21
Drive gear: res 11-7, 11-33
Duds: ord 9-4, 9-23
Dumet; oxidation: diodes 16-6, 16-35
Dust caps: misc (hardware) 15-10
Dynamic seals: gskt 7-6
Elastic limit: attach 1-4
Electrical and mechanical characteristics:
sw 12-8, 12-9
Electrical characteristics: matl 8-10;
rly 10-11, 10-21
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Failure modes: btry 2-4; cap 3-4; conn 4-3;
diodes 16-4; fuses 6-4; gskt 7-4. 7-11, 7-12;
IC 17-35; rly 10-3. 10-4; res 11-4; sw 12-4;
xstr 18-4
Failure Of contacts: rly 10-3. 10-5 thru 10-7.
10-25 thru 10-29
Failure records: conn 4-5
Failure to activate: btry 2-10
Failure to start: misc (gyro) 15-9
Failure verification: btry 2-5; cap 3-4;
corm 4-4; diodes 16-4; fuses 6-4; rly 10-4;
res 11-4; sw 12-4; xstr 18-4
Fans: misc 15-4
Fasteners: 5-1 thru 5-10
Fatigue: fstnr 5-6
Faulty anode lead-to-foil welds: cap 3-9, 3-44,
3-45
Ferrule: fuses 6-16
Field-effect transistors: xstr 18-3, 18-10 thru
18-13, 18-22 thru 18-39
Film: App B-13
Filter networks: misc (coils) 15-5
Filters, electrical: misc 15-6, 15-7
Filters, nonelectrical: misc 15-7
Fine leak: IC 17-17
Finished capacitor level: cap 3-4
Finished diode level: diodes 16-4
Finished relay level: fly 10-4
Finished resistor level: res 11-4
Finished switch level: sw 12-4
Finished transistor level: xstr 18-4
Finishes and surface treatments: misc 15-7
Firing circuit: ord 9-17
Fittings: misc (tubing & hose) 15-g
Flammability: matl 8-5, 8-21
Flange requirements: gsk-t 7-5
Flanges: gskt 7-5, 7-14
Flash fire; fluid: misc (fluid reg) 15-15
Flexing at rivet point: misc (blowers & fans)
15-4
Flip chip devices: App B-2
Flow induced vibrations: misc (hose) 15-11
Fluids: misc 15.-8
Fluorolube degradations: matl 8-6, 8-21
Flux redeposit: matl 8-8
Fluxing: wire 14-4
Foreign material: wire 14-4
Formability: matl 8-14
Formation: cap 3-15, 3-25, 3-33
Formation of hydrocarbons: misc (gen tech
data) 15-9
Fracture: gskt 7-5, 7-12; fly 10-6; res 11-5,
11-29
Fracture preclusion: attach 1-4
Fractured bolt head: ord 9-4, 9-23
Free electrons: xstr 18-3
Freon: diodes 16-7, 16-36
Frequency effects: cap 3-3; res 11-3;
xstr 18-14
Frequency limits: sw 12-11, 12-18
Friction on armature: fly 10-7
Fungus nutrient materials: matl 8-6, 8-21
Funnel type swage: attach 1-7
Fuse wire: fuses 6-6, 6-16
Fuseholders: 6-6, 6-16
Fused contacts: rly 10-6
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Hydraulic pressure: cap 3-20
Hydrogen embrittlement: fstnr 5-4, 5-10;
matl 8-15; ord 9-4, 9-23; rly 10-7, 10-28
Hydrofluoric etchant: diodes 16-6, 16-34
Identification: IC 17-11, 17-47
Identification devices and methods: misc 15-11
Ignition: ord 9-4, 9-23
Ignition of wires: wire 14-5
Impact sensitivity; LOX: misc (fluids) 15-8
IMPATT diodes: 16-24
Improper material: marl 8-11
Incompatibility: cap 3-8, 3-43; marl 8-4 thru
8-7, 8-18 thru 8-23; mise (fluids) 15-8, (Een
tech data) 15-9, (lubricants) 15-13, (regulators)
15-15, 15-16, (tank) 15-16; valves 13-4, 13-8,
13-9; wire 14-5
Induced voltage effects: cap 3-3
Inductance: misc (coils) 15-5
Information sources: ord 9-18 thru 9-22
Inert gas shielding: matl 8-15
Initiation: btry 2-10; ord 9-4, 9-16, 9-23
Initiator: ord 9-6, 9-7
In-process control: cap 3-15; mlsc (gyro) 15-9
In-process inspection: cap 3-15
Instability: cap 3-8, 3-42
Installation: corm 4-12, 4-13, 4-17; misc (part
test tech & equip) 15-14; ord 9-16, 9-17
Installation considerations: corm 4-7; .fuses 6-9
Instruments and controls: misc 15-11, 15-12
Insufficient lubrication: misc (pump) 15-15
Insulated gate: xstr 18-22
Insulating dielectric: cap 3-12
Insulation: res 11-8, 11-34
Insulation, defective: rly 10-6
Insulation resistance: cap 3-4, 3-11; fuses 6-7,
6-8; rly 10-6, 10-28; sw 12-8, 12-9; wire 14-6
Integrated circuits: 17-1 thru 17-47
Interaction: matl 8-10
Interconnecting of hybrid: App B-2 thru B-17
Intermetallic compound: attach 1-3
Intermetallics: IC 17-11
Intermittent contact: misc (waveguide &
microwave comp) 15-17, (It sce) 15-12;
sw 12-4, 12-11
Internal cleanliness control: rly 10-11
Internal lead: diodes 16-8
Internal socket recesses: fstnr 5-6
Internal wrenching element: fstnr 5-6
Inventory records: ord 9-16
Inversion channeling: xstr 18-10
Irradiation: matl 8-5, 8-21
Jack: corm 4-17
Junction diodes: 16-3
Junction field effect transistor: 18-31 thru
18-39
Junction temperature: xstr 18-11
LOX: matl 8-7, 8-23
Labryinths: gskt 7-6
Latch-up: IC 17-10
Latching difficulty: fuses 6-6, 6-17
Lead arcing: misc (elect tube) 15-6
Lead attachment: cap 3-5 thru 3-9, 3-37, 3-39,
3-41, 3-43 thru 3-45
Lead azide: ord 9-4, 9-23
Lead bond: cap 3-5 thru 3-9, 3-37, 3-39, 3--41,
3-43 thru 3-45; diodes 16-9, 16-16
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Metallic materials: matl 8-7, 8-23, 8-24.
Metallization: diodes 16-9; IC 17-8, 17-7,
17-10, 17-13 thru 17-16, 17-17, 17-41; xstr
18-7, 18-9, 18-42, 18-43
Mica: cap 3-9, 3-44
Microcracks: IC 17-5, 17-39
Military Spec, Std, and Tech Orders: ord 9-20
Minimum distance: ord 9-13, 9-14
Misapplication: diodes 16-5; gskt 7-11;
xstr 18-6, 18-19, 18-28
Miscellaneous: 15-1 thru 15-17
Mismounting: sw 12-11
Miss test: rly 10-11
Missing parts: conn 4-13
Moisture: xstr 18-7, 18-15., 18-23, 18-45
Molecular flow: gskt 7-4, 7-11
Monitoring: valves 13-7
MonoLithic: IC 17-13
MOS, assembly: IC 17-37, 17-38
MOS, design: IC 17-38
MOS devices, handling: IC 17-37, 17-38
MOS, moving: IC 17-37
MOS, receiving inspection: IC 17-37
MOS, storage: IC 17-37
MOS, test: IC 17-38
Motor control: valves 13-6
Motors and motor generators: misc 15-13
Moulded/dipped epoxy case: cap 3-11
Mounting: fly 10-7
Multitorque recess: fstnr 5-6
Multiconductor: wire 14-6
Multilayer board: attach 1-7
Mylar foil: cap 3-9, 3-44
Nickel-cedmium batteries: 2-6, 2-10
Nickel-chromium: wire 14-7
Noisy and fluctuating voltage: misc (pwr sup)
15-14
Noisy operation: misc (motor) 15-13
Nondestructive evaluation: cap 3-28
Nonhomogenous anode: cap 3-25
Nonhomogenous structure: cap 3-25
NonmetaUlc material: matl 8-5, 8-6, 8-21
thru 8-23
Nontriggering: IC 17-10, 17-45
Notch sensitivity: matl 8-7, 8-23
Nut failure: fstnr 5-4, 5-9
Nut fracture: fstnr 6-4, 5-9
Nut support bracket failure: fstnr 5-4, 5-9
O-ring: gskt 7-5; valves 13-4, 13-9
Opaque glass case: cap 3-11
Open: btry 2-6, 2-7; cap 3-4, 3-5 thru 3-9,
3-37, 3-39, 3-41; corm 4-10, 4-12, 4-13,
4-16 thru 4-18; diodes 16-4 thru 16-7, 16-33,
16-34, 16-36; fuses 6-5, 6-6, 6-16, 6-17;
IC 17-4 thru 17-7, 17-39 thru 17-41; raise
(coil) 15-5, (filter)15-6, 15-7, (hardware)
15-10, (inst & cont) 15-11, (term block) 15-16,
(xfrmr) 15-16; rly 10-8, 10-30; res 11-4 thru
11-7, 11-29, 11-31 thru 11-35; sw 12-4 thru
12-7, 12-26; xstr 18-4, 18-6, 18-7, 18-40
thru 18-43
Opening techniques: rly 10-18, 10-23
Operate voltage: rly 10-7
Operating forces: sw 12-3, 12-8, 12-11
Operation: rly 10-20
Operational degradation: btry 2-6, 2-7; IC
17-4, 17-9 thru 17-11, 17-44 thru 17-46
Operattonal frequency: sw 12-11
Optical microscope: IC 17-13
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Potting material, soft: matl 8-4, 8-19
Potting softens with age: marl 8-4, 8-19 •
Powder mixing: cap 3-15, 3-25
Power density: ord 9-13
Power factor: cap 3-11
Power supplies: 15-14, 15-15
Pozi-Drive recess: fstnr 5-6
Practical considerations: btry 2-4; cap 3-3;
diodes 16-3; fuses 6-3; rly 10-3; res 11-3;
sw 12-3, 12-4; xstr 18-3, 18-4
Preanalysis investigation: fuses 6-14
Precap visual inspection: IC 17'5 thru 1711;
rly 10-8; sw 12-24
Predominant failures: cap 3-17, 3-28, 3-35;
corm 4-10; diodes 16-21, 16-30; fuses 6-14;
gskt 7-4, 7-11, 7-12; IC 17-35; fly 10-18,
10-23; res 11-26; sw 16-16, 16-24"; xstr 18-19,
18-28, 18-37
Primers: matl 8-9
Printed circuit card assemblies: misc (part
test tech) 15-14
Problem areas: cap 3-5; diodes 16-5; fuses
6-5; IC 17-4; rel 10-5; res 11-5; sw 12-6;
xstr 18-6
Problem area/cause: attach 1-5; btry 2-6;
cap 3-5 thru 3-9; corm 4-12 thru 4-18; diodes
16-6, 16-7; fstnr 5-4; fuses 6-6; gskt 7-11,
7-12; IC 17-5 thru 17-12; matl 8-4 thru 8-7;
ord 9-4, 9-5; rel 10-6 thru 10-8; res 11-5
thru 11-8; sw 12-7; xstr 18-7, 18-8; valves
13-4, 13-5; wire 14-4 thru 14-7
Problem screening summary: bat 2-6; cap
3-5; diodes 16-5; fuses 6-5; IC 17-4; rel
10-5; res 11-5; sw 12-6; xstr 18-6
Problem solving: btry 2-4; cap 3-4; corm 4-3;
diodes 16-4; fuses 6-4; rel 10-4; res 11-4:
sw 12-4; xstr 18-4
Process: valves 13-4, 13-8; wire 14-4
Process control: attach 1-3; btry 2-6; corm
4-14 thru 4-18; fstnr 5-4; IC 17-9; matl 8-4
thru 8-6, 8-11; ord 9-4; valves 13-4; wire
14-4, 14-7
Process variables: matl 8-5, 8-21
Processing: cap 3-15, 3-25, 3-33; misc (tubing)
15-17
Production considerations: cap 3-13 thru 3-16,
3-19, 3-21 thru 3-27, 3-30 thru 3-34; corm 4-7
thru 4-9; diodes 16-25 thru 16-29; fuses 6-10
thru 6-13; IC 17-9 thru 17-35; rly 10-13 thru
10-17, 10-22; res 11-13 thru 11-25; sw 12-12
thru 12-15; 12-20 thru 12-23; xstr 18-15 thru
18-18, 18-23 thru 18-27, 18-32 thru 18-36
Propellants: ord 9-16
Propulsiou: ord 9-1 thru 9-24
Pumps and hydraulic motors: misc 15-15
Pyroceram: IC 17-46
Pyrolytic conversion: cap 3-19
Pyrophoric reaction: matl 8-14
Pyrotechnics: ord 9-1 thru 9-24
Qualification: gskt 7-7
Quality control: fstnr 5-5; res 11-12
Quick release pin: misc (hardware) 15-11
RF connectors: 4-6 thru 4-11
RF shields: ord 9-15
Radar: ord 9-13 thru 9-15
Radar transmitters: ord 9-14, 9-15
Radial fracture: attach 1-4
Radiation damage: matl 8-5, 8-21
Radio: ord 9-13, 9-14
Radio frequency: ord 9-13
Radiographic inspection: cap 3-7, 3-11; diodes
16-6, 16-7, 16-10; fuses 6-6, 6-8; IC 17-5,
17-8 thru 17-11, 17-17; rel 10-8; res 11-5,
11-10; sw 12-7, 12-10; xstr 18-7, 18-13
Reaction products/residues: wire 14-4
Recess: fstnr 5-6
ReceSs systems: fstnr 5-6
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Seals, dynamic: gskt 7-6
Seals, failures: gskt 7-4, 7-11 thru 7-13
Seals, static: gskt 7-6
Seat erosion: raise (fluid reg) 15-16
Secondary. breakdown: xstr 18-7, 18-46
Securing: misc (audio dev) 15-4
Seizure: gskt 7-12
Self-healing: cap 3-19
Sensitivity: IC 17-10
Sensitivity variations: raise (lubricants) 15-13
Sensistor: res 11-8, 11-35
Separation material: btry 2-11
Separation nut: ord 9-7
Separation system: ord 9-7
Series resistance: cap 3-8, 3-42
Shaft, canted: res 11-7. 11-32
Shock: fuses 6-17; ord 9-12
Shock level: IC 17-15
Short: btry 2-6, 2-11; cap 3-5 thru 3-9, 3-37,
3-38, 3-40, 3-42 thru 3-45; corm 4-14, 4-16,
4-17; diodes 16-6, 16-7, 16-34 thru 16-36;
fuses 6-6, 6-16; IC 17-7 thru 17-9; misc (inst
& cont) 15-12, (It sce) 15-12, (timers & prog)
15-16; rly 10-6, 10-27, 10-28; res 11-6, 11-7,
11-29, 11-30, 11-32; sw 12-7, 12-26, 12-27;
xstr 18-7, 18-43, 18-44
Short-time overload: res 11-5 thru 11-10,
11-21
Short to ease: raise (filter)15-6, (seq timer)
15-16
Shorting plug: ord 9-15
Significant variable: xstr 18-23
Silicon aluminum wire: App B-17
Silicon bleed-out: App B-4
Silicon controlled rectifiers: diodes 16-7,
16-36
Silicon planar epitaxial: IC 17-23
Silicone rubbers: marl 8-11, 8-12
Silver migration: res 11-6, 11-29
Silver/sllvar coated: wire 14-5
Silver whisker: matl 8-5, 8-21
Silver-zinc batteries: 2-3, 2-4, 2-7 thru 2-11
Sintered anode: cap 3-19, 3-20, 3-25, 3-28
Slx-Cess recess: fstnr 5-6
Sleeves: misc (fittings) 15-8
Slip rings: misc (hardware) 15-10
Slurry: cap 3-15
Smoking and eutgassing: fstnr 5-5
Solar cell, tab corm: misc (pwr sup) 15-14
Solder: raise (filters) 15-6, 15-7; res 11-6,
11-7, 11-32, 11-34; xstr 18-7, 18-41
'Solder bonds: cap 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 3-37, 3-40,
3-42
Solder connections: attach 1-5 thru 1-7, 1-9
•Solder reflow: ca_p 3-5, 3-37
Solder shelf life: attach 1-5, 1-9
SolderabiUty: wire 14-4
Soldering: attach 1-3, 1-5 thru 1-7, 1-9
Solenoid failure: valves 13-4, 13-5, 13-8
thru 13-10
Solenoid malfunction: valves 13-4, 13-10
Solenoid valve inoperative: valves 13-4, 13-8
Solenoid valves: 13-6
Solid tantalum: cap 3-3, 3-6, 3-7, 3-19 thru
3-22, 3-25, 3-26, 3-28, 3-29, 3-39, 3-40
Solute removal: marl 8-8
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Tantalum powders: cap 3-25
Tantalum riser: cap 3-7, 3-20, 3-41
Tantalum slug: cap 3-19
• .: i e
Tap test: res 11-5, 11-9, 11-10
Tape durability: misc (comp & rec elem) 15-5
Tape, magnetic: raise 15-5
Tape reels: mlsc 15-5
Teflon shrinkage: matl 8-5, 8-21
Television: ord. 9-13
Temperature: matl 8-4, 8-5, 8-19, 8-20, 8-23;
ord 9-8 thru 9-11
Temperature chambers: IC 17-14; misc (env
sire equip) 15-6
Temperature coefficient: cap 3-3, 3-6, 3-10
Temperature controlled baths: IC 17-14
Temperature cycling: cap 3-6 th_ 3-10;
diodes 16-9; fuses 6-7; IC 17-5, 17-7, 17-9,
17-14, 17-15; fly 10-6 thru 10-8, 10-11; res
11-5 thru 11-9; sw 12-7, 12-8; XStT 18-10
Temperature effects: cap 3-12; fuses 6-9;
rly 10-9; res 11-12; xstr 18-14, 18-31
Temperature limits: sw 12-18
Temperature measurement: btry 2-8, 2-9;
sw 12-8, 12-9
Temperature requirements: App B-4, B-8
Temperature variations: IC 17-14
Tensile strength: marl 8-14; wire 14-7
Terminal barrel: attach 1-5, 1-10
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
blocks: misc (hardware) 15-10
leads cracked: rly 10-7
plating: fly 10-7
rotating: rly 10-7
shorted: rly 10-6, 10-28
strength: fuses 6-7, 6-8
Terminal swaging: misc (prtd wir bd) 15-4
Terminal twist test: res 11-7
Termination end silvering: cap 3-15
Termination: App B-10, B-12
Termination metallization separation: cap 3-6,
3-39
Testing: misc (accel) 15-4; ord 9-16
Thermal compression ball bonding: App B®2
Thermal compression bonding: App B-8
Thermal conductivity: matl 8-14
Thermal expansion/contraction: gskt 7-6
Thermal expansion mismatches: sw 12-11
Thermal fatigue: attach 1-4 thru 1-6, 1-9
Thermal limits: matl 8-8
Thermal shock: IC 17-5, 17-14; raise'(It sce]
15-12
Thermal stability: sw 1_-3
Thermal stress: attach 1-4 thru 1-6, 1-9;
cap 3-28; rly 10-7, 10-28
Thermal time delay: rly 10-8, 10-29
Thermal variations: attach 1-6
Thermally induced: attach 1-3
Thermally induced breakdown: matl 8-8
Thermostat: btry 2-11
Thermostatic snap-action switches: 12-18
thru 12-25
Time delay: rly 10-8, 10-29, 10-30
Timers and programmers: misc 15-16
Tin coating: wire 14-4
Tin whisker: xstr 18-7, 18-44
Tinning: cap 3-15
Titanium: matl 8-7, 8-14, 8-15, 8-23, 8-24
o
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Voltage stress: cap 3-12
Wafer: xstr 18-11
Wandering threshold: xstr 18-10
Waveguide and microwave components: misc
15-17
Weld: diodes 16-6, 16-34; misc (coil) 15-5;
fly 10-7; res 11-7, 11-8, 11-34, 11-35
Weldability: matl 8-14
Welding: attach 1-3; matl 8-15
Wet-electrolytic: cap 3-11
Wet-slug tantalum: cap 3-3, 3-7, 3-19, 3-20,
3-25, 3-28, 3-41
Wire: 14-1 thru 14-7
Wire bonding: App B-8 thru B-12
Wire bonding equipment: App B-9
Wirewound: res 11-3, 11-7, 11-8, 11-21,
11-33, 11-34
Wirewrap: attach 1-4
Wobble bonding: App B-13
Workstage: App B-3
Wrong axis installation: misc (gyro) 15-9
•Zener diodes: 16-3, 16-6, 16-11, 16-16,
16-21, 16-34, 16-35
_J.S. GOVERNMENT PRiNTiNG OFFICE: 1973-739-153/46 Precedingpageblank 1-21

